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I.

INTRODUCTION'

In a state with a small number of lawyers, avoiding conflicts of interest
is difficult, at best. It is well worth the effort, however, as the potential adverse ethical and legal consequences can be significant. While a lawyer
may think that conflicts can be avoided by limiting his or her practice to a
certain area or areas, avoiding conflicts is impossible. Conflicts arise in all
types of law practice and in all settings. The question, therefore, is not if
conflicts will arise, but when; and when they do, how should the lawyer
handle them to avoid ethical and/or legal problems?
Not all conflicts of interest preclude representation. The keys for lawyers are to: (1) timely identify potential and/or actual conflicts; (2) properly
evaluate them to determine if and under what circumstances disclosure is
appropriate and whether a waiver of the conflict is permissible; (3) follow
the proper procedures and standards in obtaining a waiver if a waiver is
permissible; and (4) follow the proper procedure for declining or terminating representation if waiver is not permissible or the client or other party
chooses not to waive the conflict.
This article sets out the general standards which apply to conflicts of
interest, addresses common situations which present actual or potential conflicts of interest, and contains the procedures and standards which should be
followed in handling such conflicts. It is intended to provide guidance to
Wyoming lawyers in identifying, properly handling, and avoiding impermissible conflicts and potential conflicts of interest.
II.

GENERAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST STANDARDS

An attorney must represent every client zealously.2 Loyalty to the client, therefore, is the touchstone of the attorney-client relationship. The obligation of loyalty is grounded in the law of agency, which applies since a
lawyer is an agent for each of his or her clients.' Agents owe their princi-

I. This article is based, in part, on a series of articles which appeared in the Wyoming Lawyer. See
John M. Burman, Conflicts of Interest: General Standards,WYOMING LAWYER, Dec. 1996, at 16; John
M. Burman, Conflicts of Interest:Attorney Disqualification,WYOMING LAWYER, Feb. 1997, at 13; John
M. Burman, Conflicts of Interest in CriminalDefense. WYOMING LAWYER, April 1997, at 13; John M.
Burman, Conflicts of Interest When a Lawyer Switches Firms, WYOMING LAWYER, June 1997, at 12;
John M. Burman, Conflicts of Interest When a Lawyer Switches Firms: Legal Issues, WYOMING

LAWYER, Aug. 1997, at 12; John M. Burman, Support Staff Conflicts of Interest, WYOMING LAWYER,
Oct. 1997, at 12; John M. Burman, Conflicts of Interest: Business Transactions with Clients. WYOMING
LAWYER, Oct. 1998, at 13; John M. Burman, Conflicts of Interest: Third Party Payers, WYOMING

LAWYER, Dec. 1998, at 12.
2. Brooks v. Zebre, 792 P.2d 196, 200 (Wyo. 1990). See also Clark v. Alexander, 953 P.2d 145,
153 (Wyo. 1998) (The duty of zealous representation is "modified" when an attorney acts as a guardian
ad litem.).
3. See, e.g., CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 4.1 (A lawyer is a "fiduciary
agent" for the lawyer's clients.).
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pals an unwavering duty of loyalty,, including fiduciary' and confidentiality6
obligations. As both an agent and a fiduciary, a lawyer must subordinate his
or her interests to the client's. Accordingly, except in those rare instances
where a lawyer's duties to the court7 or the lawyer's duty to an innocent
third party' override the duty to the client, a lawyer's obligation to the client
is paramount. Anything which threatens an attorney's loyalty or a client's
confidentiality is, therefore, a conflict of interest, or at least a potential conflict of interest. Any actual or potential conflict of interest must be detected,
properly evaluated, and properly handled to avoid ethical and/or malpractice
problems.
Ethical Standards
1.

Sources of conflicts

Conflicts emerge from at least three different sources.! First, the interests of clients, whether former, current, or prospective, may diverge. Second, the interests of a non-client third party may conflict with those of a
client. Third, the lawyer's own interests, or those of an employee of the
lawyer's, may be inconsistent with those of a client or prospective clients.
Client-client conflicts are often obvious. When one client wishes to
sue another, or when one client wishes to purchase property from another,
for example, the divergence of interests is plain. It is less obvious, however,
when two clients have interests which appear to be congruent. Co-parties to
litigation, for example, may well have some common interests, but the potential for diverging interests is always present. Lawyers must be alert,
therefore, to potential conflicts, not just existing ones. The interests of a
prospective client may conflict with those of a current or former client, and
that conflict, too, must be identified and properly handled.
The interests of non-parties may also be significant. Third-party payers, such as insurance companies, employers, or parents, may have objectives which differ from the represented party's. Also, the lawyer may feel
obligations to other third parties, such as family members or friends, who
may be affected by the lawyer's representation of a particular client.

4. RESTATEMENT
cipal").

(SECOND) OF AGENCY §

39 (1958) ("Agent "must act for the benefit of the prin-

5. Id. at § 13.

6. Id. at § 395.
7. See, John M. Baurman, The Duty to Disclose Privileged Communications: Client Perjury,
WYOMING LAWYER, June 1996, at 17.
8. See John M. Burman, Disclosing Privileged Communications: A Lawyer's Duty to Warn,
WYOMING LAWYER, Aug.1996 at 17.
9. Scott Krob, A Practical Approach to Conflicts of Interest, COLORADO LAWYER, Sept. 1997, at
87, 88.
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A lawyer's own interests may create insurmountable conflicts. Many
clients, or prospective clients, have done things which a lawyer finds morally offensive. A lawyer's feelings about a client or a client's actions may
prevent the lawyer from pursuing the client's objectives diligently, meaning
the lawyer may not ethically represent the client.
2.

Timing of conflicts

Conflicts may arise at any time. Some are concurrent, meaning that the
interests of current clients, a current and a potential client, or two potential
clients are or may be in conflict. A concurrent conflict may also involve a
conflict between the interests of a third party and a client or potential client.
Others are successive, meaning that the interests of a former client or former
prospective client conflict with the interests of a current client or a potential
client. Whatever the type and regardless of when they arise, certain general
ethical standards apply to all conflicts.
3.

Classification of conflicts

The Wyoming Rules of Professional Conduct classify conflicts of interest into three categories of severity."° From most severe to least, they are:
(1) clients and/or prospective clients with interests which are "directly adverse" to each other; (2) conflicts which "materially limit" a lawyer's representation of a client or a prospective client; and (3) de minimus conflicts.
The classification of conflicts into those where clients' interests are "directly adverse" or those where representation would be "materially limited"
does not end the inquiry. Rule 1.7 prohibits a lawyer from representing a
client under certain circumstances, permits representation under others, despite a conflict, and permits, by omission, and without disclosure, representation when the only conflicts are de minimus."
4. Conflicts involving clients and/or prospective clients with "directly adverse" interests
The potentially most severe conflicts are those in which the interests of
one client are "directly adverse" to the interests of another client or a potential client. Such conflicts arise when, for example, a married couple seeks
joint representation in a divorce or two parties to a real estate transaction
contact one lawyer to prepare documents to implement a transaction. While
the parties may believe, and say, they are in agreement, their interests, if not
their positions, are directly adverse. Accordingly, a concurrent conflict exists, or will exist if the lawyer undertakes the joint representation. A concurrent conflict will also arise when a lawyer represents one party in litiga-

10. WYOMING RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (LEXIS 1999).
II. Id.
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tion and is then contacted by an adverse party. In such a case, the interests
of a potential client are directly adverse to those of an existing client.
Where the interests of clients and/or potential clients, are "directly adverse, "a lawyer "shall not" represent a client or potential client "unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely affected; and
(2) the client consents after consultation. When representation of
multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the consultation shall
include explanation of the implications of the common representation
and the advantages and risks involved."' 2
The exception to the rule divides "directly adverse" conflicts into two
categories. Those which may be waived, and those which may not. Accordingly, after discerning the existence of an actual or potential conflict,
the next step for the lawyer is to determine whether the conflict is one
which may be waived.
A conflict may be waived if the lawyer "reasonably believes" the representation of each client will not be adversely affected in spite of the conflict. The term "reasonably believes" means that "the lawyer believes the
matter in question and that the circumstances are such that the belief is reasonable."' In other words, the lawyer must subjectively believe that the
conflict will not adversely affect the representation and the belief must be
the objectively reasonable belief of the proverbial reasonable lawyer. Representation is objectively reasonable if "a disinterested lawyer" would conclude that the client may agree to the representation."
It is inherently impossible for a lawyer evaluating whether he or she
has a conflict to be disinterested; by definition, the lawyer is interested.
Accordingly, while it is not required by the rule, the only safe path in such
circumstances is for the lawyer or the potential client to consult a truly disinterested lawyer. At a minimum the lawyer seeking the waiver should advise and affirmatively recommend that the individual from whom the
waiver is being sought consult a disinterested lawyer. As discussed below,
that recommendation should be, but is not required to be, in writing.'5
The determination of whether a conflict may be waived must be made
before the lawyer asks the client for a waiver. If a conflict is one where a
disinterested lawyer would conclude that the client should not agree to a

12. Id. Rule 1.7(a).
13. Id. Terminology [8].
14. Id. Rule 1.7, cmt. [5].
15. See infra notes 16 through 23 and accompanying text.
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waiver, "the lawyer cannot properly ask for [a waiver] ... or provide representation on the basis of the client's consent.", In short, it is unethical to
even ask for a waiver if a reasonable lawyer would not do so. A disinterested lawyer, of course, would not ask for consent when the parties' interests are "substantially different."'" Similarly, it is unethical to represent a
client who has consented to a waiver in circumstances where a disinterested
lawyer would find a waiver to be inappropriate.
If the conflict is one that may be waived by the client's consent, then
consent must be properly obtained. A client's consent is effective only if
given after "consultation." "Consultation" means the lawyer has "communicat[ed] ... information reasonably sufficient to permit the client to appre-

ciate the significance of the matter in question."'" This requirement is really
only a restatement of the lawyer's general obligation to "explain a matter to
[the client] to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make
[an] informed decision[] .... -"9 Clients need to be told, however, that con-

sent may be withdrawn at any time and for any reason.
Except when the conflict involves a business transaction,"0 the Rules do
not require that consent be in writing. It is a foolish lawyer, however, who
does not obtain written consent from each party. Further, the document
should be more than a simple consent. It should contain: (1) a description
of the conflict; (2) an explanation of the consequences and potential consequences of that conflict; (3) a statement of the potential consequences of
agreeing to waive the conflict; and (4) an affirmative recommendation that
the individual consult another lawyer before agreeing to a waiver. While
such an advisory may result in a refusal to waive the conflict, it is far better
to learn of a party's concerns up front, instead of later. If a disagreement
subsequently arises about whether the consent was given after "consultation," the burden will be on the lawyer to prove that consent was freely
given after adequate consultation.2
A document, signed by the client,
which contains "sufficient information" to allow the client to understand the
significance of his or her consent, and a recommendation to seek outside
counsel, will be critical to meeting that burden.

16. WYOMING RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7, cmt. [5] (LEXIS 1999).
17. Kelley's Case, 627 A.2d 597, 600 (N.H. 1993).
18. WYOMING RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Terminology [2].
19. Id. Rule 1.4(b).

20. Id. Rule 1.8(a)(3).
21. British Airways v. Port Auth. of New York and New Jersey, 862 F.Supp. 889, 900 (E.D.N.Y.
1994).
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5. Conflicts where the lawyer's representation of a client will be
"materially limited" by some other interest
Conflicts may arise even when the interests of two clients or potential
clients are not directly adverse. Consider, for example, the following,
common situations. An insurance company hires a lawyer to defend an
insured. A parent hires a lawyer to represent her minor child. An adult
child hires a lawyer to prepare an estate plan for his mother. Co-defendants
in a negligence action hire a lawyer to represent them jointly. Codefendants in a criminal action hire the same lawyer." Or, a parent alleged
to have abused her child contacts a lawyer who was abused as a child. In
each of the above situations, the lawyer's loyalty to his or her client may be
compromised by either external or internal pressures.
Paragraph (b) of Rule 1.7 is designed to cover any conflict of interest,
whatever the source, which may "materially limit" a lawyer's representation
of a client:
A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely affected; and
(2) the client consents after consultation. When representation of
multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the consultation shall
include explanation of the implications of the common representation
and the advantages and risks involved. (Emphasis added)
Although the Rules do not define "materially limit," the question of
materiality has become a functional one. That is, will the lawyer's other
responsibilities or interests potentially interfere with the lawyer's independent professional judgment, and/or is there the possibility of the disclosure of
confidential information to any third party.,, In either event, the lawyer's
representation may be "materially limited."
The standards for determining whether a conflict may be waived are the
same as when a conflict is "directly adverse." That is, would a "disinterested" lawyer agree that the client should consent? The procedures for ob-

22. Representing co-defendants in a criminal trial raises such serious conflict of interest issues that it
is generally prohibited in Wyoming as violative of the right to effective assistance of counsel. See infra
notes 243 through 265 and accompanying text.
23. See WOLFRAM, supra note 3, at § 7.2.5.
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taining consent are also the same. It must be informed, and it should be,
although it is not required to be, in writing.
6.

De Minimus Conflicts

There is some conflict present in virtually every attorney-client relationship. In private practice, for example, an attorney has an inherent interest in maximizing his or her fees, while the client has an interest in minimizing them. Similarly, a lawyer may have represented a prospective client's former spouse in a wholly unrelated matter. Such conflicts do not
involve the "directly" adverse or the "materially limit" standards of Rule
1.7(a) and (b). They do not, therefore, potentially preclude representation.
The rules do not even require disclosure of such conflicts. Although the
consequences of a de minimus conflict are, naturally, de minimus, an important question arises. Which conflicts or potential conflicts are de minimus?

There is no easy or obvious rule to apply in determining whether a conflict is de minimus. The issue is important, of course, because any conflict
which is more than de minimus must at least be disclosed. The safest rule to
follow is to adopt the standard for deciding whether a conflict may be
waived, the disinterested lawyer standard. The question thus becomes
whether a disinterested lawyer would find the conflict to be de minimus.
The answer will usually be that if you find yourself even asking the question, it is probably not a de minimus conflict. Even if it is, disclosure is the
safest route.
No negative consequences can arise from the disclosure of any conflict, even de minimus ones. The "worst" thing that can happen is that the
client will object to continued representation. There is no better time to find
out the client's concerns than at the outset of representation, when there is
still time to avoid a problem.
7.

Former client conflicts of interest

The end of an attorney-client relationship does not signal the end of the
attorney's duties. The duty of confidentiality continues indefinitely.,' A
lawyer may not, therefore, ever disclose information "relating to the representation" of a former client. In addition, the lawyer's duty of loyalty continues; information learned from or about one client may not be subsequently used to the disadvantage of the former client.2' Taken together, the
continuation of the interrelated duties of confidentiality and loyalty mean
that a conflict of interest may arise between the interests of a former client
24. WYOMING RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6, cmt. [22] (LEXIS 1999).

25. Id. Rule 1.9(c) (Lawyer may not use information protected by Rule 1.6 to the disadvantage of a
former client).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol35/iss1/5
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and those of a current or prospective client. A lawyer must be able, therefore, to determine the identity of all former clients of the firm, as well as the
nature of the representation. Accordingly, every lawyer must develop and
2
maintain a conflicts database. 1
Rule 1.9 governs former client conflicts of interest. Paragraph (a) addresses a lawyer who switches sides, i.e., a lawyer represents client X in a
matter, and later represents client Y against former client X in another.
Paragraph (b) addresses a lawyer who switches firms and the former firm
represented client X against client Y, and the new firm represents client Y
against client X. This section discusses paragraph (a); paragraph (b) is discussed in detail below.7 Regardless of whether the conflict arises under (a)
or (b), the key to the proper application of Rule 1.9 is identifying the former
client before undertaking any significant work for a current client or accepting a new client whose interests are in conflict with a former client's.
Once a former client has been identified, Rule 1.9(a) requires lawyers
to use a two step analysis when the lawyer represents or is asked to represent a client with interests which may conflict with those of the former client. First, is the new matter "the same or substantially related" to the matter
involving the former client? Second, if there is such a relationship, are the
interests of the current or prospective client "materially adverse" to the interests of the former client? If not, there is no conflict. If the answer is yes,
the rules presume that the lawyer obtained confidential information from the
former client and that he or she will use it in the new matter. The presumption is irrebutable; it is irrelevant that the lawyer obtained no confidential
information, forgot or has no record of that information, or that the lawyer
will not use it in the new representation. A conflict exists and the lawyer
may not undertake the new representation unless the former client consents
"after consultation."
The scope of a "matter" for purposes of Rule 1.9 depends "on the facts
of a particular situation or transaction."' The critical question is the extent
of the lawyer's involvement in the previous transaction. If the lawyer was
"directly involved in a specific transaction," subsequent representation of
other clients with "materially adverse interests clearly is prohibited."2'9 The
principles of Rule 1.7 apply to the determination of whether the interests of
the former client are "materially adverse." 0 In other words, if a disinterested lawyer would conclude that the interests of the former and new client

26. For a discussion of client databases, see Robert W. Martin, Jr.. Practicing Law in the 21' Century: Fundamentalsfor Avoiding Malpractice Liability, 33 LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW, 191, 197
(1998).

27. See notes 436 - 439 infra and accompanying text.
28. WYOMING RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9 cmt. [2] (LEXIS 1999).
29. Id.
30. Id. Rule 1.9 cmt. [I).
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are "materially adverse," representation is unethical unless the former client
consents after consultation.
The Wyoming Supreme Court discussed and applied the former client
conflict of interest principles of Rule 1.9(a) to disqualify a lawyer in Carlson v. Langdon." In Carlson, an attorney, A.B., had been involved with
representing Leva Carlson and/or Carl Carlson, Leva's adult son, in a series
of business transaction, including the drafting of a lease agreement between
the two; there were, however, no engagement" or termination letters, or any
record of who had paid for A.B.'s services. It was unclear therefore,
whether A.B. had represented Leva, Carl, or both." Later, Leva contacted
A.B. to advise her about her rights under the lease with respect to Carl.
A.B. advised Leva that the lease gave her certain rights, to Carl's detriment,
and he notified Carl that the position Leva was asserting was correct. Carl
retained another lawyer and sued Leva (and a bank whose interests were
somewhat aligned with Leva's). A.B. answered on behalf of the codefendant bank. Carl's new lawyer requested that A.B. withdraw because
of the conflict. He refused, claiming he had never represented Carl. A motion to disqualify A.B. was denied. The case went to the Wyoming Supreme Court on a petition for writ of certiorari, which was granted. Before
evaluating whether to disqualify A.B., which involved an analysis of the
effect of Rule 1.9, the court had to determine which of the two individual's
were A.B.'s clients.
The court began with the principle that an attorney-client relationship
may arise by implication. Furthermore, the court said, the burden is on the
lawyer to clarify the existence or non-existence of an attorney-client relationship. Both Leva and Carl had consulted the lawyer for the purpose of
obtaining legal advice, and nothing in the record indicated that the lawyer
had told Carl that he represented Leva alone or that Carl should obtain independent counsel. Accordingly, in the absence of evidence that A.B. had
taken steps to "dispel" Carl's belief, it was reasonable for Carl to believe
that A.B. was his lawyer. And as Carl's lawyer, A.B. owed him an unending duty of confidentiality.?'

31.

751 P.2d 344 (Wyo. 1988).

32. The use of an engagement letter, always a good idea, is even more important when a lawyer
represents multiple parties in a transaction and/or an entity. The letter can, and should, identify the
client(s), the payer, and the scope of representation. Identifying the client is particularly important when
an entity, or a nascent entity, is involved. The letter should specify whether the lawyer represents the
entity, individual's within the entity, or both. Normally, a lawyer represents the organization, and not
the individuals within the organization. See WYOMING RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13(a)
(LEXIS 1999). If the entity is a client, the letter should identify the person or persons with whom the
attorney should interact and upon whom he or she may rely for direction in the representation. See infra

notes 290 - 299 and accompanying text.
33. Carlson. 751 P.2d at 345-48.
34. Id.at 348.
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After deciding that A.B. had been Carl's lawyer, the court relied on
Rule 1.9(a) to reverse the trial court's denial of the motion to disqualify.

The purpose of the rule, said the court, "is the protection of confidentiality."" Once there has been a showing of a former attorney-client relationship in a substantially related matter, the court will presume that the former
client communicated confidential information to the attorney. Such a presumption is necessary, continued the court, to enforce "the lawyer's duty of
absolute fidelity. ..." Raising that presumption did not, however, end the
court's inquiry. The question became whether that presumption may be
rebutted.

As the Wyoming Supreme Court observed, courts around the country
are divided on the issue of whether the presumption that a client conveys
confidential information to his or her lawyer may be rebutted. Wyoming
sided with the majority: "We adopt the majority view of irrebutable pre-

sumption.., even though we recognize that disqualification of an attorney
may prevent another client from obtaining the services of the attorney of his
choice."" Such a rule "offers greater assurance that confidential information will be protected and assists in avoiding any appearance of impropriety."3' It is also consistent with Wyoming Rule of Professional Conduct 1.9.
8. Conflicts Caused by Prospective Clients or Former Prospective
Clients

Conflicts may also result from consultations with prospective clients
who never become clients. Such conflicts are easily overlooked, until raised
by another party. Then it may be too late.
Two scenarios are common. First, a prospective client contacts a lawyer about representation. The decision about whether to accept a client is
usually not made without at least some information. Accordingly, the lawyer and the prospective client meet. The lawyer may also conduct a pre-

liminary investigation into the facts and/or the applicable law. The lawyer

then decides not to accept the client,3 ' who goes elsewhere. Later, the law-

35. ld.
36. Id. (quoting T.C. Theatre Corporation v. Warner Brothers Pictures, Inc., 113 F.Supp. 265, 26869 (S.D. N.Y. 1953)).
37. Carlson, 751 P.2d at 349.
38. Id.
39. When a lawyer decides not to accept a case, a non-engagement letter should be sent tothe prospective client. That letter, which should be sent by certified mail, should say: (1)the lawyer is unable
to represent the prospective client; (2) the materials, if any, which were left with the lawyer are being
returned; (3) the lawyer has formed no opinion as to the merits of the potential case; and (4) the prospective client should consult another lawyer as soon as possible because a statute of limitations may
ultimately bar the claims. The letter should not say why the lawyer is unable to take the case, advise the
client that he or she has a good case, or when the statute of limitations will run. A copy of the nonengagement letter, with the return receipt attached, should be retained. For a sample non-engagement
letter, see Martin, Jr., supra note 26, at app. C.
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yer undertakes to represent a client with interests adverse to those of the
rejected prospective client. Suddenly, a motion to disqualify appears based
on the lawyer's long-forgotten consideration of representing a prospective
client.
In the second situation, a prospective client contacts a lawyer about
representation. As part of a routine conflicts check, the lawyer finds that
another lawyer in the firm represents or represented the adverse party, either
in litigation or in a transaction. The lawyer properly declines representation
because of the conflict. Later, the lawyer whom the prospective client ultimately retains moves to disqualify the first lawyer because of that lawyer's
acquisition of confidential information from the then prospective client.
While the lawyer may have collected only enough information to determine
the existence of a conflict, that may be enough to have learned important,
confidential information. Indeed, the very identity of the prospective client
and/or the client's purpose for seeking representation may be critical pieces
of information.
The ABA's Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility has issued a Formal Opinion on lawyers' duties regarding information
received from prospective clients, as well as the conflict of interest implications raised by prospective client contacts.- The opinion contains important
guidance.
First, the ABA's opinion affirms the position of the ABA Model Rules
and the Wyoming Rules that information received from a prospective client
who never becomes a client is confidential under Rule 1.6." Further, just as
with information regarding clients, the obligation of confidentiality never
ends.'" Second, the prospective client must be treated as a client for purposes of evaluating the existence of a conflict of interest. Sometimes, the
,information received from a prospective client who never becomes a client
may be so critical as to require the lawyer to decline or terminate representation of another party.,, Consider the following example:"
Client A hires attorney X to represent him in seeking to purchase a
piece of property to develop. The property has been on the market
for quite some time, and the price is dropping far below the original
asking price. Shortly thereafter, B contacts the same attorney, or
another attorney in the firm, to represent her in seeking to acquire
40. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 90-358 (Sept. 13, 1998)
("Protection of Information Imparted by Prospective Client").

41. Id. See also WYOMING RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Scope [3] (LEXIS 1999).
42. WYOMING RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 cmt. [221 (LEXIS 1999); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, § 396(b) (1957) (stating an agent's duty to keep the principal's
confidences continues after the termination of the agency relationship).
43. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 90-358 (Sept. 13, 1998).
44. See id. The example is based on a hypothetical contained in the ABA's opinion. Id.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol35/iss1/5

12

2000

Burman: Conflicts of Interest in Wyoming
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

the same property for the same purpose. Neither A nor B wants
anyone to know of their plans, and each hopes to buy the property
at a low price. If A learns of B's plans, or if B learns of A's, it will
significantly affect their plans. Accordingly, simply by talking to B
and learning why she wants representation, X has learned confidential information which can be useful to A, information which can be
used to the detriment of B. The objectives of A and B are in obvious conflict. Furthermore, X owes each a duty of confidentiality,
and cannot, therefore, tell either of the other's intentions. Three
questions arise. First, may X represent A and B? Second, may X
continue to represent A? Finally, may X tell A of B's intentions?
The first question is easily answered. X (and the others in X's firm)
cannot represent B. The second is not so easy. B, through other counsel,
may seek to disqualify X because X has acquired critical information about
B's intentions which can be used to A's benefit. In response, X may assert
that X acted properly in every respect, seeking and obtaining only that information which was necessary to determine if a conflict existed. The ABA
sides with X.41 X may continue to represent A, even though X has acquired
confidential information. X may not, however, inform A of B's identity and
intentions until and unless the information becomes generally known. The
only restriction is that if X determines that the inability to disclose information about B before it is generally known will materially limit the representation, continued representation is impermissible under Rule 1.7(b).
The ABA's opinion identifies three steps lawyers should take to avoid
involuntary disqualification. First, lawyers have an ethical duty to adopt
reasonable procedures to enable them to identify conflicts of interest before
undertaking representation of a client." Second, lawyers need to limit the
information they initially receive from prospective clients to that which is
necessary to determine if there is a conflict of interest. Third, if a lawyer
learns information from a prospective client which could be used to the
benefit of one of the firm's existing clients, that lawyer should be screened
7
from involvement in the client's matter.1 By taking such measures, a firm
may be able to successfully resist a motion to disqualify. Failure to do so
may lead to involuntary disqualification.

45. Id.

46. Id.
47. Screening is often not permitted, especially in small firms, and the entire firm will be disqualified. For a discussion of imputed disqualification, see notes 49 - 53 and accompanying text.

48. Attorney disqualification is discussed infra at notes 74 - 106 and accompanying text.
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Imputed Disqualification

One of the most easily overlooked rules is the rule of imputed disqualification. If one lawyer in a "firm" may not represent a client because of a
conflict of interest, neither may any of the other lawyers in the firm." The
reference to lawyers in a "firm" raises an important threshold question.
What is a "firm"? After that question is answered, and all the lawyers in the
"firm" are identified, the rule means that a lawyer must be able to determine
the identity of all of the firm's former and current clients, as well as former
prospective clients from whom the firm has received confidential information.
The term "firm" clearly applies to lawyers associated in a partnership,
a PC, or an LLC, as well as in-house counsel. It may also apply to lawyers
who have no formal legal affiliation, but circumstances suggest that they
should be treated as a firm for purposes of conflicts of interest. Lawyers
who share office space, for example, or who have some other cooperative or
consultative arrangement may be deemed to be a "firm" for conflict of interest purposes. This is because a "firm" includes:
[L]awyers in a private firm, and lawyers employed in the legal department of a corporation or other organization, or in a legal services organization. Whether two (2) or more lawyers constitute a
firm within this definition can depend on the specificfacts... The
terms of any formal agreement between associated lawyers are relevant in determining whether they are a firm, as is the fact that they
have mutual access to confidential information concerning the clients they serve. Furthermore, it is relevant in doubtful cases to consider the underlying purpose of the rule that is involved.'
Thus, the label lawyers give to their association is not dispositive.
Whether lawyers are a "firm" requires a functional analysis. The important
questions are: (1) whether the lawyers in question have taken steps to ensure
their independence; and (2) whether the lawyers have "mutual access to
confidential information." For example, sole practitioners who share office
space and staff may have a difficult time convincing a client, a court, or the
Board of Professional Responsibility, that they are not a "firm" for purposes
of the rule on imputed disqualification. Practical questions, such as who has
keys to the office and the file cabinets, or a password to the computer, will
be more important than the narrow legal question of whether there is any
formal relationship between or among the lawyers. A firm which hires a

49. WYOMING RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10(a) (LEXIS 1999); See also,
RESTATEMENT OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 203 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1 1996).
50. WYOMING RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10 cmt [1] (LEXIS 1999) (emphasis
added).
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lawyer temporarily must also be careful that it does not thereby inherit that
lawyer's conflicts, whether personal or professional.2 Ultimately, the question is "whether the physical organization and actual operation of the office
space is such that the confidential client information of each lawyer is secure from the other." 2
Assuming a conflict with one lawyer, the other lawyers in the firm are
held to the same standards for evaluating conflicts. Also, a client may agree
to a waiver under the same circumstances."
Legal Standards

Avoiding conflicts of interest is not simply a matter of legal ethics. It
is a matter of legal responsibility.
As discussed above, lawyers are agentsM and fiduciaries" for their cliAccordingly, they have a duty to act "solely for the benefit" of their
principals (their clients) in all matters connected with the representation."
By definition, a lawyer with a conflict of interest has other obligations
which prevent him or her from acting "solely" for the benefit of the client.
The failure to act solely for the benefit of a client may result in a malpractice claim.
ents.M

A Wyoming lawyer must act with "that degree of care, skill, diligence,
and knowledge commonly possessed and exercised by a reasonable, careful
and prudent lawyer in Wyoming."5 The failure to do so is malpractice. In a
malpractice case based on a lawyer's having had an impermissible conflict
of interest or the lawyer's failure to properly obtain waiver of a conflict, the
plaintiffs expert will likely testify that a reasonable, careful and prudent
lawyer, as any reasonable agent, will act solely for the benefit of the client,
the principal. Accordingly, such a lawyer will avoid impermissible con-

51. Hiring a temporary or contract lawyer raises a broad spectrum of conflict of interest issues. For a
discussion ofhow the rule of imputed disqualification applies to temporary lawyers, see ABA Comm. on
Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 88-356 (1988) ("Temporary Lawyers").
52. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 203 cmt. e (Proposed Final Draft No. 1,
1996).
53. WYOMING RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(c) (LEXIS 1999). The only exception

is the disqualification of a lawyer because of a familial relationship with the attorney who represents an
adverse party. Rule 1.8(i) precludes a lawyer who is related to another lawyer as parent, child, sibling or
spouse, from undertaking an representation which is "directly adverse" to the related lawyer's client.
The disqualification is personal, only, and is not imputed to the other lawyers in the firm. Id. Rule 1.8(i)

cmt. [101.
54. WOLFRAM, supra, note 3, at § 4.1.
55. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 13 (1958) and WYOMING RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1.15 cmt [I] (LEXIS 1999).
56. See supra, notes 2 - 7 and accompanying text.
57- RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, § 387 (1958).
58. Moore v. Lubnau, 855 P.2d 1245, 1250 (Wyo. 1993).
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flicts of interest unless a waiver is permissible and properly obtained."
Since conflicts which may lead to malpractice liability are also unethical,
malpractice cases often involve the relationship between the Rules and the
common law standard of conduct.
The Wyoming Supreme Court has not addressed the admissibility of
the Rules of Professional Conduct and/or a lawyer's violation of them in a
legal malpractice action. By their own terms, the Rules "are not designed to
be a basis for civil liability."0 In accordance with that precept, the Wyoming Supreme Court has held that the Rules do not create a private cause of
action for a non-client.6 ' The Rules are silent on, and the court has not addressed, the question of whether the Rules are admissible as evidence of the
legal standard of conduct for lawyers in Wyoming, or if a violation of the
Rules is admissible as evidence of a lawyer's breach of the standard. Given
the development of the case law around the country, however, Wyoming
lawyers should assume that the Rules will be admissible.
Courts disagree about the role of ethical standards in malpractice
cases."2 Consequently, although almost all courts allow the admission of
ethical rules, four different standards have emerged:63 (1) a small minority of
courts have held that ethical standards are not admissible;" (2) several
courts admit ethical standards, but with significant restrictions (e.g., the
ethical standards are not evidence of the standard of conduct since they
"may or may not" coincide with the legal standard. An expert is needed,
therefore, to establish the standard of conduct and the relationship between
the standard and the ethical rules);" (3) more courts admit ethical standards
with fewer restrictions (e.g., it is illogical to say the ethical standards do not

59. See, e.g., Ishmail v. Millington, 50 Cal. Rptr 592, 596 (Cal. App. 1966) (holding that a lawyer
who represented both spouses in a divorce may have committed malpractice by failing to fully advise
wife of dual representation and by failing to advise her to obtain independent counsel). See also Annotation, Malpractice Liability of Attorney Representing Conflicting Interests, 28 A.L.R.3d 389 (1969 &
Supp. 1999).
60. WYOMING RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Scope [6] (LEXIS 1999) ("Violation of a Rule
should not give rise to a cause of action nor should it create any presumption that a legal duty has been
breached.").
61. Brooks v. Zebre, 792 P.2d 196,201 (Wyo. 1990).
62. Compare Allen v. Lefkoft, Duncan, Grimes & Dermer, P.C., 453 S.E.2d 719 (Ga. 1995) (holding
that rules of professional conduct are relevant to the standard of care in a legal malpractice case if they
are designed to protect clients) and Hizey v. Carpenter, 830 P.2d 646, 654 (Wash. 1992) (holding that
jury may not be informed of standards of ethical conduct). For a collection of cases addressing the issue,
see Annotation, Admissibility and Effect of Evidence of Professional Ethics Rules in Legal Malpractice
Action, 50 A.L.R.5th 301 (1997).
63. For a comprehensive discussion of the different approaches, see: Note, The Evidentiary Use of
the Ethics Codes in Legal Malpractice: Erasing a Double Standard, 109 HARv. L. REv. 1102 (1999)
(advocating the use of ethics rules in malpractice cases); cf. David J. Fish, The Use of the Illinois Rules
of Professional Conduct to Establish the Standard of Care in Attorney Malpractice Litigation: An Illogical Practice,23 S. ILL. U. L. J. 65 (Fall 1998) (advocating the inadmissibility of ethical rules).
64. See, e.g., Hizey v. Carpenter, 830 P.2d at 654.
65. See, e.g., Lazy Seven Coal Sales, Inc. v. Stone & Hinds, P.C., 813 S.W.2d 400,404 (Tenn. 1991)
(holding that ethical standards "are not irrelevant in determining the standard of care ....).
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play a part in establishing the legal standard of conduct);6 and (4) in Michigan, violation of a rule creates a rebuttable presumption that a lawyer's conduct falls below the legal standard of conduct. 7 Of those views, the third is
gaining primacy; it has been adopted by most recent opinions."3 As the
South Carolina Supreme Court recently noted: "a majority of courts permit
discussion of such a violation at trial as some evidence of the common law
duty of care." Generally, courts which admit ethical standards require the
plaintiff's expert to testify that the applicable rules reflect the standard of
conduct, and that the defendant breached the standard of conduct, not just
the rules of ethics. Among those courts adopting the majority view are the
Montana Supreme Court" and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit (in a case applying Colorado law)."
Although the Wyoming Supreme Court has been protective of
lawyers," it would be unwise to assume that the court will not allow evidence of malpractice to include applicable provisions of the Wyoming
Rules of Professional Conduct and the lawyer's violation of them. For although there is disagreement about the place of the rules in malpractice
cases, the great weight of authority supports at least limited admissibility.
Furthermore, the reasoning behind the majority view is persuasive. As the
Georgia Supreme Court said, "[g]iven the ...fundamental nature of their
purpose, it would not be logical or reasonable to say that the Bar Rules, in
general, do not play a role in shaping the 'care and skill' ordinarily exercised by attorneys practicing law in Georgia." 3 The same is true in Wyoming. Assuming a rule of ethics, such as a conflict of interest rule, was
intended to protect clients, and an expert testifies that the rule reflects the
standard of conduct and that the lawyer breached that standard, evidence of

66. Allen v. Lefkoft, Duncan, Grimes & Dermer, P.C., 453 S.E.2d at 721; see also Smith v.
Haynsworth, Marion, McKay & Geurard, 472 S.E.2d 612, 613 (S.C. 1995).
67. Lipton v. Boesky, 313 N.W.2d 163, 167 (Mich. App. 1981) (holding that a violation of the Code

of Professional Responsibility "is rebuttable evidence of malpractice.").
68. Note, The Evidentiary Use of the Ethics Codes in Legal Malpractice: Erasing a Double Standard, supra note 63, at 1105.
69. Smith v. Haynsworth, Marion, McKay & Geurard, 472 S.E.2d at 613.

70. Carlson v. Moran, 745 P.2d 1133, 1137 (Mont. 1987) (holding that proof of violation of Code of
Professional Responsibility's conflict of interest provisions, standing alone, is insufficient to sustain a
malpractice claim. Expert testimony must be presented).
71. Miami International Realty Co. v. Paynter, 841 F.2d 348 (10' Cir. 1988) (holding that it is permissible for expert to testify about Code of Professional Responsibility and that lawyer's conduct which
violated Code was "substandard.").
72. See, e.g., Boiler v.Western Law Associates, 828 P.2d 1194, 1185-87) (Wyo. 1992), cert denied,

506 U.S. 869 (construing statute of limitations to bar legal malpractice claim even though the appellants
alleged that the appellees' actions had prevented timely discovery and the statute of limitations defense
had not not raised before the district court). See Id. at 188-91 (Macy and Thomas, JJ, dissenting). The
author was one of the attorneys for the appellants in Boller; see also Brooks v. Zebre, 792 P.2d at 200201 (refusing to allow a non-client to sue a lawyer for negligence or violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct).

73. Allen v. Lefkoft, Duncan, Grimes & Dermer, P.C., 453 SE.2d at 721.
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the Rules and their breach ought to be admissible. Any other approach
would be illogical.
Even if the Wyoming Supreme Court were to adopt the minority view
that the Wyoming Rules of Professional Conduct were not admissible, a
violation of those rules could still lead indirectly to malpractice liability.
The reason is that the lawyer's conduct, not the violation of the rules, is the
ultimate issue. Liability may not result because the conduct was unethical,
but because a reasonable lawyer would have avoided the conflict of interest
(or received informed consent to a waiver). In addition, the expert testimony in any malpractice case will be that the reasonable lawyer has in place
a method of detecting potential conflicts, and responds appropriately once
they are detected. Accordingly, conflicts of interest present legal malpractice issues, not simply potential ethical violations.
III. ATTORNEY DISQUALIFICATION
A conflict of interest which arises during litigation may have one or
more of several adverse consequences. It may result in: (1) the filing of a
grievance against the lawyer because of a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct; (2) a malpractice action against the attorney with the conflict; and/or (3) the disqualification of the attorney (and his or her firm)
from representing any of the parties to the litigation.7' This section addresses the third potential consequence: the disqualification of the lawyer
and the lawyer's firm.
The responsibility to detect and avoid improper conflicts rests with
each lawyer. "Resolving questions of conflict of interest is primarily the
responsibility of the lawyer undertaking the representation."', If the conflict
is one which may not be waived," if the waiver is improperly obtained, or if
the waiver is rescinded, continued representation violates the Rules." Nevertheless, if a lawyer either fails to detect a conflict or proceeds in spite of
the conflict or the withdrawal of consent, the issue may be raised by the
court, sua sponte, or by another party to the litigation:

74. Courts have also responded to inappropriate conflicts by ordering the forfeiture of attorney's
fees, or setting aside ajudgment. WOLFRAM, supra note 3, at § 7.1.7.
75. WYOMING RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RULE 1.7 Cmt. [14] (LEXIS 1999).
76. In addition to those conflicts which may not be waived because a reasonable lawyer would not
find it appropriate (see supra notes 9 - 48 and accompanying discussion), the Wyoming Rules of Profes-

sional Conduct contain an easily overlooked prohibition regarding waiver by former clients. A former
client that is a government entity may not consent to the waiver of a conflict. WYOMING RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9(a) (LEXIS 1999).

77. Id. Rule 1.16(a)(I) (dictating that a lawyer must decline or withdraw from representation if
continued representation would violate the Rules of Professional Conduct.).
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In litigation, a court may raise the question when there is reason to
infer that the lawyer has neglected the responsibility [to properly resolve a conflict] ...Where the conflict is such as clearly to call in
question the fair or efficient administration of justice, opposing
counsel may properly raise the question."
It is also possible, of course, that a lawyer has acted properly in all respects, but a conflict arises after the initiation of the litigation or consent to
the representation has been rescinded. The issue, therefore, is not necessarily whether the lawyer has committed misconduct by violating one of the
Rules of Professional Conduct. Rather, the issue may be whether the lawyer should be disqualified, notwithstanding his or her good faith compliance
with the rules.
Trial Courts' Authority to Disqualify Attorneys
Although lawyer discipline is generally within the purview of the
Wyoming Board of Professional Responsibility,", the Wyoming Supreme
Court has said that trial courts are "charged with the responsibility of supervising the conduct of attorneys practicing before [them].",, That supervisory responsibility "includes a duty to disqualify an attorney when it is appropriate."' The question becomes, therefore, when is disqualification appropriate?
Standing to Move for Disqualification
As noted above, a court may raise the issue of attorney disqualification
on its own motion. In criminal cases, the court has an affirmative obligation
2
to inquire into conflicts in situations involving multiple representation."
Assuming the court does not raise the issue, the question becomes who else
may?
The commentary to Rule 1.7 provides that "opposing counsel may
properly raise the question [of an impermissible conflict]."" That does not
mean, however, that counsel for any opposing party in litigation will have
standing to bring a motion to disqualify, even where there is an apparent
violation of the rules.
Standing to move to disqualify depends on a showing that continued
representation by the lawyer with the conflict will "materially harm a cogni-

78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. Rule 1.7 Cmt. [14].
Id. Rule 8.5; see also DISCIPLINARY CODE FOR THE WYOMING STATE BAR Rule I (LEXIS 1999).
Carlson v. Langdon, 751 P.2d 344, 350 (Wyo. 1988).

Id.
82. WYo. R. CRIM. P. 44(c) (LEXIS 1999); see also Shongutsie v. State, 827 P.2d 361, 366-67
(Wyo. 1992).
83. WYOMING RULES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 1.7 cmt. [14] (LEXIS 1999).
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zable interest of the objecting party."'" The interest normally threatened is
the confidentiality of information previously obtained by the lawyer whose
disqualification is sought. That threat exists when the lawyer has previously
represented the party seeking disqualification. As a general rule, therefore,
courts do not disqualify a lawyer unless a former client of the lawyer seeks
disqualification."
The standing requirement does not mean that the moving party must be
a former client. It is sufficient if there is some likelihood that the lawyer
has gained confidential information about the moving party."
That may
occur through previous representation of the moving party, or concurrent
representation of a person or entity, such as a corporate subsidiary, that is
related in some way to the party seeking disqualification.
Finally, courts have found that any party may move for disqualification
if the public interest is "so greatly implicated,"'" or if the attorney's unethical conduct is "manifest and glaring" or "open and obvious." ' Even if there
is no objection to the moving party's standing, the court may raise the issue
on its own."
Procedure,Burden, and Standards
The procedure to bring the matter before a court is a motion to disqualify. The motion is normally accompanied by affidavits, and there is
generally no need for an evidentiary hearing.?
In Rose v. Rose, the Wyoming Supreme Court adopted principles to
govern motions to disqualify:
The decision to grant or deny a motion to disqualify counsel is
within the discretion of the trial court ... The moving party has the
burden of establishing grounds for disqualification. . . The goal of
the court should be to shape a remedy which will assure fairness to
the parties and the integrity of the judicial process . . . Whenever
possible, courts should endeavor to reach a solution that is least
burdensome to the client."

84. WOLFRAM, supra note 3, at § 7.1.7; see also Dawson v. City of Bartlesville, 901 F.Supp. 314,
415 (ND. Okla. 1995) (holding that invocation of Rule 1.7 alone does not provide standing for a party
seeking disqualification.).
85- In Re Yam Processing Patent Validity Litigation, 530 F.2d 83, 88-89 (5th Cir. 1976).
86. WOLFRAM, supra note 3, at § 7.1.7.
87. Chapman Engineers, Inc. v. Natural Gas Sales Co, 766 F.Supp. 949, 955 (D. Kan. 1991).
88. In Re Yarn Patent Validity Litigation, 530 F.2d 83 at 89.
89. Dawson, 901 F.Supp. at 314.
90. WOLFRAM, supra note 3, at § 7.1.7.
91. Rose v. Rose, 849 P.2d 1321, 1325 (Wyo. 1993) (quoting Weaver v. Millard, 819 P.2d 110, 11415 (ld. 1991)).
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Although the court did not elaborate on the "grounds for disqualification" in
the Rose decision, its earlier decision in Carlson v. Langdon 2 provides important guidance.
In Carlson, the Wyoming Supreme Court reversed a trial court's denial
of a motion to disqualify an attorney who had previously represented the
party seeking disqualification. Because of the previous representation, the
court found there to be an irrebuttable presumption that the client had conveyed confidential information to his former attorney. The court found that
protecting against the disclosure of confidential information is an integral
purpose of the conflict of interest rules. Accordingly, if the matter in litigation was "related in some substantial way" to the earlier representation, the
attorney was foreclosed from representing an adverse party. 3
The rule which emerges from Rose and Carlson is that grounds for disqualification exist if there is a threat to the confidentiality principles of the
attorney-client relationship. A threat exists if the matter is "substantially
related" to a lawyer's previous representation of a client. All a former client
need show, therefore, is that there is a "substantial relationship" between the
subject of the former representation and the current litigation. If there is a
substantial relationship, there will be no inquiry into whether there is an
actual breach of confidentiality; a breach will be irrebuttably presumed.
A party seeking disqualification that is not a former client cannot, by
definition, show a substantial relationship. The moving party will have to
show much more. Although the precise standard is unclear, one court has
said that a non-former client must show that the attorney's unethical conduct is so "open and obvious" that the court has "a plain duty to act."
Disqualificationof Firm
As a general matter, the rule of imputed disqualification, Rule 1.10,
makes it unethical for any lawyer in a firm to act when one of the lawyers in
the firm has an impermissible conflict of interest." As usual, no opinion of
the Wyoming Supreme Court speaks directly to the issue of whether the
disqualification of one lawyer in a firm should be imputed to the entire firm.
Courts in some jurisdictions have not applied the rule of imputed disqualification rigidly when an individual lawyer is disqualified. " They per-

92. 751 P.2d 344 (Wyo. 1988). The case is discussed extensively above at footnotes 31 - 38 and
accompanying text.
93. Id. at 349.
94. In Re Yam Processing Patent Validity Litigation, 530 F.2d 83, 89 (5"' Cir. 1989).
95. Imputed disqualification is discussed in detail at supra notes 49 - 53 and accompanying text.
96. For a survey of state court opinions, see Frank J.Wozniak J.D. Annotation, Disqualificationof
t
Members of Law Firm as Requiring Disqualification ofEntire Firm: State Cases, 6 A.L.R.5a 252 (1993,
& Supp. 1999).
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mit the firm to continue if the tainted lawyer is screened from involvement
in or knowledge of the matter. Such screens are often referred to as "Chinese Walls.' '1 7 Although screening has been permitted by some courts, lawyers in Wyoming should expect a more rigid application of the principle of
imputed disqualification.
Three reasons suggest the Wyoming Supreme Court will not recognize
"Chinese Walls" as an adequate method of protecting former client confidences such that a firm may continue representation, despite the presence of
a tainted lawyer. First, the Wyoming rules do not permit Chinese Walls to
cure a conflict. Second, the small size of firms in Wyoming makes it very
difficult, if not impossible, to erect workable screens. Third, the court's
reasoning in Carlson leads to the conclusion that attempts to avoid the disqualification of a firm by erecting a screen around a tainted lawyer are unlikely to succeed. The opinion places significant importance on Rule 1.9's
focus on protecting client confidences. Prohibiting "Chinese Walls" would
also further that purpose. The court emphasizes the importance of "avoiding any appearance of impropriety." Allowing a firm to continue with a
"Chinese Wall" to screen a tainted lawyer creates, rather than avoids, the
appearance of impropriety. Wyoming lawyers should assume, therefore,
that the disqualification of an individual lawyer in a firm because of a former client conflict of interest will result in the imputed disqualification of
the entire firm
Waiver of Objection

The timing of a motion to disqualify is important. A motion which is
not brought promptly upon learning of the conflict will likely be opposed on
the basis that the objection has been waived. The objection may succeed.
Courts have adopted the general rule that an objecting party may not delay
the filing of the motion until the opposing party has developed a significant
reliance on the lawyer with the conflict. 9 The rule makes good sense.
The commentary to Rule 1.7 warns courts that motions to disqualify
"should be viewed with caution" because they "can be misused as a technique of harassment."9 And the Scope section of the Rules declares that
"the purposes of the Rules can be subverted when they are invoked by opposing parties as procedural weapons." One such procedural tactic is to
wait to file a motion to disqualify until the other party has invested substantial time and money in its attorney, making the substitution of counsel both
expensive and difficult. Waiting in the face of a known conflict may well

97. See, e.g., Kala v. Aluminum Smelting & Refining Co., 688 N.E.2d 258,266 (Ohio 1998).
98. WOLFRAM, supra note 3, at § 7.17.
99. WYOMING RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 cmt. [14] (LEXIS 1999).
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be perceived by a court as just the kind of abuse against which the Rules
warn.
Appellate Review
A trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss is not a final order subject
to review by the Wyoming Supreme Courtlw The ruling will not, therefore,
normally be reviewable until after a decision on the merits. The Court does
have discretion, however, to review such an order pursuant to a writ of certiorari."' It did so in the Carlson case because the case raised a serious and
unsettled question in Wyoming, and because waiting until the end of the
case would have been to the detriment of the parties.
As noted earlier, whether to grant a motion to disqualify is discretionary with the trial court. Accordingly, the Wyoming Supreme Court will
reverse only for abuse of discretion. 0°
Successor Counsel
If a lawyer or a firm is disqualified, the now unrepresented party will
need to obtain successor counsel. Whether the disqualified attorney may
communicate with the successor attorney depends on the reasons for the
disqualification.
Perhaps the most common basis for disqualification is that the disqualified attorney has obtained, or is irrebutably presumed to have obtained, confidential information from the moving party through previous representation
of that party. The only way to prevent the communication of that confidential information to the successor attorney is to prohibit communications
between the disqualified attorney and the successor counsel. That is the rule
generally applied by the courts.' °' There is to be no communication without
the permission of the court or the affected party, and generally only if the
absence of communication would create an unreasonable hardship for the
party.00
If the disqualification is not based on protecting client confidentiality,
the need to prohibit communication is greatly lessened. Even so, successor
counsel should obtain consent of the affected party or a court order before
engaging in any communication.

100. Carlson v. Langdon, 751 P.2d 344, 350 (Wyo. 1988).
101. Id. A federal court's ruling on a motion to disqualify is neither a final order nor an appealable

interlocutory or collateral order. Firestone Tire & Rubber Company v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374
(1982),
102.
103.
104.
105.

cited in Carlson, 751 P.2d at 350; see also Amey v. Finney, 967 F.2d 418, 422 (1Oth Cir. 1992).
Carlson, 751 P,2d at 350.
Id.
WOLFRAM, supra note 3, at § 7.1.7.
Id.
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Motion to Clarify
An attorney who is uncertain about whether he or she may be disqualified if another party files a motion need not simply wait for the other shoe to
drop, while both attorneys' fees and the client's reliance on that attorney
mount. A concerned lawyer may bring a motion seeking a court order that
he or she may continue in a case, notwithstanding a conflict of interest
which the lawyer believes should not result in disqualification.'0
A motion to clarify allows an attorney and his or her client to avoid incurring attorneys' fees and building client reliance while waiting for the
possible filing of a motion to disqualify. The matter may be brought before
the court and resolved. Whatever the result, the case may move on to the
merits.
IV.

SPECIAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST RULES IN CRIMINAL DEFENSE

Conflicts of interest in criminal cases normally arise when one attorney
represents two or more defendants (such representation may occur at any
time from investigation through appeal). The conflicts inherent in such
joint representation present special issues. In addition to ethical, malpractice, and attorney disqualification concerns, a conflict of interest in a criminal case has Constitutional significance. This is because the right to counsel
guaranteed by the United States and Wyoming Constitutions includes the
right to representation by counsel free from impermissible conflicts. Prosecutors, too, may have impermissible conflicts of interest.
The United States Constitution
The Sixth Amendment to the United States' Constitution says: "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right.., to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." That right has been applied to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment. 0° The United States Supreme
Court has interpreted that right to include the right to the effective assistance of counsel.1°8 Assistance may be ineffective because an attorney's
performance is compromised by a conflict of interest.
John Sullivan was one of three persons charged with murder. At separate trials, Sullivan was convicted of first degree murder, while the others
were acquitted. All were represented by the same two privately retained
attorneys; no objection was made to the joint representation at any of the

106. Wolfram, supra note 3, § 7.1.7; see also United States v. Standard Oil Co., 136 F.Supp. 345, 348
(S.D.N.H. 1955).
107. Kenney v. State, 837 P.2d 664, 672 (Wyo. 1992).
108. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 345 (1980).
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trials. ' After an unsuccessful appeal, Sullivan sought habeas corpus relief
in federal court, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel because of the
attorneys' conflicts. The United States Supreme Court held that since Sullivan had not objected to the conflict at trial, he must show "an actual conflict
of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance."" In other words,
the Supreme Court applied the general Sixth Amendment standard, articulated in Strickland v. Washington."'

Several years later, in Nix v. Whiteside, the United States Supreme
Court cautioned that while conflicts of interest are of Constitutional concern, a breach of ethical conflict of interest standards may not be tantamount
to a Sixth Amendment violation: "[u]nder the Strickland standard, breach of
an ethical standard does not necessarily make out a denial of the Sixth
Amendment guarantee of assistance of counsel.""2 Courts must not, therefore, construe the Sixth Amendment "so restrictively as to constitutionalize
particular standards of professional conduct and thereby intrude into the
state's proper authority to define and apply the standards of professional
conduct.. .

."I"

to
The Court's deferential approach to the states' authority
4

regulate lawyers has become a hallmark of the Rehnquist Court."

The Sixth Amendment rule about conflicts of interest is now clear. If
there is no objection at trial to the joint representation, the defendant must
show that: (1) counsel's performance was deficient, i.e. not within the scope
of reasonableness; and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defense,
i.e., that errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant(s) of a fair trial. "
By contrast, a defendant who objects to joint representation "must" be
given an opportunity to show that the conflict will impermissibly impair a
6
fair trial, i.e., prejudice will be presumed if there is no such opportunity."
After such an objection, continued joint representation will be a violation of
the Sixth Amendment 7unless the trial court determines that the potential for
conflict is too remote.1
Finally, in Wheat v. United States, the Court held that the federal courts
have an independent interest in ensuring that criminal trials are conducted in
conformance with ethical standards and that criminal proceedings "appear
109. Id. at 337-38.
110. Id. at 348,

111. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984).
112. 475 U.S. 157,165 (1986).
113. Id.

114. See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Went For It, 515 U.S. 618, (1995) ("The [Florida] Bar has a substantial

interest in both protecting injured Floridians from invasive conduct by lawyers and in preventing the

erosion of confidence in the profession that such repeated invasions has engendered.").

115. Cuyler, at 348.
116. Id.
117. Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 483 (1978)(holding the trial court has a duty to investigate

a timely objection to multiple representation. The failure to do so will result in reversal.) Id.
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fair to all who observe them.""' Although a court must "recognize a presumption in favor of [defendants'] counsel of choice ....that presumption
may be overcome not only by a demonstration of actual conflict, but by a
showing of a serious potential for conflict.""' Accordingly, when an actual
conflict exists, a trial court has the discretion to decline a proffered waiver
and grant the prosecution's motion to disqualify defense counsel.'20 A potential conflict may be insufficient, however, and disqualification of defense
counsel because of a potential conflict may be reversible error.'2'
The Wyoming Constitution
The Wyoming Constitution also guarantees the right to representation
in criminal trials. "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the
right to defend in person and by counsel. . . ,,
21 While the Wyoming Supreme Court has often looked to federal precedent in construing provisions
of the Wyoming Constitution,'2 it has not rigidly adhered to that precedent.
In Shongutsie v State,' the Wyoming Supreme Court considered the
effect of an attorney's joint representation of criminal defendants on the
defendants' right to effective assistance of counsel under the Wyoming
Constitution. In particular, the Court examined whether an attorney's joint
representation of two criminal defendants should create a presumption that
the defendants were denied the effective assistance of counsel because of
the potential for conflicts of interest. Rejecting federal precedent interpreting the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, the Court
said "we deem it no longer prudent to follow the federal [interpretation]...
we choose to more firmly protect the defendant's right to representation by
an attorney who is free from any conflict of interest."12
The court gave three reasons for its rule: (1) the court wanted to discourage attorneys from accepting the role of dual advocate and thereby
"compromise their most fundamental duty-loyalty to the individual client;" (2) the rule promotes the effective administration of justice by ensuring that judges guard defendants' rights; and (3) the rule ensures that all

118. 486 U.S. 153 (1988).
119. id.at 164.
120. Id.
121. Alcocer v. Superior Court, 254 Cal. Rptr. 72, 79 (1988) (holding that trial court acted premnaturely in granting prosecution's motion to disqualify, over defendant's objection, because of potential
conflict of interest resulting from counsel's representation of potential prosecution witness.); cf., People
v. Peoples, 60 Cal. Rptr., 2d 173, 177 (1997), review denied (holding that defendant is incompetent to
waive conflict involving third parties).
122. Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 10.
123. See. e.g., Cutbirth v. State, 751 P.2d 1257, 1263 (Wyo. 1988) (relying on federal precedent to
evaluate claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel).
124. Shongutsie v.State, 827 P.2d 361 (Wyo. 1992).
125. Id. at 366.
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defendants are aware of their constitutional right to be represented by an
attorney free from conflicts.'26
If co-defendants wish to waive the conflict, the trial court must advise
each defendant, on the record, of the right to representation by an attorney
without a conflict and the dangers inherent in multiple representation. Finally, the court must fird that there is no real conflict before accepting the
waivers.'2 7 The rule against multiple representation applies whether codefendants are tried together or separately.- '
Rules of CriminalProcedure
Both the Federal and Wyoming rules of criminal procedure address
conflicts of interest. Federal Rule 44(c) says that when there is joint representation:
[T]he court shall promptly inquire with respect to such joint representation and shall personally advise each defendant of the right to
the effective assistance of counsel, including separate representation. Unless it appears that there is good cause to believe no conflict of interest is likely to arise, the court shall take such measures
as may be appropriate to protect each defendant's right to
counsel29
Wyoming's Rule 44(c) contains a similar admonition, with one important
difference:
[T]he court shall promptly inquire with respect to such joint representation and shall personally advise each defendant of the right to
the effective assistance of counsel, including separate representation. Unless it appears that there is good cause to believe that no
conflict of interest is likely to arise, the court shall order separate
representation.11
The difference is in the language of the last sentence of each rule which
appears in italics. The Wyoming rule specifically requires the trial court to
order separate representation, while the Federal rule merely requires the trial
court to take "appropriate" measures. The Wyoming Supreme Court has
interpreted the Wyoming rule to be "somewhat stricter" than (and preferable
to) the Federal Rule.' Wyoming's "bright line position," according to the
Wyoming Supreme Court, "serves to protect the defendant.. . [and] it pro126, Id. at 367-68.

127. Id. at 369; Kenney v. State, 837 P.2d 66.4, 673 (Wyo. 1992).
128. Kenney, 837 P.2d at 673.
129. FED. R. CRIM. P. Rule 44(c) (emphasis added).
130. WYo. R. CRIM. P. Rule 44(c) (LEXIS 1999) (emphasis added).
131. Id.
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tects the prosecutor from a subsequent claim of an invalid guilty verdict...
"132

Ethical Standards
Representation of co-parties in litigation falls under Wyoming Rule of
Professional Conduct 1.7(b). A lawyer shall not represent a client if the
representation will be "materially limited" by the lawyer's other responsibilities."'3 In criminal defense, the potential conflict when a lawyer reprea lawsents multiple parties is "so grave" that the Rules say that "ordinarily
'
yer should decline to represent more than one (1) codefendant." 34
The American Bar Association has established "Standards for Criminal
Justice." The standards contain a similar admonition for defense counsel:
"The potential for conflict of interest in representing multiple defendants is
so grave that ordinarily defense counsel should decline to act for more than
.- If the deone of several co-defendants except in unusual situations.. . *,
fendants desire joint representation, they must give "informed consent," and
that consent should be on the record.'
The ABA Standards are more than a good idea. They have been cited
with approval by the United States Supreme Court as embodying "prevailing norms of practice" for purposes of determining whether an attorney has
provided Constitutionally acceptable effective representation.' 7
Prosecutors'Standingto Move for Disqualification
Standing to move for disqualification of an attorney with a conflict of
The standing requirement is usually satisfied
interest is discussed above.'
by finding that the continued involvement of the attorney in question would
"materially harm a cognizable interest of the objecting party" (usually a
confidential relationship).' 9 In the absence of a former client relationship
(except with part-time prosecutors, discussed below), the application of the
standing doctrine in criminal cases involving multiple representation has
been controversial.
Courts have found standing in the state's general interest in the proper
administration of justice and every lawyer's obligation to raise ethical vio-

132. Id.
133. WYOMING RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(b) (LEXIS 1999).

134. Id. cmt. [6].
135. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4-3.5(b) (1991) reproduced in GILLERS AND SIMON,
REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 546-60 (Aspen 1999).
136. Id. at 4-3.5(c)(i) and (ii).
137. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).
138. See notes 82 - 89 and accompanying text.
139. Id. at 14 (quoting WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 7.1.7 (1986)).
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lations with the court. ' 1 In the words of one court, disqualification was appropriate where a defense attorney's conflict of interest "posed a significant
threat ... to the integrity of the judicial process.""' Other courts have denied disqualification, however, in the absence of a specific showing of an
actual or potential conflict "which would impede" the functioning of the
system. '
Prosecutors' Conflicts ofInterest
1.

General standards

Prosecutors, too, must avoid impermissible conflicts of interest. In addition to the general conflict of interest provisions of the Wyoming Rules of
Professional Conduct, prosecutors have a higher duty. According to the
Rules, "[a] prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not
simply that of an advocate.""'3 So much power is vested in prosecutors that
they have been described as holding "quasi judicial position[s]."" As quasi
judicial officers, prosecutors are held to a higher ethical standard. They
must avoid "even the appearance of impropriety."'4 In addition to the Rules
of Professional Conduct, the ABA has established standards for
prosecutors."
The standards, which are intended as "a guide to professional
8
conduct, ' "4 7 say that prosecutors should "avoid" conflicts of interest."
Prosecutors, as any lawyers, must be aware of former client conflicts. A
prosecutor who was in private practice is not to use information obtained
from a former client to that individual's disadvantage unless the information
becomes generally known."9 A prosecutor is to base decisions on his or her
professional judgment, unaffected by "his or her own political, financial,
5
business, property, or personal interests.""
0

140. United States v. Gopman, 531 F.2d 262, 265 (5th Cir. 1976); see also United States v. Clarkson,
567 F.2d 270, 271, n. I (4th Cir. 1977); and WOLFRAM, supra, note 3 at § 7.1.7.
141. People v. Peoples, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 177.
142. See, e.g., In re Special February 1977 Grand Jury, 581 F.2d 1262, 1265 (7th Cir. 1978) and
Alcocer v. Superior Court, 254 Cal. Rptr. 72, 79 (1988).
143.
144.
145.
1977).
146.

WYOMING RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8 cmt. [I] (LEXIS 1999).
Ganger v. Peyton, 370 F.2d 709, 714 (4 Cir. 1967).
State v. Ross, 829 S.W.2d 948, 951, (quoting State v. Boyd, 560 S.W.2d 296, 297 (Mo. App.
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, the Prosecution Function (1992) reproduced in

GILLERS AND SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 531-545 (Aspen 1999).

147. Id. Standard 3-1.1.
148. Id.Standard 3-1.3.
149. Id. Standard 3.1.3(d); see also WYOMING RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9(c) (containing a similar proscription).
150. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 146, at 3-1.3(0; see also WYOMING
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(b) (explaining that a lawyer shall not represent a client if
the lawyer's representation will be "materially limited by ...the lawyer's own interests.")
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2.

Special problems of part-time prosecutors

In Wyoming, some county attorneys and many city prosecutors are
part-time prosecutors. They combine their prosecutorial duties with private
practices. That combination presents special conflict of interest issues. Few
standards exist to guide part-time prosecutors. As a result, they face what
one commentator described as the "daunting task of balancing a private
set of guidelines
practice with prosecutorial duties ... [without] a coherent
5
for minimizing the impact of conflicts of interest.' '
Naturally, the general conflict of interest provisions which apply to
prosecutors, discussed above, apply to part-time prosecutors. However, just
as naturally, those provisions do not address the unique problems presented
by combining private practice and prosecution. The potential conflicts fall
into two general categories: 'Those which arise when a part-time prosecutor
represents an individual in another criminal matter, and those which result
from a part-time prosecutor's involvement in civil matters.
a.

Representation of criminal defendants

A common issue is whether a part-time prosecutor may represent a
criminal defendant in a different court. The issue is common because it
makes sense for a criminal defendant to ask a part-time prosecutor for representation. The prosecutor, after all, likely has experience and expertise in
criminal matters. The prosecutor also faces a significant conflict of interest.
It should go without saying that a prosecutor may not ethically represent a defendant in the court where the lawyer prosecutes. To do so would
be a direct conflict prohibited by rule 1.7(a). The request, therefore, is invariably to represent a defendant in another court, e.g., in a different county
(for a county attorney), a different city or county (for a city attorney), or in
federal court (for either). The differences between county and city prosecutors has led to different standards for each, with considerably greater restrictions on county prosecutors.
The Wyoming Rules of Professional Conduct are silent, and the Wyoming Supreme Court has not spoken on the issue of part-time prosecutors.
The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice provide minimal assistance. They
say only that a part-time prosecutor who also represents criminal defendants
"should not represent a defendant in criminal proceedings in a jurisdiction
where he or she is also employed as a prosecutor."'' 2 While that proscription sounds simple, it isn't. Two questions arise. First, what is "the jurisdiction." Second, does the rule of imputed disqualification prevent any
151. Richard H. Underwood, Part-Time Prosecutors and Conflicts of Interest: A Survey and Some
Proposals, 81 KY. L. J. 1, 103 (1992).
152. A.B.A. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE supra note 146, at 3-1.3(b).
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lawyer in the "firm" from representing a criminal defendant in the jurisdiction, however defined.
b.

Part-time county attorneys

A county and prosecuting attorney in Wyoming, or a deputy, may engage in private practice unless the Board of County Commissioners says
otherwise.' 3 Whether full-time or part-time, a county prosecutor's statutory
duties include acting "as a prosecutor for the state. . . ."", Accordingly, a

county attorney prosecutes felonies, misdemeanors and delinquent acts in
the name of "the State of Wyoming," not simply on behalf of the county.
County attorneys' close relationship with the State is further illustrated by
their statutory relationship with the Wyoming Attorney General. If a county
attorney wants help with a case, he or she may request it from the Attorney
General,' the state's chief lawyer."' In addition, the Division of Criminal
Investigation in the Attorney General's Office has "concurrent jurisdiction
and powers with ...

other law enforcement agencies and officers in the

state.""' 7 Among the Division's responsibilities are supervising the Wyoming law enforcement academy."' County law enforcement agencies also
work closely with the Division. They are required by law, for example, to
cooperate with the Division in establishing and maintaining a uniform sysiem of identification of criminals."' Accordingly, county attorneys often
work directly with State employees, not just county employees, in prosecuting crimes.
If a part-time prosecutor were to represent a criminal defendant in another county, he or she might well need to impeach and discredit the same
peace officers and/or Division of Criminal Investigation employees whose
testimony formed the basis for previous prosecutions, and upon whom the
lawyer will need to rely in the future. Allowing a prosecutor to assume an
adversarial role will inevitably be destructive to the working relationship
between the prosecutor and law enforcement personnel, as well as detrimental to the integrity of the criminal justice system. In addition, a defense
lawyer may need to challenge the constitutionality of the statute under
which the defendant has been charged. The prosecutorial duties of part-

153. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-303(b) (LEXIS 1999). By contrast, district attorneys, deputy district

attorneys, and assistant district attorneys may not engage in private law practice. WYO. STAT. ANN. §§
9-1-802(c), 806(b), and 807(b).
WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 9-1-104(aXi)(LExlS 1999Xemphasis added) (dictating that a district attor154'.
ney acts as the prosecutor for the state) and 18-3-302(b) (affirming that if a county does not have a
district attorney, the county attorney "shall have the jurisdiction, responsibilities, and duties of the dis-

trict attorney ....).
155. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 9-1-603(d) (LEXIS 1999).
156. Id. § 9-1-603(a).
157. Id. § 9-1-616(b).

158. Id. § 9-1-633.
159. Id. § 9-1-624(b).
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time prosecutors create "conscious and unconscious influences such that
they may be reluctant to attack the constitutionality of the laws they have
sworn to uphold. . .

."110

The problem is obvious, a lawyer may be prose-

cuting persons under the same statute in another court."'
Under the Wyoming Code of Professional Responsibility, the predecessor to the Rules of Professional Conduct, lawyers were to "avoid even
the appearance of professional impropriety."'6 2 That language was omitted
from the Rules, but it still finds frequent expression when courts or ethics
committees consider the propriety of part-time prosecutors representing
criminal defendants. While the language is gone, the concept is still important. As the Utah Supreme Court said recently, courts, not just lawyers,
need to "ensure faith in the impartiality and integrity of the justice system
[and] the appearance of fairness and impartiality in the adjudication must be
diligently maintained."'6' A part-time prosecutor representing a criminal
defendant in another court creates an "unavoidable appearance of impropriety.....,

The Prevailing view, therefore, is that "the jurisdiction" for purposes of
the prohibition on prosecutors representing criminal defendants is the
state." Once "jurisdiction" is defined, applying that definition to attorneys
in Wyoming is relatively simple. Under the general conflict of interest
standards of the Wyoming Rules of Professional Conduct, a lawyer may not
represent opposing parties in litigation,' even if the matters are "wholly
unrelated."' 7 Since a county attorney in Wyoming represents the State, he
or she may not ethically represent a criminal defendant in a case in which
the State is the adverse party, i.e., in any case brought by another county
attorney. Waiver of the conflict, generally permissible under Rule 1.7, is

160. State v. Brandley, 972 P.2d 78, 83 (Utah App. 1998).
161. WYOMING RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 cmt. [9] (LEXIS 1999) (advocating
inconsistent positions in different cases is ordinarily permissible unless the interests of either client
would be adversely affected. The concern is heightened, however, when a part-time prosecutor, a "quasi
judicial officer," is challenging a criminal statute in one case and prosecuting under it in another.).
162. RULES PROVIDING FOR THE ORGANIZATION AND GOVERNMENT OF THE BAR ASSOCIATION OF
THE ATTORNEYS OF THE STATE OF WYOMING Rule 20, Canon 8 (Michie 1984, Cumi. Supp.).
163. State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 858 (Utah 1992).

164. Id.
165. See, e.g., id. and The Supreme Court of Ohio Bd. of Comm. Griev. Disp., Op. No. 88-008
(1988); Utah State Bar Ethics Ad. Op. Comm., Op. No. 145 (1994).
166. WYOMING RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 cmt. [7] (LEXIS 1999).

167. Id. The comment suggests that exceptions may exist where a client represents an entity with
diverse operations. The ABA has interpreted that language to allow an attorney to represent a corporate
subsidiary against a corporate client in civil matters in limited circumstances. See ABA Comm. on
Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-390 (1995). Three members of the Committee
dissented vigorously. Further, the language has never been construed to permit a part-time county
prosecutor to represent a criminal defendant in another county. Id. at 11 -15.
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not a viable solution. A county attorney who represents "the State" is acting
on behalf of the public, and "the public cannot consent"'6 to a conflict.
Some authorities treat part-time county attorneys and part-time city
attorneys the same, prohibiting either from undertaking representation of 7a
criminal defendant in another court. Others distinguish between the two.1
That distinction has merit.
c.

17

Part-time city prosecutors '

The Wyoming Statutes are silent about the powers and duties of city
prosecutors.'" Cities and towns, of course, have only those powers delegated to them by the Legislature.'" Their delegated power includes the
authority to adopt ordinances and enforce them by imposing fines not to
exceed $750.00, jail terms of not more than six months, or both.'74 Attorneys hired by cities or towns, therefore, act on behalf of the municipality;
they do not have authority to act on behalf of the state. Furthermore, there
is no statutory relationship between the Attorney General and city attorneys.
Consequently, city prosecutors do not represent or act on behalf of the State;
rather, they represent municipalities. Therefore, Rule 1.7's prohibition on a
lawyer representing opposing parties in unrelated matters does not apply.
Nevertheless, conflict of interest concerns remain.
First, city prosecutors work closely with law enforcement, usually the
local police department. The local police departments must, as county law7
enforcement agencies, work with the Division of Criminal Investigation.'
It is unlikely, however, that an attorney who represents a criminal defendant
in a different county will need to use law enforcement personnel from that
county or the state to prosecute crimes in the lawyer's home town.'76 Second, city prosecutors often rely on State employees for assistance. State
employees are sometimes called as expert witnesses in cases such as Driv168. The Supreme Court of Ohio Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline, Op. No. 88008 (1988); see also RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERN[NG LAWYERS § 202 cmt. g(ii) (Proposed Final
Draft No. 1. 1996) ("Decisional law in a minority of states has limited the extent to which a governmental client may consent to a conflict of interest.").
169. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 853 P.2d at 856-57, modified by State v. Brandley, 972 P.2d 78, 83-85
(Utah App. 1998); and ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 262 (1944).
170. See, e.g., The Supreme Court of Ohio Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline,
Op. No. 88-008 (1988).

171. The author was a part-time city prosecutor in Laramie, Wyoming, while maintaining a private
practice as a member of a firm.
172. The Wyoming Statutes contain only oblique references to city attomeys. WYO. STAT. ANN. §
15-4-202(c) (LEXIS 1999) says that "[t]he city attorney is not required to perform any service other than
legal service." Subdivision (d) exempts city attorneys from merit selection. Id.
173. Wyoming State Treasurer v. City of Rawlins, 510 P.2d 301 (Wyo. 1973).
174. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 15-1-103(xii) (LEXIS 1999).
175. See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 9-1-624(b) (LEXIS 1999).

176. See. e.g., State v. Brandley, 972 P.2d 78, 84 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (holding that a part-time city
prosecutor who represents a criminal defendant in another county would have "little need" to have
testimony in support of prosecutions in home town from peace officers in that county).
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ing Under the Influence. Those same employees could be prosecution witnesses in a case in another jurisdiction where a city prosecutor is representing a criminal defendant. Third, the public perception concerns still exist.
As one court put it, when an attorney acts in the dual role of city prosecutor
and criminal defense attorney, that dual role "erodes public confidence in
the criminal justice system."'7 Since the relationship with the State is not as
close as it is for county attorneys, city attorneys have often been held to a
different, more lenient standard than county attorneys in evaluating whether
they may represent criminal defendants before another court.
There will always be concerns when a city prosecutor represents a
criminal defendant in State District Court. Instead of an outright prohibition
on such representation, however, the better view is that there is "a narrow
set of circumstances" in which it is ethically acceptable, if not advisable, for
a part-time city prosecutor to represent a criminal defendant in state court in
a different county. Those circumstances are: 7
(1) The criminal statute under which the defendant was charged is fundamentally different than the city ordinances which the attorney is responsible for enforcing (e.g., homicide vs. driving under the influence);
(2) The criminal charges do not involve the city or city officials;
(3) The law enforcement officers involved are not of the type who are
involved in violations of city ordinances (e.g., state troopers vs. local
police officers);
(4) The defendant is not a city resident; and
(5) As city prosecutor, the lawyer has no official involvement outside
the city's jurisdiction.
There is authority to the contrary. The Utah Supreme Court has held
that the conflict posed by a part-time city attorney's prosecutorial duties and
his duty to a criminal defendant in state court are so severe that they require
aper se prohibition on part-time prosecutors acting as appointed counsel for
indigent defendants.'
The court did not decide if the conflict was constitutionally impermissible, but it concluded that "vital interests of the criminal
justice system are jeopardized when a city prosecutor is appointed to assist
in the defense of an accused.""' Pursuant to its inherent supervisory power
over the courts, and its express power to regulate the practice of law, the
177. State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 858 (Utah 1992).

178. This list is based, in substantial part, on ethics opinions by the American Bar Association and the
State of Ohio. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1045 (1968) and
The Supreme Court of Ohio Bd. Comm. Griev. Disp., Op. No. 88-008 (1988).
179. Brown, 853 P.2d at 856-57.

180. Id.
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court banned the appointment as defense counsel of any attorney with
Failure to comply with the ban would result in
prosecutorial obligations.'
"per se" reversal." The Utah Court of Appeals subsequently narrowed the
Brown opinion by declining to apply the rule of per se disqualification to
who was hired to represent a crimithe partner of part-time city prosecutors
3
nal defendant in state court."
The per se prohibition seems inappropriate. As the dissent in Brown
noted, the defense attorney's prosecutorial duties were limited to violations
of city ordinances, while the defendant had been charged with unrelated
crimes (murder and felony assault) under state law.- Further, the "distinct
differences" in the prosecutorial duties of county and city attorneys justifies
treating them differently so that the former should be prohibited from criminal defense work in state courts and the latter should not be."d.

Representation in federal court

The same concepts should apply when a part-time county or city
prosecutor wishes to represent a defendant in federal court. Neither represents the United States, the charging party in federal court. Accordingly,
neither should be automatically precluded from representing a criminal defendant in that forum.
Assuming the existence of circumstances similar to the "narrow circumstances" where it is permissible for a city prosecutor to represent a
criminal defendant in state court,"' it should be ethically permissible for a
part-time county or city prosecutor to act as a defense attorney in federal
court. Even though the "jurisdiction" might be geographically coterminous,
e.g., the State of Wyoming, part-time county prosecutors (and part-time city
prosecutors) should not be automatically precluded from criminal defense
work in federal court. Instead, the circumstances of each case should be
evaluated to see if they present an insurmountable conflict. The five factors
7
listed above regarding city prosecutors ' can be easily modified for use in
federal court. Only if all five are satisfied should the attorney proceed.
Authority does exist for the contrary view. In at least two states, the
ban on part-time county prosecutors representing criminal defendants in

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Id. at 857.
Id.
State v. Brandley, 972 P.2d 78, 84 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
Brown, 853 P.2d at 863 (Hall, C.J., dissenting).
Id.
See notes 171 - 185 and accompanying text.
Id.
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state court has been extended to preclude criminal defense in federal court
in the state.'8 That position seems unduly restrictive.
e.

Imputed disqualification

However one defines "the jurisdiction," the rule of imputed disqualification is usually, and should be, applied to the other lawyer's in the parttime prosecutor's firm. The Wyoming Rules of Professional Conduct are
clear: "[w]hen lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a client when any one of them practicing alone would be
prohibited from doing so.... ."" In the context of part-time prosecutors, the
Ohio Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline echoed that
general standard: "[w]hen a member of a law firm may not accept employment ... other members of that law firm are likewise precluded from accepting such employment."90 Consequently, when the prosecutor is ethically prohibited from representing an accused criminal defendant, others in
the firm are, as well.
It has been suggested that the rule of imputed disqualification should
not be applied rigidly when one attorney in a firm is a part-time prosecutor.
The Utah Court of Appeals recently held that in the absence of an actual
conflict of interest, a lawyer whose partner was a part-time city prosecutor
could ethically, and constitutionally, represent a criminal defendant in another county.'" The court focused on the relationship between the lawyer
involved in representing the accused (the partner of prosecutors) and the
peace officers who were involved. First, the court said that since the defense attorney had no prosecutorial responsibilities, he "thus would never
have occasion to need a police officer's testimony" in a future case.'9 Second, the lawyer's associates, who were prosecutors, would have no need of
the testimony of the peace officers involved in the criminal matter in the
other county.'"
Finally, the court noted that the accused was not being
asked to "confide in a prosecutor... [but] in an attorney who merely shares
an association with attorneys who prosecute elsewhere."'1' These factors, in
the court's view, justified departing from the rule of imputed disqualification.
The court's reasoning Brandley is not persuasive. First, it assumes that
the partners of a prosecutor will never have occasion to act in the prosecutor's stead. In a small firm which acts as city prosecutor, it is possible, if
188. Underwood,supra note 151, at 38 (citing authorities from Kentucky and South Carolina).
189
WYOMING RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10(a)(LEXIS 1999). The general principles of imputed disqualification are discussed at surpra notes 19-53 and accompanying text.
190. The Supreme Court of Ohio Bd. of Comm. Griev. Disp., Op. No. 88-008 (1988).
191. State v. Brandley, 872 P.2d 78, 86 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
192. Id. at 84.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 85.
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not likely, that the attorney who acts as primary city prosecutor will be gone
on occasion.' 9' When that happens, another attorney in the firm will likely
act in the absent attorney's place. Second, the suggestion that a client imparting information to one lawyer in a firm is not the same as telling another
runs counter to the very basis of the principles of imputed disqualification.
A lawyer, and the lawyer's firm, owes each client the duties of confidentiality and loyalty. Communicating with one lawyer (or staff person) in a
firm is the functional equivalent of communicating with every other person
in the firm. The better view is that access to information, rather than actual
knowledge, is the key. The Missouri Court of Appeals took that approach
in disqualifying a part-time prosecutor and reversing a conviction.- The
part-time prosecutor's "access to privileged information," even in the absence of evidence of actual knowledge, raised an unacceptable conflict of
interest.1' 9 The rule of imputed disqualification, in sum, should be applied to
part-time prosecutors, and their firms, for the same reasons it is applied in
general.
2.

Representation in civil matters

As discussed above, there are significant limitations on the ability of a
part-time prosecutor with a private practice to represent criminal defendants. Representing clients in civil matters can also pose conflicts, with
implications on both the attorney's role as a prosecutor, and on the attorney's role in civil practice. An inappropriate conflict poses both ethical and
constitutional problems.
The potential for conflicts is enormous. To begin with, every person in
the county where a part-time county attorney prosecutes or in the municipality where a part-time city attorney prosecutes, is a potential criminal defendant. Such a person might be a client or a former client of the prosecutor, or the prosecutor's firm, the adverse party in a lawsuit or other transaction in which the prosecutor or the prosecutor's firm is involved, or a witness in a lawsuit in which the lawyer is involved. Any of the above scenarios presents a troublesome conflict.
a.

Current clients

A lawyer may not ethically prosecute a client."' The rule of imputed
disqualification makes it unethical to prosecute the clients of any other law-

195. In my experience as a former part-time city prosecutor with a private practice as a member of a
firm, it was not uncommon for others in the firm to fill in for me as the prosecutor.
196. State v. Ross, 829 S.W.2d 948 (Mo.1992).

197. Id. at 951 (quoting State v. Wacaser, 794 S.W.2d 190 (Mo. bane 1990)).
198. WYOMING RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 cmt. [8] (LEXIS 1999) ("Ordinarily, a

lawyer may not act as advocate against a client the lawyer represents in some other matter, even if the
other matter is wholly unrelated.").
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yer in the firm. '" But while the rules are reasonably straight-forward, their
application is not.
A part-time prosecutor cannot anticipate who will become a defendant,
especially in municipal court. Simply receiving a traffic citation renders a
person a defendant in a misdemeanor case.'9 More serious offenses, such as
DUIs, are also unpredictable. As a result, a current firm client might suddenly become a defendant, especially in city court.
If a current client becomes a defendant in a criminal matter, there are
three potentially available options. The firm may: (1) continue to represent
the client in the original matter and not prosecute; (2) withdraw from the
original matter and continue with the prosecution; or (3) withdraw from
both matters. Options (1) or (2) may be unavailable, i.e., unethical, in any
given situation.
Unless a part-time prosecutor and/or the firm chooses not to represent
clients who live in the geographic area where the firm prosecutes, conflicts
will inevitably arise. When that happens, the firm will have to limit its role
in some way; it simply cannot prosecute and continue to represent the client.
Assuming that the firm recuses itself promptly from the prosecution, it
should be permitted to continue with the other representation. The exception will be if the lawyer learns something which creates a conflict. For
example, an attorney representing a parent in a divorce case may, at the
client's request, be arguing vigorously for custody. That person is then
charged with DUI and resisting arrest. The police report about the incident
suggests behavior which causes the attorney to believe that custody would
be inappropriate. If knowing that information would cause the lawyer's
representation of the parent to be "materially limited," continued representation would be inappropriate."' The opposite approach, withdrawal from
the civil matter in favor of prosecution, is often more difficult. Whether it
is ethical depends on several factors.
The first issue facing a firm which wishes to terminate its relationship
with a client in a civil matter is whether doing so is ethical. Rule 1.16 governs the termination of representation by withdrawal. Since prosecuting a
client is impermissible under the rules, withdrawal is required under paragraph (a) of that rule because to continue the representation would result in

199. Imputed disqualification is discussed at supra notes 49 - 53 and accompanying text. See also
Underwood, supra note 151, at 59.

200. The possibilities for conflicts are almost endless. In addition to traffic offenses, municipalities
routinely issue citations for animals without licenses, animals running at large, loud parties, weeds in the
alley, etc. Any such citation may be issued to a client of the firm's. If the person who received the
citation contests it, the firm is squarely in the middle of an impermissible conflict of interest.
201. WYOMING RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(b) (LEXIS 1999); see also supra notes
436 - 439 and accompanying text.
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a violation of the rules. 20 2 When the firm withdraws, it must "take steps to
the extent reasonably practicable to protect [the] client's interests ... "201
Such steps may include giving "reasonable notice ...allowing time for
employment of other counsel ... and refunding any advance payment of fee
that has not been earned."2' The second issue is if withdrawal is permissible.
An attorney's right to withdraw is contingent on whether the attorney
has entered an appearance in a court on behalf of the client.205 If so, the attorney may withdraw only with the court's permission.2 If permission to
withdraw is denied, the lawyer's ethical obligation is clear. The lawyer
"shall continue representation notwithstanding good cause for terminating
the representation."'' 7 Courts have broad discretion in deciding whether to
permit withdrawal. Permission may be denied if permitting withdrawal
would adversely affect the client.'" A law firm may not have the option,
therefore, of withdrawing from representation of a client in a civil matter so
that the firm, or a lawyer in it, may prosecute the individual involved. Furthermore, if the firm does terminate its relationship with a client whom it
then intends to prosecute, the firm faces former client conflict of interest
issues. Those issues are discussed below.
At times, terminating an attorney-client relationship with one client
will not allow the attorney to continue representing another. The problem is
that a concurrent conflict of interest may preclude representation of both
clients pursuant to Rule 1.7. Then, after the lawyer withdraws from representing one client, a former client conflict of interest may preclude representation of the other.2 19The only ethical course of action, therefore, may be
to withdraw from representing either client.

.(a)(i) (LEXIS 1999) (to continue would
202. WYOMING RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule LI
be a violation of the conflict of interest rules, rule 1.7, in particular.).
203 Id. at 1.16(d).
204. Id.
205. UNIFORM RULES FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE STATE OF WYOMING Rule 102(c) (LEXIS
1999) ("Counsel will not be permitted to withdraw from a case except upon court order."). The Uniform
Rules also apply in County Courts. UNIFORM RULES FOR THE COUNTY COURTS OF WYOMING Rule 1.02
(LEXIS 1999). Similarly, an attorney who has entered an appearance in the Wyoming Supreme Court
may not withdraw "without written consent of the appellate court... " WYOMING RULES OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE Rule 19.02 (LEXIS 1999). The same rule applies in federal court in Wyoming. LOCAL
RULES OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF WYOMING Rule 83.12.3(b) (explaining that a lawyer who has entered an appearance may withdraw "with court permission").
206. Id.
16(c) (LEXIS 1999).
207. WYOMING RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.
208. See. e.g., In Re Lathen, 654 P.2d 1110, 1112 (Or. 1982) (denying counsel's request to withdraw
immediately before trial because it would create a substantial hardship to the client).
209. WYOMING RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 cmt.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2000

[3) (LEXIS

1999).

39

Land & Water
Review, Vol. 35 [2000], Iss. 1, Art. Vol.
5 XXXV
LANDLaw
AND WATER LAW REVIEW

b.

Former clients

An attorney's continuing obligations of loyalty and confidentiality impose restrictions on representing future clients with conflicting interests. ' ' 0
Rule 1.9, the general former client conflict of interest rule, applies. A
prosecutor may not, therefore, prosecute a former client if there is a substantial relationship between the former representation and the prosecution,
and the interests of the new client (the city or the county) are materially
adverse to the former client's.I ' Further, a part-time prosecutor may not use
confidential information about a former client learned during a previous
representation to the disadvantage of the former client.c.

Adverse party conflicts

A conflict may exist because a criminal defendant is also the adverse
party in a civil case. In Ganger v. Peyton,2 ' for example, the Fourth Circuit
reviewed the grant of a writ of habeus corpus based on the conflict created
when a part-time prosecutor simultaneously prosecuted a person and represented the person's wife in a divorce proceeding. A prosecutor, said the
court, "is an officer of the court, holding a quasi judicial position.., vested
with a vast quantum of discretion which is necessary for the vindication of
the public interest."' " , The conflict presented by representing the accused's
wife made it impossible for the court to "ascertain what would have happened if the prosecuting attorney had been free to exercise the fair discretion which he owed" to the accused."' The prosecutor's conduct was not
simply improper, it "violate[d] the requirement of fundamental fairness assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."2 6' The
only remedy was to affirm the district court's grant of a writ of habeas corpus and vacate the sentence of the state trial court. 117 The United States Supreme Court has taken a similar view.
In Young v. United States, a federal district court appointed the attorney for the prevailing party in a trademark infringement case to act as a
special prosecutor for the purpose of bringing criminal contempt proceedings against another party for alleged violations of the court's order."' The
Court reversed. Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan said the appointment of an interested attorney as a special prosecutor was a "fundamental

210. See supra notes 2 - 23 and accompanying discussion.
211. WYOMING RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9(a) (LEXIS 1999); see also Underwood,
supra note 151, at 66-67.
212. WYOMING RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9(c) (LEXIS 1999).
213. 379 F.2d 709 (4 'h Cir. 1967).
214. Id. at 714 (internal citations omitted).
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 715; see also Underwood, supra note 151, at 71-86.
218. 481 U.S. 787, 790(1987).
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and pervasive" error which "undermine[d] confidence in the integrity of the
criminal proceeding."21' As with any fundamental error, prejudice was presumed, and the Government was denied the opportunity to show that the
appointment of an interested attorney was "harmless error."'The conflict exists because of the prosecutor's position of power over
the adverse party, not because of more traditional conflict of interest concerns. Prosecutorial powers such as the discretion to bring or decline to
bring criminal charges, or to enter or reject a plea bargain, create the potential for a part-time prosecutor to gain an advantage in civil litigation through
the threat, explicit or implied, of criminal proceedings. Such threats are
expressly prohibited by the Wyoming Rules of Professional Conduct: "A
lawyer shall not present, participate in presenting, or threaten to present
criminal charges solely to obtain an advantage in a civil matter."'2
Part-time prosecutors occupy a unique position. Unlike the great majority of lawyers, they wear the mantle of prosecutorial power. With that
power comes responsibility. Because the potential for real or perceived
abuse of prosecutorial power is enormous, a part-time prosecutor needs to
be sensitive to the perceptions of opposing parties who are or become the
subject of criminal proceedings.
d.

Other conflicts

A conflict may also arise when a person is involved in a civil matter,
although not as a party, and is a criminal defendant. Consider, for example,
a person who is to serve as a witness in a civil matter, on behalf of either
party. That individual's testimony could harm or hurt the interests of the
client of a part-time prosecutor. Once again, the part-time prosecutor is in a
position to reward or punish the witness for his or her testimony through
decisions about charging or not charging, etc.
It would be a foolish lawyer, indeed, who made any kind of agreement
to go easy on a person in exchange for beneficial testimony. But the reality
of an imbalance of power exists, and the appearance, alone, is sufficient to
create an impermissible conflict. The concern is identical to the problem
which exists when a part-time prosecutor represented the wife of an accused
in a divorce action. The attorney's dual role as prosecutor and civil attorney
makes it impossible for a reviewing court to "ascertain what would have

219. Id. at810.

220. Id. at 809.

221. WYOMING RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.4(b) (LEXIS 1999). The ABA Model
Rules do not contain a paragraph (b). Accordingly, the ABA ethics opinion regarding the use of criminal threats to gain an advantage in a civil matter should be viewed with great caution by Wyoming
lawyers. See, ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 92-363 (1992) (declaring that the Model Rules do not prohibit a lawyer from using the possibility of pressing for criminal
charges against the opposing party in a private civil matter to gain a benefit for a client).
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happened if the prosecuting attorney had been free to exercise the fair discretion which he owed" to the accused."' Accordingly, when faced with
such a situation, the part-time prosecutor should withdraw from the criminal
matter or the civil matter, and may be required to withdraw from both. m
3.

Part-time judges

Many municipal judges and justices of the peace in Wyoming work on
a part-time basis. They are allowed to maintain a private practice in addition to their judicial obligations. The combination of functions poses even
more potential conflicts than combining prosecution and private practice.
In addition to the ethical standards for lawyers as set forth in the
Wyoming Rules of Professional Conduct, all judges, including part-time
judges, must comply with the more exacting principles of the Wyoming
Code of Judicial Conduct.2 25 This is because judges, in the words of the
Wyoming Supreme Court, bear "heavy moral, social and professional responsibilit[ies]. ... "I" Those responsibilities must be discharged in a manner that builds, rather than destroys, public confidence. And although the
Code generally prohibits judges from practicing law,'21 part-time judges are
28
exempt from that prohibition.
The Code of Judicial Conduct begins with the proposition that every
judge "should participate in establishing, maintaining, and enforcing high
standards of conduct, and shall personally observe those standards so that
the integrity and independence of the judiciary will be preserved. '2' Integrity and independence depend, in large part, on public confidence in the
system. Confidence, in turn, depends on "the impartiality of the judiciary..

222. Ganger v. Peyton, 379 F.2d 709, 714 (4"' Cir. 1967).
223. For a discussion of when a lawyer must withdraw from all further involvement in a matter, see
supra notes 54 - 73 and accompanying text.
224. The statutes are silent about municipal judges. It is common, however, for them to be part-time
and to also practice law. A justice of the peace who is a lawyer may practice law "so long as that practice does not conflict with his duties as justice of the peace." WYO. STAT. ANN. § 5-4-206 (LEXIS

1999); A county court judge may not practice law. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 5-5-121 (LEXIS 1999).
225. WYOMING CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Application of the Code of Judicial Conduct A.
(LEXIS 1999) ("Anyone ... who is an officer of a judicial system and who perform judicial functions,
such as a magistrate, court commissioner, special master or referee, is a judge within the meaning of this
Code.").
226. Matter of Johnson, 568 P.2d 855, 865 (Wyo. 1977).
227. WYOMING CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4G (LEXIS 1999).
228. Part-time judges, whether continuing or periodic, are exempt from Canon 4G, which proscribes

judges from practicing law. id. Canon 4C(l), and 4D(l)(b).
229. Id. Canon I (LEXIS 1999).
230. Id. Canon I Commentary.
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Although the appearance of impropriety standard is no longer part of a
lawyer's express ethical duties, 3' it is a fundamental tenant of the Code of
Judicial Conduct: "A Judge Shall Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance of
Impropriety in All of the Judge's Activities." 32 And as a public figure, a
judge "must expect to be the subject of constant public scrutiny. A judge
must therefore accept restrictions on the judge's conduct that might be
viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen... ."233 or the ordinary lawyer. This mandate applies "to both the professional and personal conduct of
a judge."- As it is not possible to catalogue the acts which create an appearance of impropriety, judges are directed to consider "whether the conduct would create in reasonable minds a perception that the judge's ability
to carry out judicial responsibilities with integrity, impartiality and competence is impaired."2 "
The appearances of impropriety standard has been expressly adopted
by the Wyoming Supreme Court as applicable to part-time judges. "A justice of the peace by virtue of the dual capacities of judge[s] and private
practitioner, must be extremely diligent in avoiding even the appearance of
impropriety... ."" 23Such an appearance exists when the judicial office is
used for private gain.
Under the appearances standard, many actions by a part-time judge
create problems of perception. Consider a part-time judge whose private,
civil practice includes involvement in any of the following: (1) representing
a person who is a criminal defendant in either the judge's court or another
court in the jurisdiction; (2) representing a person whose spouse, significant
other or family member is a criminal defendant; (3) involvement in a civil
matter in which a witness (or witnesses) will be testifying before the judge
in a criminal matter; or (4) involvement in a civil matter in which a lawyer
who regularly appears before the judge represents another party (or even a
co-party). While the only specific restriction is that the law partner of a
justice of the peace may not appear before that justice,23' each of the above
scenarios presents sufficiently significant perception problems that it should
be avoided.
231. That standard was in Canon 9 of the Wyoming Code of Professional Responsibility. It was
removed from the ABA Model Rules which were adopted, with modifications, in Wyoming in 1986.

232. WYOMING CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Cannon 2 (LEXIS 1999).
233. Id. Canon 2A Commentary.
234. Id.

235. Id.
236. Matter of Johnson, 568 P.2d 855, 866 (Wyo. 1977). Although the opinion was written at a time
when the Wyoming Code of Professional Responsibility contained the avoidance of impropriety standard, the Johnson opinion does not rely on or even mention that standard. The elimination of that standard from the Rules of Professional Conduct which were subsequently adopted (but not from the Code
of Judicial Conduct) should not, therefore, be construed to eliminate the standard's applicability to
judges.

237. Id.
238. WYO. STAT. ANN. §5-4-111 (LEXIS 1999).
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A part-time judge also needs to be ready to recuse himself or herself
when persons with whom the judge has or had a professional relationship
appear in court. A part-time judge should not, of course, sit on a case in
which the defendant is a client or client of the firm with which the judge is
associated or the adverse party in a matter in which the judge was involved
as a lawyer. Similarly, if the defendant is a former client, or a former adverse party, the judge may need to step aside. Even if the former matter was
completely unrelated, the issue of the appearance of impropriety remains.
That is, the perception that a person received more or less favorable treatment than others in similar situations.
Assuming the bench as a part-time judge will substantially curtail a
lawyer's practice, but as the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates, a judge
must act, both personally and professionally, in a manner which preserves
and promotes the "integrity and independence of the judiciary."23' Further, a
judge's judicial responsibilities "take precedence over all the judge's other
activities.'"4 A part-time judge's "other activities" may include, of course,
the practice of law. Accordingly, part-time judges "must be extremely diligent in avoiding even the appearance of impropriety. '24 If necessary to
avoid that appearance, the judge's law practice must take a back seat to his
or her judicial responsibilities.
4.

Special problems of public defenders

The great majority of persons accused of crimes, or involved in related
proceedings, are represented by a public defender. Persons charged with
violations of Wyoming Statutes are eligible to be represented by the Wyoming Public Defender,"' either through full-time or part-time assistant public defenders,' or by private attorneys designated and paid by the Public
Defender." The Federal Public Defender for the Districts of Wyoming and
Colorado provides appointed counsel for persons charged with federal offenses who are indigent. In municipal courts, representation of indigent
defendants charged with crimes for which a jail sentence is a possible punishment is usually furnished by private attorneys who accept
appointments.' Whether part-time or full-time, public defenders face significant conflict of interest issues.

239. WYOMING CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 (LEXIS 1999).

240. Id. Canon 3A.
241. Id. Canon].
242. WYO. STAT. ANN. §7-6-105(a) (LEXIS 1999)
243. id. §104(f) ("The governor may appoint full or part-time assistant public defenders .... ") Id.
Full-time assistants may not engage in private practice; part-time assistants may. Id. § 104(h).
244. WYO.R. CRIM. P. Rule 44(e) (LEXIS 1999).
245. The State Public Defender is precluded by law from representing persons in municipal court.
WYo. STAT. ANN. § 7-6-112(a)(iii). While there are no Wyoming statutory provisions about appointing
counsel for violations of municipal ordinances, such a right is guaranteed by the United States and
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Perhaps the most serious conflict which occurs regularly is that presented by an attorney's representation of multiple criminal defendants in the
same matter. That issue is discussed in detail above.2" The conflict and the
Wyoming Supreme Court's rule of presumed prejudice in the absence of
independent counsel for each defendant present vexing issues for public
defenders in Wyoming because of the rule of imputed disqualification.
As previously discussed,2 47the rule of imputed disqualification precludes any of the lawyers in a "firm" from representing a client when any
one of them could not ethically do so. A "firm" includes "lawyers employed in.. . [an] organization .... ,,"4' The Rules make no express exception for a firm which has offices in more than one locale, as does the Wyoming Public Defender. The Wyoming Public Defender's office is an "organization" which employs lawyers. It is, therefore, a "firm" as defined by
the rules. The rigid application of the rule of imputed disqualification to the
entire office, however, would create difficult and significant problems since
that office is often the only potentially available source of legal representation for indigent criminal defendants.
The applicability of the rule of imputed disqualification to public defenders' offices has generated considerable controversy around the country.
Two general views have emerged. First, a rule of per se disqualification has
been applied when the various public defenders' offices within a jurisdiction are subject to common control, and there is common access to confidential client information. 4 Second, a rule that conflicts based on joint
representation by more than one public defender should be evaluated case
by case using the "disinterested lawyer" standard.3 0 Even the per se disqualification rule, however, may not require the disqualification of public
defenders in different offices.
The approach of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit exemplifies the per se disqualification approach. Michael Selsor and an
associate, Mr. Dodson, were accused of robbing a convenience store in
Tulsa, Oklahoma, and murdering one clerk and injuring another during the
Wyoming constitutions, as well as Rule 44(a) of the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure, if the sentence for the charged crime involves a possible jail term.
246. See supra notes 107 - 37 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 49 - 53 and accompanying text.
248. WYOMING RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Terminology (LEXIS 1999); see also id. Rule
1.10 emt [1].
on Ethics and Professionalism, Informal Op. 1418 (1978), cited in Selsor
249. See, e.g., ABA Comm.
h
v. Kaiser, 81 F.3d 1492 (10" Cir. 1996). See also McCall v. District Court, 783 P.2d 1223 (Colo. 1989);
Okeani v. Arizona, 871 P.2d 727 (Ariz. App. 1994); State v. Dilman, 591 N.E.2d 849 (Ohio App. 1990);
Commonwealth v. Green 550 A.2d 1011 (Pa. Super. 1988); and State v. Hatfield, 754 P.2d 126 (Wash.
App. 1988).
250. See, e.g., People v. Banks, 520 N.E.2d 617, 620-21 (I1. 1987); Graves v. State, 619 A.2d 693
(Md. App. 1993); State v. Bell, 447 A.2d 525 (NJ. 1987); and Utah v. Barella, 714 P.2d 287 (Utah
1986).
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robbery."' Over objection, they were tried together and represented by the
same two public defenders from the Tulsa County public defenders office. 2
Their convictions and sentences were affirmed. 2" Selsor sought habeus
corpus relief in federal court, alleging inter alia, ineffective assistance of
counsel because of the conflict posed by the joint representation." The
Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of relief.
The Tenth Circuit adopted the per se disqualification approach suggested by the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professionalism in Informal
Opinion 1418."' The ABA was asked whether it was permissible for public
defenders in different cities to represent criminal defendants with conflicting interests in the same case. The answer was a qualified no. If the public
defender's offices are affiliated, joint representation is inappropriate. 5' Offices in different cities are "affiliated," according to the ABA, if they are
subject to the "common control" of the Chief Public Defender.' The solution proffered by the ABA is to have one defendant represented by appointed counsel "outside" the public defender's office."- By directing the
two public defenders to represent Selsor and Dodson, despite timely objection, the trial court had failed to adequately protect the defendants' constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel, and "conditional habeus
relief' was granted.? 9
Courts in other jurisdictions have held, however, that the rule of per se
disqualification does not necessarily apply to public defender offices in different localities. In McCall v. District Court, for example the Colorado
Supreme Court applied the rule of imputed disqualification to all assistant
public defenders in "the local public defender's" office.' Accordingly,
conflicts of one attorney within the local office would be imputed to the
other lawyers in the office. 6 ' The court was not asked, and did not address,
whether the imputed disqualification would extend to offices in other locales. Other courts have rejected the per se rule in favor of a case-by-case
approach.

251. Selsorv. Kaiser, 81 F.3d 1492, 1493-94 (10" Cir. 1996).
252. Id. at 1494.
253. Dodson v. State, 562 P.2d 916 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977).
254. 81 F.3d at 1496.
255. Selsor, 81 F.3d at 1502, n. 5.
256. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1418 (1978). The opinion
is based on DR 5-105(D) of the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility. In most states, including Wyoming, the Code has been superseded by the adoption of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Responsibility. Rule 1.10 of the Model Rules, which is identical to Wyoming Rule 1.10, is substantially similar to DR 5-105(D).
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Selsor, 81 F.3d at 1503.
260. 783 P.2d 1223, 1226 (Colo. 1989).
261. Id. at 1228.
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The case-by-case approach is best illustrated by the Maryland Court of
Appeals's decision in Graves v. State."2 The court began by acknowledging
that every case where the public defender's office represents two or more
joint defendants presents potential conflicts of interest.263 Accordingly, the
public defender, as any lawyer, must evaluate the degree of the potential
conflict. When the office determines that the potential is such that other
counsel should be appointed, the case should be assigned outside the office;
and assignment to "another district public defender's office" is one of the
acceptable alternatives.2"
The case-by-case approach, when properly applied, represents an ethical resolution of the imputed disqualification dilemma. While public defenders should not be held to a lesser standard than private attorneys in providing conflict-free representation with an assurance of client confidentiality, those objectives can be accomplished in other ways. The first step is for
the lawyers involved to be in different physical locations, even if the offices
are in the same municipality, with no access to information in the other office. Questions such as who has keys to the office and the file cabinets, who
has a password to the computer, and are the computers networked will be
critical. Different physical locations are meaningless if the lawyers in the
different offices have effective access to information via computer networking. Second, different individuals should supervise the lawyers. Although all lawyers in the Wyoming Public Defender's office are, by statute,
subject to the ultimate control of the Public Defender,16 she can certainly
delegate responsibility for a case and/or certain attorneys to someone else
within the office, screening herself from any involvement in or information
about the matter. Establishing effective procedures does not, however, end
the matter. Trial courts retain ultimate responsibility and authority to ensure
that criminal defendants have conflict-free representation.
Wyoming Rule of Criminal Procedure 44(c) sets the standard. It applies, inter alia, whenever two or more defendants are represented by " assigned counsel who are associated in the practice of law." Since members
of the state public defender's office are "associated in the practice of law,"
Rule 44(c) applies. Accordingly, the trial court "shall promptly inquire"
into the joint representation and "personally advise" the defendants of their
right to effective representation of counsel. The rule concludes with the
directive that "[u]nless it appears that there is good cause to believe no conflict of interest is likely to arise, the court shall order separate representation." An arrangement under which attorneys "associated" in the public
defender's office do not have access to information about the other defen-

262.
263.
264.
265.

619 A.2d 123 (Md. App. 1993).
Id. at 133.

Id.
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-5-103(cXv) (LEXIS 1999).
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dant(s) and are not subject to common control should meet the "good cause"

language of the rule. In every case involving joint defendants and attorneys
from the public defender's office, therefore, the court should, on the record,

make the required inquiry and give the requisite advisements. Before approving an arrangement such as described above, the court must find "good
cause to believe no conflict of interest is likely to arise" before approving

anything short of completely separate representation.
The typical conflict of interest issue which arises in criminal defense is

joint representation. Under the Wyoming Constitution and the Wyoming
Rules of Criminal Procedure, joint representation is prohibited unless the
co-defendants knowingly waive the right to conflict free counsel on the record. That standard applies whether co-defendants are tried together or separately, and the waiver must be made knowingly. This puts a burden on defense counsel and the courts to apprize codefendants of the risks of joint
representation before requesting or accepting a waiver.
V.

THIRD PARTY PAYERS

Lawyers frequently represent clients with the understanding that someone else will pay for the lawyer's services. Often, in fact, a lawyer agrees to
represent a client only because someone with the means to pay for the lawyer's services has agreed to do so. While such an arrangement is permissible, a third party payer relationship creates numerous potential conflicts of
interest. Lawyers must handle those conflicts properly to avoid both ethical
and legal problems.
Third party payers are common in many areas of law practice. In civil
litigation, defense attorneys are often paid by insurance companies or by a
litigant's employer. In criminal defense, third party payers include the state,
which provides public defenders for indigent defendants. An employer,
legal or otherwise, may also desire to provide counsel for an employee
charged with a crime in connection with the operation's activities. Lawyers
involved in business transactions, particularly the formation of new entities,
are often paid by someone other than the new entity (which may have no
assets). The line between the interests of the individuals who own a small
business entity and the interests of the entity itself is often blurry. Parents
often pay for lawyers for their minor children when they run afoul of the
law. Estate planning lawyers often find themselves in the middle of family
situations where the identities of the client and the payer are unclear. And
prepaid legal plans necessarily involve a third party payer. Nearly all lawyers, in short, become involved in third party payer relationships. They
need to be aware, therefore, of the potential conflicts inherent in third party
payer arrangements and how to structure a lawyer-client relationship to
avoid impermissible conflicts.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol35/iss1/5
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The Threshold Question: Who is the Client?
As with many conflict of interest issues, the threshold question is who
is the client? The question is important because most of a lawyer's ethical
and legal duties arise upon the formation of the lawyer-client relationship.2"
It is the client, for example, who sets the objectives of the representation,'
decides, in a civil case, whether to accept an offer of settlement or compromise,," determines, in a criminal case, which plea to enter, whether to waive
a jury trial, and whether to testify,2"6and with whom, in all cases, the lawyer
must communicate. 0 In addition, since many of a lawyer's legal duties are
to the client,'' it is usually the client who may bring an action for legal malpractice.-' One might think that identifying the client would be clear. Often it is, but too often it is not. Consider the following common situations.
1. Insurance defense counsel
A great number of lawsuits involve liability insurance. In such cases,
the named defendant is represented by an attorney hired by the insurance
company with which the defendant had previously entered into an insurance
contract. Pursuant to that contract, the normal relationship among a third
party payer, the client, and counsel is altered. By agreement between the
insured and the insurer, the insurance carrier is obliged to hire (and pay) a
lawyer to represent the insured, and is further obliged to indemnify the defendant up to a specified amount in the event of a settlement or a judgment.
In addition, most insurance contracts not only require the insured to cooperate with the insurer, they allow the insurer to 27control the defense, including
the selection and direction of defense counsel.
The tripartite relationship among insurer, insured, and defense counsel,
raises numerous ethical issues. Among them are the questions of who is the
client and to whom does the lawyer owe legal and ethical obligations. Although the Wyoming Rules suggest an answer, and many states' ethics
committees and courts have issued opinions trying to clarify the issue, those
attempts are ultimately unsatisfactory, leaving nearly as many questions as

266. WYOMING RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Scope [2] (LEXIS 1999). The exception is the
obligation of confidentiality. That duty arises at the instant a lawyer considers whether to enter into an

attomey-client relationship. Id.
267. WYOMING RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a) (LEXIS 1999). A lawyer must also

consult with the client about the means to be used to accomplish the client's goals. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id. Rule 1.4
271. Lawyers also have duties to the court and the public. See. e.g., WYOMING RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 3.1, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, and 6.1 (LEXIS 1999).

272. Bowen v. Smith, 838 P.2d 186, 190 (Wyo. 1992) (holding that a lawyer-client relationship is a
prerequisite to an action for legal malpractice).
273. Charles Silver and Kent Syverud, The ProfessionalResponsibilities ofinsurance Defense Law-

yers, 45 DUKE L. J. 255, 264-65 (1995).
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they answer. The reason is simple. The tripartite relationship is sui generis;
ethical rules do not address the situation directly, and "there is an awkwardness in attempts" to apply them.-' Two general views have emerged. Defense counsel represents either one client (the insured) or two (the insured
and the insurer).-3 As Professors Silver and Syverud have pointed out,
however, "it is perilous and inappropriate to adhere to either the one client'
or the two clients' view." ' ' The better view is that an attorney-client relationship necessarily arises by contract, either expressed or implied.2" In any
given situation, therefore, an attorney can agree to represent either the insured, alone, or the insured and the insurance company, jointly."' It is, nevertheless, worthwhile to be familiar with the debate.
The official commentary to the Wyoming Rules of Professional Conduct says that the insured is the client. Rule 1.2 addresses the "Scope of
Representation." Comment [4] refers to "a lawyer [who] has been retained
by an insurer to represent an insured. . .

."

The language that the lawyer

"represent[s] the insured" certainly suggests that the insured is the client.
Identical or similar language has been adopted in most states since thirtynine states (and the District of Columbia and the Virgin Islands) have
adopted some form of the ABA Model Rules,' 9 and the commentary to
Model Rule 1.2 contains the language adopted in Wyoming and quoted
above. 10 The dispute, however, is far from ended. The statement in the
commentary that a lawyer represents the insured has become universally
accepted. The question left unanswered is whether the lawyer also represents the insurance carrier (such joint representation would, of course, create a multitude of conflict of interest issues). Does the lawyer, in other
words, have one client or two? States disagree.
In Colorado, for example, the Bar Ethics Committee has opined that
the insured is the client to whom the lawyer owes the duty of loyalty, regardless of any contractual arrangement between the lawyer and the insurance carrier181 The lawyer's relationship with the insurance carrier is "less

clear," but it is not, according to the committee, a lawyer-client relationship.
The New Jersey Ethics Committee has reached a similar conclusion. The
lawyer hired by an insurance company represents the insured. 2 Accord-

274. Nancy J. Moore, The Ethical Duties of Insurance Defense Lawyers: Are Special Solutions Required? 4 CONN. INS. L. J. 259 (1997).
275. For discussions of the question of whom does the insurance defense lawyer represent, see C.
Silver and K. Syverud, supra note 271, at 273-80; and Nancy J. Moore, supra note 274, at 261-66.
276. Charles Silver and Kent Syverud, supra note 273, at 274-75.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. ABA COMPENDIUM OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY RULES AND STANDARDS at 517 (1997).
280. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2 cmt. [4] (1997).
281. Colo. Bar Ethics Op. (Jan. 16, 1993) (Ethical Duties of Attorney Selected by Insurer to Represent the Insured).
282. N.J. Adv. Comm. Prof. Eth. Op. No. 502 (Sept. 23, 1982) (Conflict of Interest Representation of
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ingly, the lawyer must give "undivided loyalty" to the insured, the client.In doing so, "the attorney will sometimes act contrary to the insurer's interest. Yet anything less than undivided loyalty does not give the insured a full
defense."' "
The other view is that the lawyer represents both the insured and the
insurer as co-clients. 5 Even under this view, however, the lawyer's "primary" client is the insured, and his or her interests come firstM This view
is unsatisfactory, however, because a hierarchy of clients, with some more
important than others, is incompatible with the fundamental principle that a
lawyer, as a fiduciary, must put his or her client's interests first. By contrast, the competing view that a lawyer represents the insured alone, albeit
with a third party payer, and not the carrier, is much more in keeping with
the general nature of the lawyer-client relationship.
Whatever view one takes, the primacy of the lawyer's duties to the insured becomes clear when the interests of the carrier and the insured actually diverge. For example, when an insurer retains a lawyer for an insured
with a reservation of rights, an obvious divergence of interests exists. In
such a situation, the general view is that the lawyer represents the insured,
first and foremost." 7 Authority does exist for the contrary position. Circumstances may be such that notwithstanding a tender of defense subject to
a reservation of rights, a court should not assume that counsel for the insured, although retained by the insurer, "will defend in a manner that prejudices" the insured.81

Insurance Carrier and Insured Where Questions of Coverage is in Issue).
283. Richard H. Jerry, 17 A.J. Trial Advoc. 101, 141, quoted in Pa. Bar Comm. Prof. Resp., Formal
Op. 96-196 (1997) at 3 ("Ethical Concerns of Insurance Defense Counsel with Comments Appropriate to
Staff Trial Lawyers); see also Ill. St. Bar Advisory Op. No. 98-08 (1999) (Topic: Conflict of Interest:
Insurance Representation: Multiple Representation). (Lawyer retained by insurance company to represent insureds "has that same professional obligation that would exist had the lawyer been personally
retained by the insured.").
284. Richard H. Jerry, supra, note 283.
285. See e.g, Pa. Bar Comm. Prof. Resp., Formal Op. 96-196 (1997) at 6 (Ethical Concerns of Insurance Defense Counsel with Comments Appropriate to Staff Trial Lawyers) (An insurance company and
its insured are considered co-clients so long as their positions are "substantially the same."); Cal. St. Bar.
Comm. Prof. Resp. Op. No. 1995-139 (1995) ("To Whom Does an Attorney Owe Duties When He or
She Acts as Insurance Defense Counsel.")
286. Richard H. Jerry, supra, note 283.
287. See, e.g., Cal. St. Bar. Comm. Prof. Resp. Op. 1995-139 (1995) (To Whom Does an Attorney
Owe Duties When He or She Acts as Insurance Defense Counsel). See also McGee v. Superior Court,
233 Cal. Rptr. 421, 423 (Cal. App. 1985) and Michigan Millers Mutual v. Bronson Plating, 496 N.W.2d
373 (Mich. App. 1992), affd 519 N.W.2d 864, reh denied 536 N.W.2d 746 (holding that there is no
attorney-client relationship between carrier and attorney for the insured where carrier tendered defense
under reservation of rights.)
288. U.S. Underwriters, Inc. Co. v. TNP Trucking, Inc., 44 F.Supp.2d 489, 492 (E.D. N.Y. 1999)
(holding that nothing in the record supported either parties' argument that a factual scenario might exist
which would cause a potential conflict of interest). Id. at 491.
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To wait for an actual conflict of interest to emerge before deciding that
insurance defense counsel represents the insured, and not the carrier, makes
no sense. The better approach is for the insured, the insurer, and the lawyer,
to expressly agree that the lawyer has one client, the insured. The insurance
carrier is not, of course, just another third party payer. It is a payer which,
by prior agreement with the insured, now the client, has certain rights regarding the conduct of the litigation. How far those rights should be allowed to go raises another question. At some point, allowing a third party
to assume complete control may well be against public policy.28'
2.

Employees or Agents

Individuals are often sued in their official capacities as employees or
agents of some entity, private or public. The entity is sued, too, either directly or under a theory of respondeatsuperior. Furthermore, the individual
may not be personally liable, even if there is an adverse judgment, because
of a statute, contract, or policy of indemnification. Generally, the entity
hires a lawyer who often acts as the de facto lawyer for the employee or
agent, who usually does not retain separate counsel. So whom does the
lawyer represent, the entity, the employee, or both?
Rule 1.13(a) says that a lawyer for an organization represents "the organization, acting through its duly authorized constituents." The rule goes
on to say, however, that a lawyer may represent both the organization and
its employee(s) or agent(s), subject to the rules on conflicts of interest.'"
But there is an important qualification. Since a lawyer who represents an
organization must communicate with some of its constituents, the lawyer
has a special disclosure obligation. He or she must "explain the identity of
the client [the organization] when it is apparent that the organization's interests are adverse to those of the constituent with whom the lawyer is dealing."291

Conflicts of interest are inherent in nearly every case where an entity
and one or more of its employees or agents are sued. The reason is simple.
The individual's interest is to have no personal liability, even if the entity
has to pay. The entity's interest may be to defend on the basis that the employee was acting beyond the scope of his or her authority, thereby limiting
the entity's liability. A lawyer for the entity should be careful, therefore,
not to allow an individual to think that the lawyer represents him or her,
unless that is the case. The lawyer should be aware that most individuals
will assume that the entity's lawyer is their lawyer and that the interests of
289. The Tennessee Supreme Court recently said that an arrangement "which effectively limits... the
attorney's professional judgment on behalf of or loyalty to the client is prohibited by the Code [of Professional Responsibility] ....
Petition of Youngblood, 895 S.W.2d 322, 328 (Tenn. 1995).
290. WYOMING RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule I.13(e)(LEXIS 1999).
291. Id. Rule 1.13(d).
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the entity and the individual are the same. That is a dangerous assumption,
both for the individual and for the entity's lawyer. It should be promptly
corrected, preferably in writing, and the Rules put the burden squarely on
the lawyer to do so.2" The Wyoming Supreme Court has embraced this
principle. A lawyer's failure to correct an individual's reasonable belief
that he or she has a lawyer may lead to an implied attorney-client relationship. 93 If a lawyer represents an employee, rather than an employer, the
lawyer "should be reluctant to look to the employer for direction unless the
employee's informed consent is obtained and the lawyer reasonably beIn
lieves that the employee's interests will not be adversely affected."''
addition, employers, unlike insurers, generally have no contractual right to
control the defense.' 9,
3.

Criminal Defendants

The most common attorney-client relationship in criminal matters is
that an indigent criminal defendant is represented by a public defender.
Since public defenders are invariably paid by some governmental entity,
either as salaried employees or contract attorneys, there is a third party
payer relationship. It is well settled, however, that the individual is the client, not the governmental entity.9 The lawyer's duties, therefore, are owed
to the defendant, not to the agency
When a private third party, known or unknown, pays for the representation of an indigent defendant, the same rule applies. The client is the defendant, not the payer.297 Such an arrangement presents special ethical concerns for defense lawyers and courts. Those concerns are discussed below. 98
4.

New Business Entities

When an individual or group of individuals decides to form a business
entity, the identity of the client is often cloudy. Once an entity is formed,
the lawyer usually represents it, not the entity's constituents. 9 9 Before formation, the answer is less clear and there are several possibilities. The client may be one of the individuals who is forming the entity. It may be part

292. Id. Rule 1.13(e)(LEXIS 1999). See also Id.Rule 1.3 cmt. [3].
293. Carlson v. Langdon, 751 P.2d 344, 348 (Wyo. 1988).

294. Nancy J. Moore, supra note 274, at 608-09.
295. Nancy J. Moore, Ethical Issues in Third-PartyPayment: Beyond The Insurance Defense Paradigm, 16 REV. LITIG. 585,608 (1997).
296. See, e.g., White v Galvin, 524 N.E. 2d 802, 803 (Ind. 1988).
297. See. e.g., Quintero v. United States, 33 F.3d 1133, 1134 (9th Cir. 1994).
298. See infra notes 335 through 349 and accompanying text.
299. WYOMING RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13(a) (LEXIS 1999). The lawyer may
also represent constituents, subject to normal conflict of interest constraints. Id. Rule 1 .13(e). See supra
notes 290 - 292 and accompanying text. For a general discussion of representing entities, see John M.
Burman, Representing Entities: Confidentialty, Attorney-Client Privilege and Disclosure Issues,
WYOMING LAWYER (April 1999) 12, 13.
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or all of the group of individuals who is forming the entity, or it may be the
entity to be formed, acting through the persons who wish to form it. The
diverse options indicate the diversity of interests involved. Nevertheless, it
is almost impossible, or at least unrealistic, to involve attorneys to represent
the various interests of everyone involved in forming the entity, especially if
it is a small business, even though the situation is rife with potential conflicts of interest. There is, however, an answer to the ethical conundrum.
An engagement letter, or letters (if there are multiple individuals involved) should specify the identity of the client(s), the identity of the
payer(s), and the scope of the lawyer's responsibilities. Also, if the client is
an entity, the letter should identify the person or persons who are authorized
to communicate with the lawyer about the representation and upon whom
the lawyer may rely for guidance in the representation. While such letters
are not required, they should be used for all clients, especially where the
identities of the client, the payer, or both, are murky2 ®
A lawyer who was involved in forming an entity may be asked to represent the entity after it is formed. It is permissible to do so, subject to the
possibility of a former client conflict of interest. If, for example, the lawyer
represented one or more of the individuals who formed the entity, and then
undertakes to represent the entity, there is obvious potential for conflict
between the interests of the entity and those of the persons previously represented. That potential conflict may ultimately become an actual conflict
and require the lawyer to withdraw from any involvement in a matter involving a dispute between the entity and one, some, or all of its
founder(s)? °'
5.

Small Businesses

Small businesses often operate through a legal entity, such as a corporation or partnership. In many cases, the same individuals own the stock,
serve on the board of directors, and are the entity's officers. They may also
consult the business's lawyer for assistance with personal legal matters. It
is easy, and natural, for laypersons to assume that "their lawyer" represents
them, as well as the business. If that belief is reasonable, the lawyer will
have a dual relationship. Under such circumstances, the persons involved
generally pay little attention to the questions of who is the client and who
will be paying the bill in any given circumstances. The lawyer, however,

300. For sample engagement and closing letters, see Robert W. Martin, Jr., PracticingLaw in the 21st
Century: Fundamentals ForAvoiding MalpracticeLiability, 33 LAND AND WATER LREv. 191 app. B

(engagement letter), C (non-engagement letter), and D (closing letter) (1998). For a discussion of engagement letters, see John M. Burman, A Lawyer's Time and Advice Are His Stock In Trade: LawyerFee Agreement and Fee Dispute Resolution, WYOMING LAWYER (April. 1998) at 13.
301. For a discussion of former client conflicts of interest, see supra notes 24 - 38, and accompanying
text.
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should not be so cavalier. Absent an agreement to the contrary, the lawyer
represents the entity, not the individuals. To avoid misperceptions about the
lawyer's role, it should be clarified, preferably in writing.
6.

Juveniles

Minors are usually unable to hire lawyers when they run afoul of the
law or are otherwise involved in the legal system. Accordingly, a child's
parents or a government agency often retain a lawyer to represent the child.
In such situations, the lawyer represents the juvenile, and not the third party
payer. (The issue of whether a lawyer appointed to serve as a guardian ad
lilem represents the child or the best interests of the child is difficult and
complex. It is beyond the scope of this article.30) As with any third party
payer relationship, however, the lawyer who fails to clarify the identity of
the client and to whom the lawyer's duties flow may be held to have also
formed an attorney-client relationship with the parents, 3 which will present
a host of conflict of interest and confidentiality issues.
7.

Estate Planning

Conflict of interest issues are common in estate planning. Married persons often ask an attorney to do estate planning for both of them. That often
makes sense because the couple has the same interests, especially if they
have the same children. However, the potential conflict of interest is readily
apparent. Spouses may have differing ideas or understandings about who
should benefit from their largesse, even if they express agreement when
together. One may hear a different tune when visiting with spouses individually. If that occurs, the lawyer will be in a difficult position. On the
one hand, the lawyer has a conflict of interest because of the spouses' differing ideas. On the other hand, he owes each a duty of confidentiality,
meaning that neither can be informed of the other's views. The only ethical
path in such circumstances is to withdraw from the representation without
disclosing why.
A divergence of opinions is more common with second marriages.
Neither spouse may want his or her estate to wind up in the hands of the
other spouse's family. The lawyer needs to be sure to identify the client and
the scope of the representation. The client may be either or both of the individuals. If it is to be both, the potential conflict of interest needs to be
disclosed, discussed, and waived, preferably in writing.

302. The Wyoming Supreme Court recently addressed some of the issues involved in the appointment
of an attorney to serve as guardian ad litem. See Clark v. Alexander, 953 P. 2d 145 (Wyo. 1998); see
also Jennifer P. Hanfl, Attorney for Child Versus Guardian Ad Litem: Wyoming Creates a Hybrid. But is
it a Formula for Malpractice? 34 LAND AND WATER L.REv. 381 (1999).
303. Nancy J. Moore, supra note 274, at 610 (citing the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 26 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996)).
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Another common conflict of interests problem is when an adult child
accompanies an elderly parent to meet with a lawyer to discuss estate planning. Often, the adult child takes an active role in initiating the process and
in consulting with the lawyer about what should be done and how. The
potential conflict is obvious. First, there may be other adult children who
may live far away and do not take an active role in the parent's affairs.
Second, the adult child is an interested party who will likely be a primary
beneficiary of the estate planning. Third, he or she may already have some
effective control over the assets of the parent through an arrangement such
as a joint bank account or joint tenancy of real or personal property. Since
the estate planning is, ostensibly, being done for the parent's benefit, he or
she is the client, even though the adult child may be actually directing the
representation by telling the lawyer what "mom wants." The identity of the
payer is also often muddled, especially when there has been some commingling of assets. All the lawyer can do is document the relationship and, in
so doing, identify the client and the payer. To ensure that he or she is fulfilling his or her duty to the client to implement the client's wishes, the lawyer should, if possible, meet privately with the parent (the client). The story
the lawyer hears may be very different than when the adult child is present.
Also, if the adult child is to be present for conferences with the lawyer, the
engagement letter should include a consent to his or her presence and the
disclosure of otherwise confidential information to a non-client.?1
8.

Prepaid Legal Plans

Prepaid legal plans are similar to insurance companies in that individuals "purchase" representation in advance by the payment of premiums, either directly or through an employer. 05 Many concerns quickly develop
with this type of a situation. Does a lawyer hired by the plan represent the
individual, the plan, or both? The answer is also the same. A lawyer can
agree to represent the individual alone, or the individual and the plan
jointly. All parties will benefit if the retainer agreement between the lawyer
and the payer clarifies the identity of the client and the plan's role in the
litigation. The agreement should then be discussed with the client, whose
informed consent should be obtained. If there is no express agreement, the
better view is that the lawyer represents the individual, not the plan, and the
lawyer owes his or her primary loyalty to the individual.
The ABA's Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility has
issued an opinion discussing prepaid legal service plans.sw The Committee

304. The problem will be magnified if the adult child is a former or on-going client who brings in his
or her parent for an estate plan.
305. Employer paid legal plans are growing rapidly. As of August 1999, some 2.6 million employees
were covered by such plans, a thirty percent increase since 1994. Armour, Legal Aid is Latest Job Perk,
The Denver Post, August 30, 1999, at 6A.
306. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. No. 87-355 (1987) (Law-
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endorses lawyers' participation in such arrangements under the following

circumstances. First, the lawyer must be allowed to exercise independent
professional judgment on behalf of individual clients. Second, the lawyer
must maintain client confidences. Third, the lawyer is held to the normal
standards of legal and ethical competence. Finally, the plan may not involve improper advertising or solicitation. If it does, the lawyer cannot turn
a blind eye since it is the lawyer's obligation to ensure that the plan is in
compliance with applicable ethical rules. 31'
Third PartyPayers:GeneralEthical Standards
Once the identity of the client is confirmed and clarified, a lawyerclient relationship with a third party payer is subject to several conflict of
interest provisions of the Wyoming Rules of Professional Conduct. First,
the general conflict of interest standards of Rule 1.7 apply. Second, Rules
1.8 and 5.4 impose special requirements on a lawyer when there is a third
party payer.
The general standards on concurrent conflicts of interest are contained
in Rule 1.72" Paragraph (b) is applicable to third party payers. A lawyer
"shall not" represent a client if the representation of that client "may be
materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to ... a third person, or
by the lawyer's own interests. . . .'" A third party payer relationship creates the potential for a material limitation because of the interests of the
third party payer and the lawyer.
A third party payer's interests are, at least in part, obvious, and they are
often different from the client's. The payer has an interest in minimizing
attorney's fees and its own potential liability. The payer may also have an
interest in the precedential value of the case, and be relatively unconcerned
about its effect on an individual defendant.-" Similarly, the lawyer may
have his or her own interests. Insurance defense counsel, for example, may
wish to maintain an ongoing, lucrative relationship with the third party
payer. The client, of course, does not share that interest. If the payer's
and/or the lawyer's interests materially limit the lawyer's representation,

yer's Participation in For Profit Prepaid Legal Service Plan).
307. Given Wyoming's unique advertising rules, Wyoming lawyers need to be very careful if they
become involved with a prepaid legal plan. The plan's advertisements may well comply with the rules

in other states, and be out of compliance with Wyoming's. For a discussion of the applicable Wyoming
rules, see, John M. Burman, Wyoming's New Rules on Lawyer Advertising & Solicitation. WYOMING

LAWYER (Dec. 1997), at 13.
308. For a discussion of the general conflict of interest standards, see notes 2 - 73, supra, and accompanying text.
309. WYOMING RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(b) (LEXIS 1999). That rule does con-

tain provisions for waiver of some such conflicts, but those waiver provisions are less stringent than the
requirements of Rule 1.8(a).

310. See e.g.. Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. at 267. (The possibility that the employer/third party payer
wanted to create a "test case" presents a "clear possibility" of a conflict of interest).
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Rule 1.7(b) prohibits continued representation in the absence of an appropriate waiver (and some conflicts are not waivable)" Even if the rule is
satisfied, however, Rules 1.8(f) and 5.4(c) contain specific provisions about
third party payers.
Rule 1.8(f) says that a lawyer, "shallnot accept compensation... from
one other than the client unless:
(1) the client consents after consultation;
(2) there is no interference with the lawyer's independence ofprofessionaljudgment or with the client-lawyer relationship; and
(3) information relating to representation of a client is protected as required by Rule 1.6.12
The rule contains both substantive and procedural requirements which must
be satisfied every time there is a third party payer.
First, although the requirement that the client consent after consultation
appears to be procedural, it contains an important substantive standard. The
standard is the general client consent standard from Rule 1.7, client consent
is not sufficient. Further, a lawyer may not ethically ask for consent, unless
the lawyer "reasonably believes" that the representation will not be adversely affected. The language from Rule 1.7 applies to third party payers
because Comment [4] to Rule 1.8 states: "an arrangement [for a third party
payer] must also conform to the requirements of ... Rule 1.7 concerning
conflict of interest." Accordingly, a lawyer may request client consent to a
third party payer when a "disinterested lawyer" would think it reasonable to
do so."'
Client consent is ineffective unless it is given "after consultation." The
Rules define "consultation" as the "communication of information reasonably sufficient to permit the client to appreciate the significance of the matter
in question."31 ' A client will not likely know of or understand the significance of the potential conflict of interest created by having a third party pay
unless the lawyer informs the client how the conflict could affect the representation. Similarly, the client should be informed of the steps the lawyer
will take to protect against inappropriate interference by the payer in the
lawyer's relationship with the client, and especially that the lawyer will not
communicate with the payer without the client's consent.
311. See supra notes 10 - 23 and accompanying text.
312. WYOMING RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(f) (LEXIS 1999) (emphasis added).

313. Id. Rule 1.7 cmt. [41 (LEXIS 1999).
314. Id. Terminology [2]. This is a restatement of the general requirement that a lawyer "explain a
matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the
representation." Id. Rule 1.4(b).
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Second, there must be no interference in the lawyer's professional in-

dependence or the lawyer-client relationship. This requirement is essentially a restatement of a lawyer's fundamental responsibility to provide independent professional advice.- Professional independence is of such importance that all the conflict of interest rules can be viewed as designed to
preserve and protect a lawyer's ability to give, and a client's rights to receive, such advice. The second half of the rule, that there be no interference
with the lawyer-client relationship, further emphasizes the primacy of the
client's interests.
The lawyer-client relationship involves a broad array of duties. It includes, for example, the lawyer's duty of communication. Rule 1.4(a) contains a general requirement to keep a client "reasonably informed." In the
insurance defense context, this has been interpreted to mean that the lawyer
has a duty to communicate all settlement offers to the client, even when the
lawyer thinks the offer is not bonafide.316 The holding makes sense because
it is the client, not the payer or the lawyer, who has the ultimate authority to
accept or reject a settlement offer."' Similarly, the lawyer must place the
client's interests above the payer's financial interests. If there is a disagreement about costs which the lawyer believes are reasonably necessary
to protect the client's rights, the lawyer should ask for3 the necessary funds.
If the payer refuses, the lawyer may have to withdraw. '
Third, the lawyer must protect information protected by Rule 1.6. This
language is, again, a restatement of a lawyer's general confidentiality obligation, but it may be the area of greatest concern to clients. The language of
Rule 1.6 is unambiguous: "[a] lawyer shall not reveal information relating
to representation of a client ... ." Although there is no exception for disclosing information to a third party payer, there is good reason to repeat the
language in Rule 1.8(0. Third party payers often want (and expect) information regarding the representation which clients do not want them to
know. The inclusion of the language on preserving client confidences reminds lawyers and payers alike that such information is protected. This
duty of confidentiality is so important that the New York City Bar Ethics
Committee has said that an insurance defense lawyer may not disclose information to the carrier even when the information may eliminate the carrier's responsibility for paying. 1'"

315.
316.
317.
318.
sent its
319.

See id. Rule 5.4.
Miller v. Byrne, 916 P.2d 566, 574 (Colo. App. 1995).
WYOMING RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a) (LEXIS 1999).
Colo. Bar Ethics Op. (Jan.16, 1993) ("Ethical Duties of Attorney Selected by Insurer to RepreInsured").
N.Y. City Law Assn Comm. Prof. Eth. Op. No. 669 (89-2) (May 17, 1989) ("Obligation of

Lawyers Appointed by Insurance Company to Provide Representation to an Insured When Lawyer
Learns Confidential Information of Client That Would be Grounds for Denial of Coverage,") Lawyer
who learns confidential information from insured that would be a basis for denying coverage may not
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Rule 5.3 is entitled "Professional independence of a lawyer." The rule
addresses third party payers by restating the requirement of Rule 1.8(0: "[a]
lawyer shall not permit a person who ... pays the lawyer to render legal
services for another to direct or regulate the lawyer's professional judgment.
." The importance of independence is such that the source of payment is
irrelevant. An arrangement for a non-client to pay "should not interfere
with the lawyer's professional judgment." 2 '
1.

Special considerations for insurance defense counsel

Whether one assumes that an insurance defense attorney's only client
is the insured or that such a lawyer has co-clients with his or her primary
obligation to the insured, significant issues of professional independence
remain. These concerns are increasing as insurance companies attempt to
control the amount of attorneys' fees they pay. Two methods are now
common and becoming more so: (1) litigation guidelines; and (2) third
party audits of attorneys' bills. Each raises significant ethical issues. The
former implicates lawyers' independence and creates a potentially severe
conflict of interest. The latter, which is beyond the scope of this article,
may result in the disclosure of confidential information in violation of Rule
1.6.321 The next step, an insurance company's employment of in-house staff
counsel, allows even greater control, but creates concomitantly greater conflicts of interest. Whether an insurance company may directly employ lawyers to represent insureds is also beyond the scope of this article?"
Several years ago, managed care became a common method of attempting to curb rising health care costs." Under managed care, physicians
must seek approval from third party payers, either insurance companies or

tell carrier unless client consents. The lawyer should withdraw if the client refuses. Id.
320. WYOMING RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.4 cmt. (LExIS 1999).
321. For a discussion of the issues presented by third party audits, see John M. Burman, Litigation
Guidelines and Third Party Audits, WYOMING LAWYER (Aug. 1999), at 12.
322. States have taken varying positions on whether counsel employed by an insurer may represent
insureds. See, e.g., North Carolina State Bar, Ethics Op. 151 (1993) ("Representation ofInsureds and
Insurer) (explaining that in-house counsel for an insurance company man not represent the insured.);
and Pa. Bar Comm. Prof. Resp., Formal Op. 96-196 (1997) (Ethical Concerns of Insurance Defense
Counsel with Comments Appropriate to Staff Trial Lawyers) (discussing that where there is no question
of coverage, in-house attorneys may represent the insurance company and the insured as co-clients if
each consents after consultation.). See also Nancy J. Moore, Conflicts of Interestfor In-House Counsel:
Issues Emerging From the Expanding Role of the Attorney-Employee, 39 S. TEx. L. REv. 497 (1998).
Courts disagree about whether in-house counsel may represent insureds. Compare, Gardner v.
North Carolina State Bar, 316 N.C. 285, 341 S.E.2d 517 (1986) (holding that an insurance company
which represents insureds through in-house counsel is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.); In
re Allstate Insurance Company, 722 S.W.2d 947, 954 (1987), en banc (rejecting Gardner and permitting
in-house counsel to represent insureds); and American Insurance Association v. Kentucky Bar Association, 917 S.W.2d 568, 570 (1998) (declining to follow Gardner). See also William W. Hurst, Todd R.
Ryden, and Jeffrey A. Cooke, Can Insurance Defense Firms Be Ethically Replaced by Staff Counsel?
Ruling Says Use ofStaff Counsel Constitutes UPL. 42 RES GESTAE 42 (August 1998).
323. The section is based, in part, on John M. Burman, Litigation Guidelines and Third Party Audits,
WYOMING LAWYER (Aug. 1999), at 12.
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governmental entities, before furnishing services to patients which the physicians believe to be medically necessary and which the patients desire to
receive. The rise in the increase in health care costs has slowed, and managed care appears to deserve part of the credit. Slowing the rise in health
care cost increases has not, however, been without costs. To achieve control, the independence of physicians has been significantly curtailed. Physicians complain that health care payers impose "a bewildering plethora of
formularies, which has turned even routine prescribing into a bureaucratic
nightmare."3"' The combination of control by payers and reduced autonomy
for physicians has reached the stage that self-employed physicians are discussing unionizing because they believe they are effectively "employees" of
the insurance companies.Managed care is now coming to the legal profession. Its name is litigation guidelines. Just as physicians must seek approval before performing
many medical procedures, and justify their medical necessity, some lawyers
must do the same regarding legal services they wish to provide to clients. A
significant question for lawyers is how to respond to the conflict between
the economic constraints imposed by third party payers' litigation guidelines and the lawyers' responsibility to provide proper representation to
their clients, the insureds.
Litigation guidelines take many forms.2 ' Some, such as billing periodicity requirements, are reasonably unobtrusive. Some, such as not compensating lawyers for time spent preparing for and making telephone calls
which are not completed or making deposition arrangements, ignore reality
and simply reduce or eliminate compensation for time which lawyers reasonably devote to representing clients. Others, such as reimbursing paralegals, and not lawyers, for reviewing depositions or medical records (lawyers
get paid only for reviewing summaries prepared by paralegals) seem shortsighted. Finally, some, such as not reimbursing for computer research
without prior approval, virtually invite malpractice (when a reasonable lawyer would conduct computer research, the failure to do so may be malpractice, even if the insurer will not pay). Whatever the guidelines, however,
two constants emerge. First, litigation guidelines will slow and ultimately
reduce a lawyer's cash flow. Second, a lawyer's ethical and legal obligations are unaffected by such guidelines.
Every lawyer has an ethical " ' and a legal"' duty to provide competent
representation to every client. The duty is the same if the lawyer is well-

324. U.E. Reinhardt, Should Physicians Unionize? No. Patients Would Pay the Price, Wall St. J. (July
1999) (1999 WL 5459371).
325. Id.
326. The following examples come from conversations the author had with various insurance defense
attorneys.
327. WYOMING RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1 (LExIS 1999) (demanding that a lawyer
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compensated, poorly compensated, or receives no compensation at all. 29
Similarly, an insurance company's insistence on a lawyer's adherence to
litigation guidelines cannot affect that lawyer's ethical and legal obligations;
they remain the same.13° Even if the insurance contract gives the insurer
complete discretion to control the litigation, a lawyer "must exercise independent judgment on behalf of the client."' - The only question for a lawyer, therefore, is whether he or she is willing to represent an insured on the
terms offered by the insurance company. Those terms may include litigation guidelines which the lawyer regards as inappropriately interfering with
his or her professional independence.
Limitations on reimbursement do not limit the lawyer's ethical (or legal) obligation to provide competent representation to the insured. Such an
agreement may, however, be unethical. As the Tennessee Supreme Court
said recently, an arrangement "which effectively limits . . . the attorney's
professional judgment on behalf of or loyalty to the client is prohibited by
the Code [of Professional Responsibility]....,"332
In the final analysis, the question of what a lawyer should do is simple.
If a reasonable lawyer would provide legal services for which the insurer
will not reimburse the lawyer, the obligation to furnish those services remains. Payment or non-payment for those services is irrelevant. The
choice, therefore, is clear. Accept the litigation guidelines, understanding
they do not reduce the lawyer's legal and/or ethical obligations, or reject
them and the client and the insurance company. At least some firms are
rejecting them. According to the Chairman of the Dallas Bar Association's
Tort and Insurance Practice Section, "[m]ore and more law firms are telling
insurance companies to go elsewhere."'33

"shall provide competent representation....").
328. Moore v. Lubnau, 855 P.2d 1245, 1250 (Wyo. 1993).(holding that a lawyer must act with the
"degree of care, skill, diligence, and knowledge [of] . . . a reasonable, careful, and prudent lawyer in
Wyoming.").
329. See Kelly v. Roussalis, 776 P.2d 1016, 1019 (Wyo. 1989) (holding that a real estate broker who
voluntarly undertakes to assist friend for no compensation held to standard of reasonable care).

330. Id.
331. New York State Bar Ass'n Committee on Professional Ethics, Opinion 716 (March 3, 1999)
("Lawyer's Submission of Client Billing Records to Outside Auditor Employed by Insurance Company"). See also WYOMING RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.8(0(2) and 5.4(c) (LEXIS
1999).
332. Petition of Youngblood, 895 S.W.2d at 328; see also Opinion of the Disciplinary Commission of
the Alabama State Bar, Third PartyAuditing of Lawyer's Billing-ConfidenhialityProblems and Interfer-

ence with Representation 60 ALA. LAw. 35 (January, 1999) (emphasis added )("[A] lawyer should not
permit an, insurance company, which pays the lawyer to render legal services to its insured, to interfere
with the lawyer's independence of professional judgment... through the acceptance of litigation management guidelines which have that effect").
333. L.M. Whitely, Big Law Firms Turning Away Insurance Defense Cases. 22 DALLAS BUS. LAW J.

18 (Feb. 26, 1999).
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Insurance defense counsel will, inevitably, face a difficult ethical dilemma. On the one hand, the lawyer owes an unfettered obligation of loyalty to the client. On the other, the client has, by prior agreement, given
control over the litigation to a third party, the insurer. In the final analysis,
however, an insurance defense lawyer owes primary loyalty to the insured,
whose interests take precedence over those of the insurer:
[I]n giving undivided loyalty to the insured, the attorney will sometimes act contrary to the insurer's interest. Yet anything less than
undivided loyalty does not give the insured a full defense. The burden of resolving the conflict in the insured's favor should rest on
the insurer, who assumed a fiduciary obligation toward the insured
in exchange for the insured's premiums."'
2.

Special considerations for private criminal defense counsel

A potentially significant conflict arises when an indigent criminal defendant's attorney is retained and paid by a private third party, whether
known or unknown, particularly when that third party is the alleged operator
of the criminal activity in question. The severity of the potential conflict
has drawn the attention of the United States Supreme Court. Such a third
party payer arrangement, said the Court, includes the "risk... that the lawyer will prevent his client from obtaining leniency by preventing the client
from offering testimony against his former employer or from taking other
actions contrary to the employer's interests."' The scenario is common in
cases involving drug conspiracies, and sufficiently serious to impose additional obligations on trial judges.
In Quintero v. United States,- " the Ninth Circuit addressed the conflict

presented by an unknown third party paying for the defense of an indigent
person. The Court's per curium opinion begins with this admonition:
This opinion is being published to alert trialjudges, particularly in
drug cases, to determine whether or not third parties are paying the
fees of retained counsel when the defendant is indigent and, if so,
whether the defendant understands the potential conflict of interest
that may exist in such an arrangement and voluntarily waives that
1
conflict. '

334. Robert H. Jerry, 17 A.J. Trial Advoc. 101, 141. quoted in "Ethical Concerns of Insurance Defense Counsel with Comments Appropriate to Staff Trial Lawyers," Pa. Bar Comm. Prof. Resp., Formal
Op. 96-196 (1997) at 3.
335. Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 269 (1981).
336. 33F.3d 1133 (9b Cir. 1994).
337. Id. at 1134 (emphasis added).
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The court's concern was that such a conflict may reach the level of a Sixth
Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel claim.33 ' Because the drug
conspiracy at issue involved large sums of money, and the defendant had
rejected a plea agreement on the advice of counsel, the court ordered an
evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether the conflict impermissibly and
unconstitutionally affected the attorney's performance.1 9 Further, the court
expressed its concern that a third party payer arrangement such as that alleged not only affected the rights of the individual defendant, "the court has
been prevented by trickery from making certain that justice was accomplished."
The potential conflict posed by an unknown third party payer is potentially as significant as the conflict posed when a lawyer represents more
than one co-defendant. In the latter situation, the solution is clear. The
Wyoming Supreme Court decided to "firmly protect the defendant's right to
representation by an attorney who is free from any conflict of interest."' 1
Accordingly, a defendant's waiver of that right is permissible only if given
knowingly and voluntarily on the record. 2 Since the risks presented by an
unknown third party payer are similar, the solution should be, as well.
When a trial judge learns or suspects that an indigent criminal defendant is
being represented by an attorney paid by an unknown third party payer, the
court has a duty to inquire further." If a conflict of interest exists and is not
knowingly and voluntarily waived, the court should not allow the lawyer
with the conflict to continue.- The reason is simple. While an individual's
right to choose counsel is important, it may be outweighed by the court's
interest in maintaining the integrity of the justice system. If necessary to
prevent "a fraud upon the court, 3' 5 an attorney may be disqualified, even if
the client has consented to the lawyer's involvement."

338. Id.at 1135.

339. Id. at 1136.
340. Id. at n. 3.
341. Shongutsie v. State, 827 P.2d 361, 366-67 (Wyo. 1992).

342. Id. at 369; see also WYO.R. CRIM. P. Rule 44(c) (LEXIS 1999).
343. Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. at 272. The identity of the fee payer and the fee arrangements are
generally not protected by the attorney-client privilege. See, e.g., Rails v. United States, 52 F.3d 223,
225 (9'h Cir. 1999); and Hueck v. State, 590 N.E.2d 581, 584 (Ind. App. I Dist. 1992) (holding that if,

however, the third party payer is also a client, the identity and payment arrangements may be privileged
"if disclosure would convey the substance of a confidential professional communication between the

attorney and the client") Id. (citing In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Hirsch), 803 F.2d, 493, 498 (9' h Cir.
1986), corrected by 817 F.2d 64.).
344. Id. 450 U.S. at 272.
t
345. Quintero v. United States, 33 F.3d 1133, 1136 n. 3 (9 h Cir. 1994).

346. See. e.g., Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. at 273-74 (holding that in a probation revocation proceeding where attorney had a conflict created by a third party payer, the court must hold hearing "untainted"
by lawyer's presence unless defendant voluntarily and knowingly waives the conflict).
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3.

Special considerations for lawyers who represent juveniles

A lawyer who represents a minor has a special problem. A child is, by
definition, legally incompetent to do certain things. If the child is young, he
or she may also be incompetent in fact. This raises difficult issues regarding client consent to a third party payer and whether the client is capable of
making informed decisions about the representation. The rules provide
some guidance.
Rule 1.14 is entitled "Client under a disability." It applies whenever a
client is impaired for any reason. It begins with the principle that the lawyer-client relationship should be as normal as possible: "[w]hen a client's
ability to make adequately informed decisions in connection with the representation is impaired . . . the lawyer shall, as far as reasonably possible,

maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship with the client."", Comment
[1] reminds lawyers that "a client lacking legal competence often has the
ability to understand, deliberate upon and make conclusions about matters
affecting the client's own well-being. Furthermore, to an increasing extent,
the law recognizes intermediate degrees of competence. For example, children as young as five (5) or six (6) years of age... are regarded as having
opinions that are entitled to weight in ... custody [proceedings]. ..

."

How-

ever, if the lawyer "reasonably believes" that the client cannot act to protect
his or her own interests, the lawyer may seek the appointment of a guardian
to do so. " The Rules acknowledge, however, that it may not be possible to
have a guardian appointed. In such cases, the lawyer may have to act as the
If that occurs, the lawyer must carefully document
de facto guardian.what he or she is doing and why.
A client's young age is immaterial to the lawyer's obligations. The
lawyer must satisfy his or her regular legal and ethical duties. That includes
communicating and consulting with the client in a manner appropriate to the
client's age and understanding. If the lawyer believes that the client is unable to understand something, the lawyer should document why he or she
believes that, the action that the lawyer is taking, and, perhaps most importantly, why the lawyer is doing so.
Summary

Third party payer arrangements are both common and permissible.
Lawyers should take certain steps, however, in every case where payment
will be from a non-client. First, the lawyer must inform the client of the
inherent conflict of interest created by the situation. Second, the lawyer
347. WYOMING RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.14(a) (LEXIS 1999).
348. Id. Rule 1.14(b).
349. Id. Rule 1.14 cmt. [2].
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must consult with the client about what that conflict means. The consultation should include an explanation of how the lawyer will ensure the integrity of the lawyer's professional relationship with the client, especially that
information will not be disclosed to the payer without the client's consent.
Third, as in all conflict of interest situations, the client should be advised of
the right to consult outside counsel about the conflict. Fourth, the lawyer
must obtain the client's consent. While the rules do not require it to be in
writing, it should be. The consent should include the explanation of the
conflict and its potential effects. Fifth, the lawyer should be sure to keep
the client informed of all developments in the case. Finally, the lawyer
should be alert for and notify the client if one of the potential conflicts becomes an actual conflict.
While it should go without saying, it bears repeating. Documentation
is critical. All of the foregoing should be done in writing every time there is
a third party payer. Nothing bad, and only good, can happen when a client
is properly informed and gives knowing consent to a third party payer relationship.
VI. BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS WITH CLIENTS

Serious conflict of interest issues arise when a lawyer becomes involved in a business transaction with a client. The reason is simple. A lawyer has a fiduciary relationship with every client. Accordingly, he or she
has the same relationship with each client that a trustee has with a beneficiary. 5 In such a relationship, one party, the lawyer or trustee, occupies a
position of trust and influence over the other, and is supposed to be watching out for the interests of that person. Such a relationship has been referred
to by the Wyoming Supreme Court as a "confidential relationship.""' Business dealings between persons in a confidential relationship dramatically
alter that relationship. Instead of focusing primarily on the interests of the
subordinate party, the dominant party has a new and conflicting obligation-his or her own business interests. Accordingly, business transactions
in such a context are inherently suspect. If the subordinate party subsequently challenges the fairness of a business transaction with the dominant
party, that party "has the burden to establish that the transaction was fair
and conducted in good faith."" 2 The principles applied to confidential relationships by the courts have been incorporated into the Rules of Professional Conduct, which strongly discourage lawyers from entering into business transactions with clients. Unfortunately, lawyers often ignore the
warning.

350. Chapter VII Transactions With Client, 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 753 (1998),
351. Estate of Short, 785 P.2d 1167, 1170-71 (Wyo. 1990).
352. Id. at 1170.
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Business transactions between lawyers and their clients are, regrettably, common. Innumerable disciplinary and malpractice opinions involve
lawyer-client business transactions, and the supply of misbehaving lawyers
appears to be limitless. More lawyers get into ethical and/or legal hot water
because of business transactions with their clients than for any other reason.
Lawyers' business transactions with clients take many forms. Common transactions include loans to or from clients, a lawyer taking an interest
in a business venture as the lawyer's fee, or a lawyer investing services or
money in a business venture. Whatever the form, attorney-client business
transactions present a host of troublesome issues. A lawyer's failure to
properly resolve those issues may lead to a sanction for unethical behavior,
civil liability for malpractice, and vicarious liability for the lawyer's firm.
Lawyers have many opportunities, and often receive invitations, to become involved with clients in business transactions, and with good reason.
As Professor Wolfram has observed, "many lawyers acquire impressive
knowledge and a sense of judgment in business matters through their practice, and many clients come to regard their lawyers as both trusted legal
advisers and respected business colleagues."3 " ' Those same virtues create
significant concerns.
Clients' trust and respect provide opportunities for lawyers to exercise
undue influence and overreaching in business transactions. Accordingly,
while lawyers doing business with their clients is permissible, it is strongly
discouraged by the Wyoming Rules of Professional Conduct and the courts.
It is an area, according to the Missouri Supreme Court, which is "fraught
with pitfalls and traps and the court is without choice to hold the attorney to
the highest standards."' m
The Threshold Question: Is There a Lawyer-Client Relationship?
A lawyer often learns of a business opportunity from a former or current client, rather than from a person whom the lawyer has never represented. While that makes sense, it also creates problems. When a lawyer
learns of a business opportunity from a former or current client, the threshold question for the lawyer is whether there is a current lawyer-client relationship with the other party or parties to the potential business deal, or only
a former client relationship. If there is no current lawyer-client relationship,
the former client provisions of Rule 1.9 apply and the business relationship
is unlikely to be improper, although the lawyer will have to take care that
his or her participation does not develop into an attorney-client relationship.

353. WOLFRAM, supra note 2, at § 8.11.1, p. 479.
354. In re Lowther, 611 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Mo. 1981).
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If there is an on-going lawyer-client relationship, however, the very restrictive provisions of Rules 1.7 and 1.8(a) apply.
Whether there is a current attorney-client relationship or only a former
client relationship should be an easy inquiry. Unfortunately, it is often difficult.
If the lawyer is currently working on matters for the client, the existence of an attorney-client relationship will be (or at least it should be) obvious. The lawyer is likely logging time and/or sending bills, both irrefutable evidence of a lawyer-client relationship. More problematic is the lawyer
who has completed one or more matters for a client and has no matters
pending. The lawyer may believe that the absence of any current work
means there is no lawyer-client relationship. The client generally believes
to the contrary; many clients, once they have been to a lawyer, regard that
lawyer as "their lawyer," and they expect "their" lawyer to be looking out
for "their" interests at all times. As discussed above,", where there is dis36
agreement about the existence of an attorney-client relationship, the Rules
and the Wyoming Supreme Court' 7 say that the client's belief, not the lawyer's, controls.
If the lawyer follows a practice of using letters of engagement when
matters begin, and closing letters at the conclusion of those matters, there
will be a good documentary record of the relationship of the parties. The
client or former client will also not be mistaken about the relationship. If
the lawyer does not use appropriate letters, a critical issue arises. Are the
circumstances such that a person could reasonably believe there is a continuing lawyer-client relationship? If so, a court may find the existence of
such a relationship, even where the lawyer is not currently performing work
for the client and believes there is no such relationship.
The burden of clarifying the existence or non-existence of an attorneyclient relationship is on the lawyer. 8 Whether there is such a relationship
"should be clarified in writing, so that the client will not mistakenly suppose
the lawyer is looking after the client's affairs when the lawyer has ceased to
do so." " Accordingly, if the lawyer believes there is no lawyer-client relationship, and there is no termination letter in the file, the lawyer should prepare one and discuss the situation with the client before taking any further
action, even if the lawyer has no intention of entering into a business trans-

355. See infra notes 409 - 414 and accompanying text.
356. WYOMING RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3 cmt. [3] (LEXIS 1999) ("Doubt about
whether a client-lawyer relationship still exists should be clarified by the lawyer, preferably in writing...
357. Carlson v. Langdon, 751 P.2d 344, 350 (Wyo. 1988).
358. WYOMING RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3 cmt. [31 (LEXIS 1999).
359. Id.
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action with the client. It is simply bad practice to leave clients uncertain
about their status.
Once the non-existence of a current lawyer-client relationship has been
established, the lawyer must take care that his or her involvement in the
business transaction does not itself give rise to a new attorney client relationship. The Oregon Supreme Court has held, for example, that a lawyer's
involvement in a partnership created a lawyer-client relationship where the
partnership had no outside counsel.' The only reasonable assumption, said
the court, was that "some of the work the lawyer does for the partnership is
'legal' and is for each of the individual partners, including the lawyer.''6,
Other courts have been more forgiving. In Peachtree Plantations,
the South Carolina Supreme Court said that although a lawyer in a
business partnership had performed legal services for the partners previously, there was no current lawyer-client relationship with the partnership,
or with any of the partners, because the lawyer had not been expected to
exercise his independent professional judgment on behalf of the
partnership.363
Inc.,16

The cases make clear that in the absence of documentation of the nonexistence of a lawyer-client relationship, such a relationship may exist by
implication because of the lawyer's active involvement in the business
transaction. Without proper documentation to clarify the parties' responsibilities, including that the lawyer will not perform legal services for the
business entity, the lawyer is asking for trouble. In a subsequent dispute
about the lawyer's role, the reasonable expectations of the other party, a de
facto client, should control. It is one more reason to use engagement and
closing letters. '"
Lawyer-Client Business Transactions: The EthicalStandards
The Wyoming Rules of Professional Conduct discourage, but do not
prohibit, lawyer-client business transactions. If there is to be such a relationship, however, the Rules regulate it more strictly than any other type of
conflict. Business transactions with clients are subject not only to the general conflict of interest standards of Rule 1.7, which regulate and prohibit

360. In re Gant, 645 P.2d 23 (Or. 1982).
361. Id.
362. 355 S.E. 2d 286 (S.C. 1987).
363. Id.
364. For a discussion of engagement letters, see John M. Burman,A Lawyer's Time and Advice Are
His Stock In Trade: Lawyer-Fee Agreements and Fee Dispute Resolution. WYOMING LAWYER, (Feb.
1998), at 12; for sample engagement and closing letters, see Robert W. Martin, Jr., PracticingLaw in the
21st Century: FundamentalsFor Avoiding Malpractice Liability, 33 LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW
191, App. B (engagement letter), C (non-engagement letter), and D (closing letter) (1998).
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some conflicts, they are also governed by the more restrictive provisions of
Rule 1.8(a).
The general standards on concurrent conflicts of interest are contained
in Rule 1.7.315 Paragraph (b) is applicable to attorney-client business transactions: "[a] lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that
client may be materially limited.., by the lawyer's own interests. ... "I"
A lawyer who enters into a business transaction with a client obviously
has his or her "own interests," i.e., the business interests in question. If
those interests "materially limit" the lawyer's representation, Rule 1.7(b)
prohibits continued representation in the absence of an appropriate waiver
(and some conflicts are not waivable).161 Even if Rule 1.7(b) is satisfied,
Rule 1.8(a) imposes a higher standard on a lawyer who wishes to enter into
a business transaction with a client.
Rule 1.8(a) directly discusses and governs lawyer-client business
transactions:
A lawyer shall not enter into a business transactionwith a client or
knowingly acquire an ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless:
(1) the transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the interest
are fair and reasonableto the client and are fully disclosed and transmitted in writing to the client in a manner which can be reasonablyunderstoodby the client;
(2) the client is given a reasonableopportunity to seek the advice of independent counsel; and
(3) the client consents in writing thereto.'
The rule contains both substantive and procedural requirements. It is a violation of the rule for a lawyer to enter into a business transaction with a client which either does not meet the substantive standard or fails to satisfy the
procedural steps.
The substantive standard is that the transaction must be "fair and reasonable to the client." The official commentary to Rule 1.8 suggests that in
determining whether that standard has been met, "a review by independent

365. For a discussion of those standards, see supra notes 10 - 23 and accompanying text.
366. WYOMING RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(b) (LExis 1999). That rule contains
provisions for waiver of some such conflicts, but those waiver provisions are less stringent than the
requirements of Rule 1.8(a).
367. See supra notes 10 - 23 and accompanying text,
368. WYOMING RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(a) (LEXIS 1999) (emphasis added).
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counsel on behalf of the client is often advisable."' " That suggestion is
more than just a good idea. It is the only way to protect the client, and it is
the only way the lawyer can protect himself or herself. Even if a client believes such consultation is not necessary, the lawyer should insist on outside
counsel to protect the lawyer if the deal goes sour and the client begins to
look for someone to blame. If the client declines to seek independent counsel after being advised to do so, the lawyer should document both the giving
of the advice and the client's decision not to consult an independent attorney.
Even assuming the transaction is "fair and reasonable," a lawyer may
not proceed until three procedural steps have been taken. A lawyer who
misses even one of them will be subject to discipline, even though the transaction was fair to the client.7 0
First, the terms of the proposed business transaction, and the lawyer's
role in it, must be "fully disclosed and transmitted in writing to the client in
a manner which can be reasonably understood by the client."3 This is the
only conflict of interest provision of the Rules which requires that the lawyer communicate the existence of the conflict to the client in writing. It is,
of course, always advisable to disclose a conflict and its potential effects in
writing. Rules 1.7 and 1.9 do not, however, contain such requirements; only
Rule 1.8(a) does. Furthermore, the manner of disclosure is specified: "a
manner which can be reasonably understood by the client." The practical
meaning of this standard will vary, therefore, with the relative sophistication
of the client. A business person may reasonably be expected to understand
a different type of disclosure than an elderly layperson (from whom lawyers
seem prone to borrow money, and for which they are severely disciplined").
Second, after the written disclosure, the lawyer must give the client "a
reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of outside counsel."7 A question
which has frequently arisen is whether this means that the lawyer may simply advise the client of the client's right to seek outside counsel, or whether
the lawyer needs to affirmatively recommend that the client do so. The
latter view is by far the better practice. The recommendation should, naturally, be part of the written disclosure which the lawyer makes. If the client
does not wish to seek outside counsel, that, too, should be reflected in the

369. Such a review is also suggested by the procedural requirements. Id. Rule 1.9 cmt. [1].
370. See. e.g.. In re Charfoos, 183 B.R. 131 (Bank. E.D. Mich. 1994) (holding that disclosure obligations applicable even where the client is financially sophisticated and has independent knowledge of the

terms of the transaction).
371. WYOMING RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(a)(1) (LEXIS 1999) (emphasis added).
372. See, e.g.. Board of Professional Responsibility v. Williams, 816 P.2d 115 (Wyo. 1991); see also
People v. Bennet, 843 P. 2d 1385 (Colo. 1993)
373. WYOMING RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(aX2) (LEXIS 1999).
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consent form, along with a statement that the client is aware of the recommendation to seek counsel, the reasons for the recommendation, and that the
client is electing not to do so, despite the risks associated with that failure.
The written disclosure and consent requirements rest on the cardinal
principle that a lawyer is a fiduciary 7 , and an agent " ' for each client. As
such, a lawyer is ethically and legally obligated to subordinate the lawyer's
interests to the client's. Furthermore, a lawyer has a duty to obtain a client's informed consent to all aspects of the 76
representation, including
3
whether to enter into a lawyer-client relationship.
A lawyer has the duty to explain potential conflicts of interest in sufficient detail to allow a client to make an informed decision about whether to
enter into or continue a lawyer-client relationship. That duty applies with
extra force when the conflict is because of a business transaction involving
the lawyer and the client. The client is entitled to have sufficient information to make an informed decision about whether to continue the lawyerclient relationship. In addition, the client is entitled to receive enough information to make an informed decision about whether to enter into a business relationship with the lawyer.
Third, the client must consent in writing. "' As with the Rule 1.8(a)(l)
requirement for a written disclosure, this is the only conflict of interest
waiver provision in the rules which requires the client's consent to be in
writing, clear evidence of the skepticism with which the Wyoming Supreme
Court, which adopted the Rule, views lawyer-client business transactions.
Vicarious Liabilityfor A Lawyer's Improper Business Transaction with a
Client
Law partners are, of course, jointly and severally liable for the actions
or inactions of the lawyer's partners and/or associates if they "relate to the
course of the partnership business." ' Adopting another form of organization, such as a professional corporation or an LLC will not eliminate such
liability.' Further, the firm is vicariously liable for the malpractice liability

374. See, e.g., WOLFRAM, supra note 3, at § 387.
375. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 387 (1958); and WYOMING RULE OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1. 15 cmt. [ 1] (LEXIS 1999).
376. See WYOMING RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.4(b) (LEXIS 1999) ("A lawyer shall
explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions
regarding the representation").
377. WYOMING RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(a)(3) (LExIS 1999).

378. WOLFRAM, supra note 3, at § 16.2.3.
379. See WYo. STAT. ANN. § 17-3-102 (LEXIS 1999)(determining that each member of a professional corporation "shall remain as fully liable and responsible for his professional activities ... as
though practicing individually rather than in a corporation") and WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-15-103(b)
(LEXIS 1999) (Each licensed member of an LLC which offers professional services "shall remain as
fully liable and responsible for his professional activities . . . as though practicing individually rather
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of one of the attorneys who practices with the firm if the loss or injury was
caused "[by] actionable conduct of a partner acting in the ordinary course of
business of the partnership or with the authority of the partnership."3
When a lawyer in a firm enters into a business transaction with a client, the
question becomes whether a lawyer's partners or a lawyer's firm are liable
for injuries arising out of that lawyer's business transaction with a client.
Twenty years ago the answer was invariably "no." Today, the answer is
probably "yes."
Until the mid-1980s, courts were reluctant to hold a law firm liable for
damages caused by the decision of one lawyer in the firm to enter into a
business transaction with a client by borrowing money from the client.'
The rationale was the so-called "club model" of law practice. That is, each
member of a firm was allowed to "assume[] that other firm members act2
appropriately and passively allow[] her colleagues to do their own thing."'
Under this view, the practice of law was thought to be primarily noncommercial. Accordingly, one lawyer's business transaction with a client
was generally held to be outside the ordinary course of the firm's practice,
The rethereby absolving the firm and its other members from liability.sult, of course, was that innocent clients were sacrificed in favor of protecting lawyers. Fortunately for clients, and unfortunately for lawyers, the club
model has been replaced by the "professional model."
The professional model reflects a shift in courts' view of the practice of
law. Courts now tend to "emphasize the professional, business nature of
law practice, as well as the firm's institutional obligations to its clients.
This model normally holds the law firm responsible for firm's members'
debts [resulting from a loan from a client]." 3" A firm may not, therefore,
"passively permit its members to borrow from its clients." ' The Kansas
Supreme Court's decision in Phillipsv. Carson, et al, is instructive'"
David Carson practiced with the Kansas law firm of Carson, Fields,
Boal, Jeservich & Asner. Carson handled the probate of the estate of Robert
L. Phillips. 7 While the estate was pending, Carson borrowed $200,000.00
from Mr. Phillips's wife, Thelma. When Carson did not repay the loan, she
sued Carson and his law firm for malpractice. On appeal, the Kansas Su-

than in a limited liability company").
380. WYO. STAT. § 17-21-305(a) (LEXIS 1999); see also WOLFRAM, supranote 3, at § 16.2.3.
381. For a comprehensive discussion of the issue, see Stephen E. Kalish, When a Law Firm Member
Borrows From a Client- The Law Firm's Responsibility:A ProfessionalModel Replaces a Club Model,

37 U. KAN. L. REv. 107 (1988).
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.

Id. at 107.
Id. at 118.
Id. at 108.
Id. at 135.
731 P.2d 820 (Kan. 1987); see also Roach v. Mead, 722 P.2d 1233 (Or. 1986).
The factual scenario leading to liability is described at 731 P.2d at 823-24.
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preme Court affirmed summary judgment against Carson, and reversed
summary judgment in favor of the firm.
The Phillips opinion begins with the proposition that lawyer business
transactions with clients are "subject to strict and crucial scrutiny, and such
agreements are construed in a manner most favorable to the client." 8 The
court then had little difficulty finding Carson liable for malpractice: Carson
had a duty, said the court, "to advise Mrs. Phillips of the legal ramifications
of the transactions [and] . . . to recommend that she secure independent

counsel.""8 His failure to do so not only breached his ethical obligations, it
breached his legal duties, leading to civil liability. "' The court then turned
to the issue of the firm's vicarious liability.
A firm may be held liable for a lawyer's business transactions if they
are done with the actual or apparent authority of the firm." Since it was
unlikely that the firm had authorized Carson to borrow from a client, the
court focused on the issue of apparent authority. Carson, noted the court,
had written to Mrs. Phillips on firm stationery, no one in the firm had ever
told Mrs. Phillips that the lawyer was acting individually, not as a firm
member, attorneys in the firm commonly used firm supplies for personal
work, and there was no firm policy against business transactions with clients. 9' These factors, said the court, raised a material factual issue of
whether the attorney was "carrying on the usual business of the partnership."", The trial court had erred, therefore, in granting summary judgment
to the firm on the basis that Carson was acting outside of the firm's normal
course of business.04 Since the practices which the court discussed are relatively common, the opinion should cause lawyers to pause and reconsider
how their firms operate. Changes to eliminate potential liability might be in
order.

Nothing, of course, can protect a firm completely from vicarious liability if one lawyer in the firm borrows money from a client. The most
important step a firm can take is to affirmatively "prohibit[] its members
from borrowing from firm clients.""' Such a provision can be included in
the firm's partnership agreement, the firm's employee handbook, or a
memorandum to the firm's lawyers. Further, "it may be advisable for the
firm to communicate this policy directly to its clients."' Whatever actions
a firm takes, it should assume that the club model is gone. Courts will no
388. Id. at 832.
389. Id. at 833.
390. Id.

391.
392.
393.
394.

Id. at 836.
Id.
ld.
Id.

395. Kalish, supra note 381, at 142.
396. Id.
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longer protect firms at the expense of innocent clients. Instead, the professional model will likely, and should, be applied.
Serving on a Client's Boardof Directors.
Lawyers are often asked to serve on the board of directors of a corporate client. Agreeing to do so creates a significant conflict of interest, as
well as significant potential liability.
1.

Ethical Considerations

A lawyer who serves on the board of directors of a corporate client has
an inherent conflict of interest. On the one hand, the lawyer represents the
corporation?'1 The lawyer must, therefore, "exercise disinterested, professional judgment and render candid advice""' to the corporation. On the
other hand, as a director, the lawyer must act in "the best interests of the
corporation."'" Those duties may diverge.
Rule 1.7(b) is the applicable rule. A lawyer "shall not" represent a client if the lawyer's representation will be "materially limited by the lawyer's
responsibilities to... a third person ..... " As a director, a lawyer will have
responsibilities to the corporation, a third person. The question, therefore, is
whether those responsibilities will "materially limit" the lawyer's representation of the client.
The Rules do not prohibit a lawyer from serving in the dual roles of
corporate director and corporate counsel. The commentary to the rules cautions that a lawyer contemplating undertaking such a dual role should determine whether the responsibilities of the two roles may conflict.' The
commentary is not particularly helpful since the potential for conflicts will
always be present. The only questions, therefore, are whether the lawyer
will put himself or herself in a position which is likely to be, or become,
contrary to the lawyer's interests, and contrary to the corporation's.
The ABA's Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility has
issued an opinion about the ethical propriety of a lawyer serving as both
corporate counsel and a corporate director.4 ' While acknowledging, at
some length, that such a dual role presents "ethical concerns," the opinion
concludes that the Model Rules "do not prohibit a lawyer from serving as a
director of a corporation while simultaneously serving as its legal counsel..

13(a) (LEXIS 1999).
397. WYOMING RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.
398. Id. Rule 2.1.

399. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-16-830(a)(iii) (LEXIS 1999).
400. WYOMING RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 cmt. [14] (LEXIS 1999).
401. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 98-410 (1998) (lawyer
serving as director of client corporation).
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Despite its conclusion that a lawyer may do both, the opinion notes

several recurrent problem areas, and concludes with specific guidelines for a
lawyer in a dual role.
A lawyer who is considering serving both as corporate counsel and a
corporate director should:413 (1) "[r]easonably ensure" that corporate management understands the differing responsibilities the lawyer will have
when acting as the corporation's lawyer or a board member; (2)
"[r]easonably assure" that corporate management and the board understand
that the attorney-client privilege may not include anything other than communications between the board and the lawyer when the lawyer is acting
only as the corporation's lawyer; (3) "[r]ecuse herself as a director" from
any discussions or deliberations which involve the corporation's relationship with the lawyer's firm, such as whether to continue to retain it and, if
so, on what terms; (4) "[m]aintain ... independent professional judgment
required of a competent lawyer," advising against actions or inactions which
are illegal, even though favored by management; (5) "[p]erform diligently
the duties of counsel" after the board makes a decision with which the attorney disagrees; and (6) "[d]ecline any representation as counsel when the
lawyer's interest as a director conflicts with the responsibilities" of a competent attorney.
The reason for the ABA's extensive opinion, with its plethora of cautionary notes and suggestions, is that the potential for conflicts is very high,
so high that one wonders why the opinion does not conclude that such a
dual role is ethically impermissible. In the final analysis, the high number
and degree of concerns expressed by the ABA are such that a lawyer who
strives to follow the opinion's admonitions while serving in both capacities
will have to curtail his or her activities to such an extent that it "would so
infringe upon both the lawyer and the corporate client that the better course
is not to serve in such a dual capacity."Although the better course is not to serve both as corporate counsel and
a corporate director, the rules do not prohibit a lawyer from doing so.
Rather, the lawyer must comply with all relevant conflict of interest standards. This means, among other things, that the lawyer must make the appropriate disclosures and obtain the appropriate consents, and the ABA recommends that this be done in writing." While it is ethically permissible to
fulfill both roles in at least some circumstances, the potential legal liability
argues strongly in favor of avoiding such a dual role.

402. Id.

403. Id.
404. Robert W. Martin, Jr., Lawyers as Members of the Clients Boards of Direciors, COMMUNIQUE
22 (June 1998).
405. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 98-410 (1998) ("the lawyer-
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2.

Legal malpractice issues.

Corporate directors may be sued. If that occurs, the lawyer who is on
the board will become a defendant in the lawsuit. He or she will not be able
to represent the corporation in the lawsuit; nor will other lawyers in the
firm. In addition, if there is a determination of liability, "[m]ost [legal]
malpractice carriers will not cover the activity of lawyers who also function
as board members."10 While the corporation may generally insure directors,
many directors' policies do not cover a lawyer who serves the dual role of
attorney and corporate director (or officer). A lawyer may, therefore, be
completely exposed, with the exception that one may argue that the lawyer's firm is vicariously liable for the lawyer's actions as a member of the
board of directors. The argument that a firm is liable for the debts of a lawyer in the firm who borrows money from a client can easily be applied.
That is, if it is part of the ordinary course of a firm's business for lawyers in
the firm to serve on clients' boards of directors, the firm should be responsible for the actions taken by a lawyer while serving as a member of the
board.
The potential ethical and liability problems should convince lawyers to
adopt a firm policy of not serving on the boards of directors of clients, and
prohibiting others in the firm from doing so. If you simply cannot resist the
lure of a directorship, however; there is an easy answer. Accept the directorship, but stop serving as the corporation's attorney. Be a businessperson
or a lawyer, but not both.
Summary

While the Wyoming Rules of Professional Conduct do not prohibit
lawyers from entering into business transactions with clients, they discourage them. The requirements for written disclosure and written consent,
which are unique in the rules, are ample testimony to the Court's concern
with such arrangements. In litigation, too, courts view lawyer-client business transactions with considerable skepticism. That skepticism is rooted in
the fiduciary nature of the lawyer-client relationship which requires that a
lawyer subordinate his or her interests to the client's, and the confidential
relationship which is an inherent part of every attorney-client relationship.
In a business relationship, the attorney's normal role is inevitably altered by the lawyer's new interest-his or her business interest. Clients are

director should consider providing a written memorandum in addition to an oral explanation" about the

potential conflicting roles of lawyer and director).
406. Martin, Jr., supra note 402, at 199. The Individual Attorney's Supplement used by ALPS, which
insures a large number of lawyers in Wyoming, contains the following question: "Do you serve as di-

rector or officer of, or do you exercise any fiduciary control over, any business enterprise, other than the
applicant firm, including profit and not for profit organizations?"
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generally unaware of the lawyer's changed relationship and the lawyer's
conflicting responsibilities. The client, therefore, often has mistaken assumptions about the lawyer's role. Only when those assumptions are corrected, and the client makes an informed decision to proceed, should the
lawyer-client relationship continue.
In the final analysis, the words of the Iowa Supreme Court are apt:
"[The] safest and perhaps best course would [be] to refuse to participate
personally in the transaction."' '
VII. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST WHEN A LAWYER SWITCHES

FIRMS

When a lawyer switches firms, a myriad of issues arise. Along with financial and personal issues, potential conflicts of interest abound, particularly if the lawyer remains in practice in the same geographical area. The
potential conflicts raise both ethical and legal concerns. It is possible, however, and not difficult, to switch firms without running afoul of ethical
and/or legal standards.' °
Before embarking on a discussion of a lawyer's ethical and legal duties
when he or she switches firms, it is important to consider the nature of the
attorney-client relationship. Specifically, is a client the client of the firm,
the client of a lawyer within the firm, or both? The answer has important
ethical and legal implications.
The Dual Nature of the Attorney-Client Relationship
The Wyoming Rules of Professional Conduct do not define the attorney-client relationship or the contours of that relationship once it has arisen.
Instead, the Rules assume, for the most part, the "traditional" relationship
between an individual client and an individual lawyer. While the rules recognize that many attorney-client relationships involve an attorney representing an entity client,' they do not define the relationship between a
multi-lawyer firm and a client (except to say that all members of a firm are
disqualified from representing a client when any one of the lawyers in the
firm would be,41' and that supervisory lawyers and subordinate lawyers in a
firm have some different responsibilities'"). Accordingly, whether there is
an attorney-client relationship depends on "principles of substantive law

407. Comm. on Professional Ethics and Conduct v. Mershon, 316 NW. 2d 895, 899 (Iowa 1982).
408. This section presupposes that the lawyers are in private practice both before and after the switch.
Switching from government employment to private practice or vice versa raises different issues that are
addressed by Rules 1.11 and 1.12. See Ann B. Stevens, Wyoming Rules of Professional Conduct: A
Comparative Analysis, 23 LAND AND WATER L. REV. 463, 483 (1988).
409. See WYOMING RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13 (LEXIS 1999).
410. Id. Rule 1.10.
411. Id. Rules 5.1 and 5.2.
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external to the[] Rules ...."defined by substantive law. 3

Similarly, the nature of that relationship is

There is surprisingly little law on the question of whether a client is a
client of an individual lawyer in a firm or a client of the firm. The authority
which exists supports the notion of a dual relationship. A client of a firm
has an attorney-client relationship with the lawyer or lawyers who work
directly on the client's behalf, as well as with the firm itself.414 This notion
is consistent with the agency based rules of liability which make a firm responsible for the acts or omissions of every lawyer within the firm. It also
has important implications when a lawyer decides to leave a firm because
both the departing lawyer and the remaining firm will owe ethical and legal
duties to their joint clients.
1.

Ethical Issues

Potential conflicts of interest may appear even before a lawyer actually
switches employment. They may arise when the lawyer begins to actively
search for alternate employment. Simply exploring other job prospects may
create conflicts of interest which need to be disclosed to clients and which
may result in disqualification of the lawyer from further representation of a
client.
a.

Exploring Job Prospects

A lawyer looking for another job suddenly has an interest, obtaining
another job, which his or her clients have no reason to expect the lawyer to
have. The interest in obtaining alternative employment becomes a conflict
of interest issue if it interferes with the lawyer's independent professional
judgement. Any interference with a lawyer's professional judgment must
be disclosed to the client. And if the conflict must be disclosed, the question becomes whether the client may waive the conflict. The answer depends on the circumstances.
Rule 1.7(b) sets the standard. A lawyer shall not represent a client "if
the representation may be materially limited by the lawyer's . . . own interests... unless... the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not
be adversely affected; and the client consents after consultation." The
questions are apparent. Will the representation be "materially limited"? If

412. Id at Scope [3].
413. Id.
414. See, e.g., Vincent R. Johnson, Solicitationof Law Firm Clients by Departing Partners& Associates: Tolf Fiduciary & DisciplinaryLiability. 50 U. PITT. L. REv. 1, 38 (Fall 1988); see also, Illinois
State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Responsibility, Op.86-16 (1987).
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so, would a reasonable lawyer agree to continued representation by the lawyer with the conflict? Has the client consented after consultation?4"
A conflict of interest resulting from job prospecting may arise in either
of at least two ways. In a small town, both are likely. First, a lawyer exploring job prospects in the town where he or she practices will, likely, be
seeking employment from a firm which represents clients who have an adversarial relationship with one or more of the current firm's clients. The
lawyer's interest in employment with a firm which represents clients with
opposing interests may improperly limit one or more of four fundamental
duties a lawyer owes to his or her clients:-6 (1) the duty to serve clients
without material limitations imposed by the lawyer's own interests; (2) the
duty to represent clients zealously; (3) the duty to protect client confidences;
and (4) the duty to communicate to each client the information reasonably
sufficient to allow the client to make informed decisions about the representation.
The question for a job-seeking lawyer is when must he or she disclose
the job exploration to a client. According to the ABA Committee on Ethics
and Professional Responsibility, the answer depends on "concreteness,
communication and mutuality.""11 "Concreteness" means something more
than idle speculation; a job exploration is concrete when the lawyer agrees
to participate in a substantive discussion with a prospective employer.
"Communication" is simpler. Has the lawyer communicated his or her interest to the other firm? If so, the potential conflict is apparent. "Mutuality" exists when the interest of the lawyer is reciprocated by the other firm.
When those criteria are met, and when the lawyer is playing a significant
role in representing a client, the lawyer must disclose the job exploration to
a client when the other firm represents a party with interests adverse to the
client's." If the client does not consent to continued representation, after
"consultation," the lawyer must withdraw from the representation. This is
one of those rare situations, however, where there is no imputed disqualification." The firm may continue with the representation (with the client's
consent).
Second, an indirect conflict will almost always exist because of clients'
expectations. A client may have hired a particular lawyer, at least in part,
because he or she is part of a firm which has a good reputation. Conversely,

415.

"Consultation" means "communication of information reasonably sufficient to permit the client

to appreciate the significance of the matter in question." WYOMING RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Terminology [2] (LEXIS 1999).
416. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 96-400 (1996) (job
negotiations with adverse firm or party).
417. Id.
at4.
418. Id.
419. Id. at 5.
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a client may have hired an individual lawyer without regard to that lawyer's
membership in or association with a firm. In the former situation, the lawyer's exploration of leaving the firm is likely to be a material fact to the
client, and one the client is entitled to know, regardless of the lawyer's level
of competence or zeal. The client may feel that spending time and energy
working with a lawyer who may be leaving the firm is a waste of time and
effort, which the client will resent. The latter situation is somewhat different. The time spent with the lawyer is likely not duplicative since the client
will probably move with the lawyer.
A lawyer exploring job prospects may wish to keep his or her job
search quiet. While that desire is only natural, there comes a time when the
lawyer's intentions become a relevant and important factor which must be
disclosed to clients. At that point, a lawyer should not speculate on which
clients might want to know; all clients are entitled to that information so that
they can make informed decisions about their representation.
b.

Notification of Clients

After a lawyer decides to switch firms, clients must be promptly notified of the switch. Such a notice is not only permissible, it is required.
The ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility has
expressly approved a notice sent to clients after a lawyer left a firm."' The
Committee approved a notice which: (1)was sent immediately after the
lawyer left the firm; (2) was sent only to clients with whom the lawyer had
an active lawyer-client relationship immediately before changing firms; (3)
clearly related to open and pending matters for which the lawyer had direct
professional responsibility; (4) was sent promptly after the change; (5) did
not urge the client to change representation (although it said the departing
lawyer was willing to undertake representation); (6) made clear the clients'
right to choose which lawyer would represent the client in the future; and
(7) was not disparaging of the former firm. The Committee subsequently
clarified its opinion by noting that the same standards apply to partners or
4
associates who leave a firm.
While notifying clients that a lawyer has departed to begin practicing
with a new firm is permissible, a lawyer must be careful not to engage in
pre-departure solicitation of the soon to be former firm's clients. The ABA
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility recently interpreted
the ABA Model Rules, which are similar to the Wyoming rules, to bar predeparture solicitation: "[c/ontactingthe clients of the presentfirm before a
420. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1457 (1980) (notice
mailed by lawyer to clients that lawyer has changed firms).
421. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1466 (1981) (notice
mailed by associate lawyer that he has changed firms; further consideration of Informal Opinion 1457).
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lawyer begins employment with a new firm for thepurpose of solicitingtheir
business is not permitted."'22 The Committee was not asked, and did not
address, pre-departure notification where solicitation is not the purpose.
Compelling policy reasons suggest, however, that a lawyer may provide
such notification when the purpose is to notify clients of material facts,
rather than to solicit them to move.
The dual nature of the attorney-client relationship imposes ethical and
legal obligations on both the departing lawyer and the remaining lawyer(s)
in the firm regarding the clients the departing lawyer is currently representing. One of those duties is to keep clients "reasonably informed" about the
client's matter.' 1 The departure of a client's lawyer from the firm is a material fact which a client is entitled to know so that the client can make an
"informed decision" about future representation.2 ' Waiting until after the
lawyer's departure limits, rather than fosters, informed client decisionmaking.
A client is free to switch lawyers at any time, regardless of the type of
contract the client has with the lawyer.'2 As a result of this right and a client's right to make informed decisions about continued representation, the
departing lawyer and the remaining firm should notify current clients of the
departure and what that means for the clients as soon as the decision to
leave is made, not after it is implemented. The question is how should that
notification be done.
The best approach to client notification is a joint letter from the departing lawyer and the remaining firm to clients with whom the departing
lawyer has an active lawyer-client relationship with open matters. The letter should advise clients of the departure and provide factual information
about the clients' options regarding further representation. Specifically,
clients need to know that they have the right to: (1) continued representation
by the firm (assuming the firm is ready, willing, and able to competently
undertake such representation); (2) representation by the departing lawyer
and his or her new firm; or (3) secure other representation altogether. If a
client does not wish to have the departing lawyer or the remaining firm
continue the representation, or if neither is prepared to undertake continued
representation, the lawyers have a joint obligation to assist the client in obtaining appropriate representation.

422. ABA Comm. of Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 96-400, n.10 (1996) (job

negotiations with adverse firm or party) (emphasis added).
423. WYOMING RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.4(a) (LEXIS 1999).
424. id. at 1.4(b).
425. See, e.g., Robert W. Hillman, Law Firms and Their Partners: The Law and Ethics of Grabbing
and Leaving, 67 TEX. L. REv. 1,17 (Nov. 1988) (explaining that while the client is free to switch law-

yers, the client will likely remain liable to the client's former lawyer for the lawyer's fees and costs
incurred during the course of the representation).
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Unless the acrimony between the lawyers makes joint notification impossible, a joint letter will not only fulfill all parties' obligations to notify
their joint clients, it may be the only way to avoid allegations of improper
solicitation and/or legal claims against the departing lawyer. So long as the
notification is not a solicitation, it should be permissible either before or
after the lawyer's departure.
c.

Solicitation of Clients

The issue which has caused the most controversy is whether a departing lawyer may ethically and/or legally solicit clients to leave the firm along
with the departing lawyer and switch to the departing lawyer's new firm.
Neither the ethical nor the legal standard is clear.
The Wyoming Rule of Professional Conduct which addresses the solicitation of prospective clients has recently been amended.' 2' Rule 7.3 prohibits lawyers from soliciting prospective clients "with whom the lawyer
has no family or prior professional relationship" (the old rule contained
identical language). The Rule appears to allow solicitation by a departing
lawyer.
First, the rule regulates contact with "prospective clients." Since a departing lawyer already has an attorney-client relationship with his or her ongoing clients, the rule does not seem to apply to pre-departure solicitation of
clients, particularly in light of the United States Supreme Court's opinion in
Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association' 7 (allowing direct mail solicitation of
potential clients).
Second, the rule prohibits "direct contact" when the lawyer has "no
prior professional relationship" with the prospective client. Before leaving
a firm, the departing lawyer has, by definition, a professional relationship
with existing clients, and a "prior" relationship with former clients. Similarly, after leaving the firm, the lawyer has a "prior" professional relationship with his or her former clients.
As noted above, the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility recently interpreted similar language in the ABA Model Rules
to prohibit predeparture solicitation: "[c]ontacting the clients of the present
firm before a lawyer begins employment with a new firmfor the purpose of
soliciting their business is not permitted."'' The Opinion does not explain
426. Wyoming Rule of Professional Conduct 7.3 was amended by Order of the Wyoming Supreme
Court filed on December 3, 1996, to be effective 60 days after publication in the advance sheets of the

Pacific Reporter.
427. 486 U.S. 466 (1988) but see WYOMING RULE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 7.3(c)
(LEXIS 1999) (imposing a thirty day waiting period before solicitation of prospective clients known to

be in need of legal assistance).
428. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 96-400 n.10 (1996) (lob
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the basis for the prohibition; it merely cites Informal Opinion 1457, discussed above.
While Wyoming Rule 7.3 does not contain a clear ethical prohibition
on soliciting current or former clients to move with a departing lawyer, the
ABA Committee's opinion is certainly reason for pause. The better ap-

proach remains a joint notice from the departing (or departed) lawyer and
the remaining firm.
Even if the ambiguity of the ethical standards does not cause a lawyer
to avoid any semblance of solicitation of firm clients, the risk of potential
legal liability should.119 Those potential consequences are discussed

below. 30
d.

Notification and Approval of Court

Once a lawyer enters an appearance in court"'3 on behalf of a client, the
lawyer represents that client "for all purposes."' 2 The lawyer may not withdraw from the case without court approval, and except in the event of "extraordinary circumstances," such
approval will be conditioned upon the
33
substitution of other counsel.'
In most cases, the departing attorney has entered an appearance on behalf of or as part of the firm. Accordingly, the individual lawyer and the
firm are both considered to represent the client, and neither may withdraw
without court approval. Since court approval will be given upon substitution of counsel, it is imperative that the departing lawyer and the remaining
firm sort out who is going to represent each client on whose behalf an appearance has been entered. Once that decision has been made, the appropriate motions can be filed to clarify the court record. Until orders have
been signed and entered reflecting substitution of counsel, both departing

negotiations with adverse firm or party).
429. There are two primary theories of liability: (1) intentional interference with contract; and (2)
breach of fiduciary duty to the firm. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 414, at 73.
430. See notes 432 - 499 and accompanying text.
431. A lawyer appears in a case by attending a proceeding as counsel for a party, permitting his or her
name to appear on a pleading, or by written appearance. UNIFORM RULES FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF
THE STATE OF WYOMING Rule 102(a)(l) (LEXIS 1999). That rule also governs appearances in county
Court. UNIFORM RULES FOR THE COUNTY COURTS OF THE STATE OF WYOMING Rule 1.04 (LEXIS 1999)
A similar rule applies to appearances in the Wyoming Supreme Court. WYO. R. APP. P. Rule 19.01
(LEXIS 1999).
432. UNIFORM RULES FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE STATE OF WYOMING Rule 102(a)(2)
(LEXIS 1999). See also UNIFORM RULES FOR THE COUNTY COURTS OF THE STATE OF WYOMING Rule
1.02) ("the Uniform Rules for the District Courts of Wyoming shall govern the practice before the
county courts of Wyoming"), and WYO. R. APP. P. Rule 19.02 (LEXIS 1999) (providing that no lawyer
who has appeared in a matter before the Supreme Court may withdraw without consent of the appellate
court).
433. UNIFORM RULES FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF WYOMING Rule 102(c) (LExIS 1999).
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lawyer and the remaining firm will be ethically and legally responsible for
representing each client for "all purposes."
e.

Conflict Checking

A lawyer who joins a firm also brings new potential conflicts, regardless of whether the lawyer brings clients. The former client conflict of interest rule means that the new lawyer may be disqualified from representing
a current client of the new firm. Further, the rule of imputed disqualification may disqualify the entire firm. It is only prudent, therefore, for the firm
to carefully check for conflicts before agreeing to hire a new lawyer and/or
accept the lawyer's clients. The task may be large since every client of the
lawyer's former firm is, by definition, a former client of the lawyer who has
switched firms. Accordingly, a plethora of former client conflicts exist.
Such conflicts are subject to different, more lenient standards, however,
than normal former client conflicts of interest.14' The question of whether to
disqualify a firm based on a lawyer having switched firms is, ultimately, a
"functional analysis" designed to "preserv[e] confidentiality and avoid[]
positions adverse to a client"' " The standard for disqualification, therefore,
is more forgiving than for regular former client conflicts.
Rule 1.9(b) contains the applicable standards when a lawyer switches
firms (Rule 1.9(a) addresses regular former client conflicts.) The first two
questions are similar to the questions asked under paragraph (a), which applies when a lawyer switches sides. That is, (1) does the new firm represent
a client in a matter which is "substantially related" to a matter in which the
former firm represented a different client? If so, (2) are the positions of the
former firm's client and the new firm's client "materially adverse?" If the
answer to both of these questions is yes a third question arises (in a normal
former client conflict, an affirmative answer to the first two questions disqualifies a lawyer; the third question is never asked). Did the lawyer
switching firms acquire confidential information which is material to the
matter? If the lawyer did, the rule prohibits the new firm from involvement
in the matter, even if the new firm's client is a long-time client and the firm
has been involved in the matter for a significant time. The use of a "Chinese wall" or other device to screen the new lawyer from involvement in the
matter is not sufficient. If the lawyer has material, confidential information,
it is presumed that he or she will share it with the new firm. That presumption may not be rebutted. The only exception is that the conflict may436be
waived, under some conditions, by the former client "after consultation.

434. For a discussion of the normal rules for former client conflicts of interest, see supra notes 24 - 37
and accompanying text.
435. WYOMING RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9 cmt.[6].
436. In evaluating former client conflicts of interest, including the question of whether the conflict
may be waived, the principles of Rule 1.7 apply. WYOMING RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
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The reason for the different standard when a lawyer switches firms is
that the Rules attempt to balance several competing interests which are not
present, or which are present to a lesser degree, in ordinary former client
conflict situations.' 7 First, all clients have reasonable expectations of loyalty and confidentiality. Those are plainly implicated when a lawyer
switches firms. Second, clients should have discretion in choosing their
lawyers. Finally, the rules "should not unreasonably hamper lawyers from
forming new associations and taking on new clients after having left a previous association."," The rules contain an important procedural standard. If
disqualification of the new firm is sought, the burden of proof will be on the
new firm, the firm opposing disqualification."41
As with any potential conflict, a firm hiring a lawyer from another firm
must perform a conflicts check before hiring the lawyer to avoid disqualifying the firm from continuing to represent a client in a matter.
3.

Legal Issues

Lawyers in a firm have legal obligations to their clients, to each other,
and to the firm. The departure of a lawyer, therefore, necessarily has potentially significant legal ramifications. This section discusses the nature of
the legal obligations lawyers in a firm owe the firm and each other, and how
to terminate those obligations without incurring legal liability.
a.

Obligations to the Firm

A lawyer in a firm, whether an associate or partner," has duties to the
firm. These duties are substantially similar, although a partner, not surprisingly, has higher duties.
Associates are employees and agents of the firm."' As agents, they
owe the firm a fiduciary obligation under principles of agency law."2 That
obligation, generally speaking, is to subordinate the associate's personal
3
interests to the firm's."

1.9 cmt.[l] (LEXIS 1999). This means of course that a conflict may be waived only if a disinterested
lawyer would think it appropriate to do so. Id. Rule 1.7 cmt. [5].
437. WYOMING RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9 cmt. [3](LEXIS 1999).
438. Id.
439. Id. cmt. [5].
440. A shareholder in a professional corporation or a limited liability company is the functional
equivalent of a partner for liability purposes. See e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-15-103(b)(LEXIS) (liability of professionals who practice in a limited liability company); and WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-3-102
(LExIS 1999) (liability of professionals who practice in a professional corporation.).
441. See e.g. Robert W. Hillman, Law Firms and Their Partners: The Law and Ethics of Grabbing
and Leaving, 67 TEX. L. REv. 1,25 (1988).
442. Id. see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 13 (1958) ("An agent is a fiduciary with
respect to matters within the scope of his agency").
443. A fiduciary must act "primarily for another's benefit." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 753 (4" ed.
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A fundamental principle of agency law is that an agent's loyalty to his
or her principal precludes the agent from competing with or acting contrary
to the best interests of the principal during the term of the agency." As a
result of the law of agency, therefore, an associate who is preparing to leave
a law firm must be careful that none of his or her preparations undermine
the firm's practice. Any steps which undercut the firm's economic wellbeing, such as improperly soliciting firm clients, may result in liability for
breach of the attorney's fiduciary duty to the fim.
Just as an associate is an agent for a law firm, so too is a partner. Accordingly, a partner is bound by the same fiduciary duties to the firm."' In
addition, a partner is a co-owner. As a co-owner, a partner has an even
higher duty to the firm than does an associate:
Partners are trustees for each other, and in all proceedings connected with the conduct of the partnership every partner is bound to
act in the highest goodfaith to his copartner and may not obtain any
advantage over him in the partnership affairs by the slightest misrepresentation, concealment, threat or adverse pressure of any
kind."
It is difficult to articulate the specifics of a duty higher than a fiduciary
duty. The words "higher duty" are perhaps best understood as expressing
the view that partners owe the highest legal duty to their law partners. But
what does that mean?
Professor Hillman has prepared guidelines for withdrawing partners."
Any partner, or associate, considering leaving a firm should consult them
carefully. In general terms: (1) a partner considering withdrawing from a
firm generally has no affirmative obligation to disclose his or her
thoughts;"' (2) the lawyer may not, however, misrepresent those contemplations if asked; (3) after a partner has decided to leave, the partner must
give the firm reasonable notice of that intention;"' (4) a departing partner
may make limited logistical arrangements in anticipation of leaving, but
those activities are limited by the prohibition on disclosing information
about the firm or its clients to third parties; 5'0 and (5) any solicitation of firm
clients should be done only after the firm has been informed of the partner's

1968).
444. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 13 (1958)

445. Graubard Mollen Dannet & Horowitz v. Moscovitz, 653 N.E.2d 1179, 1182 (N.Y. 1995)
446. Page v. Page, 359 P.2d 41, 44 (Cal. 1961) (emphasis added).
447. See Robert W. Hillman, Loyalty in the Firm: A Statement of GeneralPrinciples on the Duties of
PartnersWithdrawing From Law Firms, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 997 (1998).
448. Id. at 1002-04.
449. Id. at 1004-07.
450. Id. at 1008-09.
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intent to withdraw,"' and even then, solicitation may lead to ethical and/or
civil liability.
d.

Solicitation of Clients

Although a common practice in the nineteenth century, lawyer solicitation of clients has been subject to ethical restrictions since the adoption of
the first lawyer codes of ethics shortly after the turn of the century.'52 After
a loosening of restrictions in the 1980s and early 1990s," the United States
Supreme Court has reversed course and endorsed states' authority to impose
ethical restrictions on lawyer solicitation.4 ' Apart from ethical issues, client
solicitation raises potential legal issues.
The potential legal consequences of client solicitation when a lawyer
switches firms are murky. All that may be safely said is that client solicitation may lead to legal liability to the firm.
Whether client solicitation by a departing lawyer will lead to legal liability depends on a variety of factors such as: (1) the departing lawyer's
status with the firm, i.e., is the lawyer a partner or an associate; (2) when the
solicitation occurred, i.e., before or after departure; and (3) the nature of the
solicitation.
Firms have based their claims against departing lawyers on two causes
of action: (1)intentional interference with contract and; (2) breach of fiduciary duty to the firm.4'1 Liability may exist under either.
i.

Intentional Interference with Contract

Alan Epstein, Richard Weisbrod, Arnold Wolf, and Sanford Jablon
were associates at the Philadelphia law firm of Adler, Barish, Daniels,
Levin and Creskoff. While still working for the firm, the four associates
decided to form their own firm.' Before leaving Adler, Barish, the four
lawyers took two steps to facilitate the opening of their new firm which
landed them in litigation. First, they arranged for a line of credit from a
bank, secured with the expected legal fees from eighty-eight cases on which
the associates were working and which they expected to take with them.
451. Id. at 1009; see also discussion infra at notes 452 - 455 and accompanying text.

452. For a brief history of lawyer solicitation and the rise of ethical prohibitions, see WOLFRAM,
supra note 3, at § 14.2.5.
453. See, e.g., Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association, 486 U.S. 466 (1988) (striking down Kentucky's
prohibition on direct mail solicitation of potential clients.)
454. See Florida Bar v. Went For It, 515 U.S. 618 (1995) (upholding Florida's rule prohibiting plaintiffs' lawyers from contacting accident victims by direct mail for thirty days after the accident). Wyoming's new rule 7.3 echoes the Florida requirement of a thirty-day waiting period. WYOMING RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.3(c) (LEXIS 1999).
455. See Johnson, SOLICITATION OF CLIENTS BY DEPARTING ATTORNEYS, supra note 412, at 73.
456. Adler. Barish. Daniels. Levin and Creskoffv. Epstein, et. al., 393 A.2d 1175, 1177 (Pa. 1978).
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Second, they embarked on a campaign to persuade Adler, Barish clients to
move to the new firm." Part of the campaign involved sending forms to
selected clients which the clients could use to discharge Adler, Barish as
their attorneys and select the associates' new firm.
When the firm learned of the associates' actions, it sought an injunction to prevent the now former associates from contacting firm clients. The
injunction was granted by the trial court, dissolved by the intermediate court
of appeals, and reinstated by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court; the Supreme
Court also held that the associates' conduct was actionable as intentional
interference with contract."'
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court analyzed the associates' contacts
with Adler, Barish clients under the Restatement's view of intentional interference with contract,' 5' the view which has been expressly adopted in
Wyoming.' There was no doubt, said the court, that there had been intentional interference with the firm's contracts with clients; the only question
was whether the interference was improper."' The court found that the form
the associates sent to clients inviting them to switch to the new firm improperly failed to indicate the existing firm's willingness to continue the
representation."- This omission improperly interfered with the clients' ability to make informed decisions about future representation. 3 It was, therefore, actionable as intentional interference with contract.
While the Adler, Barish court found the associates' conduct actionable
as intentional interference with contract, decisions imposing liability on
lawyers for such interference are rare." The more well-reasoned and recognized claim is for breach of fiduciary duty.
ii.

Breach of Fiduciary Duty

The breach of fiduciary duty has been raised as both an independent
cause of action, and a consideration relevant to claims for intentional interference with contract."' While the concept that a lawyer leaving a firm has
a fiduciary duty to the firm is widely accepted, there is "jurisprudential uncertainty"" as to the nature of the obligations a departing lawyer owes to
the former firm and the consequences of their breach in the context of law

457. Id.
458.
459.
460.
461.
462.
463.

Id.
Id.
at 1183.
First Wyoming Bank, Casper v. Mudge, 748 P.2d 713, 715 (Wyo. 1988).
Adler, Barish, 393 A.2d at 1183.
Id. at 1184.
Id.

464. Johnson, supra note 412, at 77.
465. Id. at 99.
466. Id.
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firm dissolutions, some activities by a departing lawyer may lead to civil
liability.
The New York Court of Appeals, New York's highest court, recently
addressed the question of whether a departing partner's solicitation of firm
clients was a breach of fiduciary duty."7 The answer was yes, under some

circumstances. The court began by reaffirming law partners' fiduciary obligations to each other." The court acknowledged that it was difficult to
draw "hard lines" to define the contours of a lawyer's fiduciary duty to his
or her partners, the court laid out some broad parameters. On the one hand,
the court found it to be perfectly permissible for a departing lawyer to locate
space and make "alternative affiliations," even confidentially, before leaving."- On the other hand, the court held that a partner breaches his or her

fiduciary duty to the partners by "[slecretly attempting to lure firm clients
(even those the partner has brought into the law firm and personally represented), . lying to clients about their rights with respect to the choice of
counsel, lying to partners about plans to leave and abandoning the firm on
The court also held that a
short notice (taking clients and files) .... ,,470

with respect to his future with the
partner's false statement of intentions
7
firm may be actionable fraud.41

The removal of client files by a departing lawyer implicates a departing
lawyer's fiduciary duty to the firm, and is bound to create problems unless
done by agreement of the attorneys and the client. Client files, of course,
belong to the client,'1 subject to the attorney's right to assert a lien.1n Nevertheless, the removal of client files without the consent of the firm
"474
"[a]ppears certain to be regarded as a breach of fiduciary duties ....

653 N.E.2d at 1179; see also Dowd and Dowd, Ltd. v. Gleason, 672
467. Graubard Mollen. et al,
App. 1995), modified, 693 N.E.2d 353 (I1. 1998) (denying summary judgment
N.E.2d 854, 862-63 (111.
to departing lawyers where law firm sued for breach of fiduciary duty where departing associates and
partner made substantial plans, including client solicitation, before leaving the firm).
468. GraubardMollen, etal 653 N.E.2d at 1182.
469. Id. at 1183.
470. Id. 1183-84; see also In re Silverberg, 438 N.Y.S.2d 143, 144 (N.Y.App.Div. 1981).
471. GraubardMollen,etal,653 N.E.2d at 1184.
472. See WYOMING RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16(d) (LEXIS 1999) (explaining that

at the termination of the attorney-client relationship the attorney shall "[s]urrender[] papers and property
to which the client is entitled .. ");and ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1376 (1977) ("The attomey must return all of the material supplied by the client to the attorney.
.He must also deliver the 'end product'....") Other authorities opine that the entire file belongs to the
client. See, e.g., Committee on Professional and Judicial Ethics of the State Bar of Mich., Op. CI-722
(1982).
473. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 29-1-102 (LEXIS 1999) (authorizing an attorney's lien on client papers.
The assertion of such a lien is not a breach of the attorney's fiduciary duty.) Morfeld v. Andrews, 579
P.2d 426, 433 (Wyo. 1978). An attorney may not, however, assert a lien against funds which represent
payments for child support because the money belongs to the child, and not to the parent who owes
money to the attorney. Sue Davidson, P.C. v. Naranjo, 904 P.2d 354, 357 (Wyo. 1995).
474. Johnson, supra note 414,at 109.
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While it is not possible to describe a lawyer's fiduciary duties with
precision, it is foolish to assume that the lack of clarity means there are
none, or that they will not support a lawsuit. There are, and they will. The
consistent basis for lawsuits based on breach of fiduciary duty is predeparture solicitation of firm clients.
c.

Pre or Post-Departure Solicitation

The timing of solicitation is important. Courts look more critically at
pre-departure solicitation than post-departure solicitation because they generally analyze solicitation under agency law as reflected in the Restatement.
As discussed above, an agent may not act contrary to the principle's interests during the term of the agency relationship. Once the agency relationship has ended, however, the former agent may compete with the former
principle, subject to certain limitations.
A former agent has a duty not to use or disclose confidential information, such as "[w]ritten lists of names," in post-departure competition.' 7'
The former agent is normally entitled, however, to use "the names of customers retained in his memory as the result of his work for the principal...
"476 Drawing a line between "written" and "memorized" lists seems nearly
impossible, and not particularly meaningful. Nevertheless, the Restatement's admonition that a departing agent may not take advantage of a confidential relationship has been adopted by the courts.
In the Adler, Barish opinion, for example, the court said the departing
associates were free to compete with their former firm "upon termination"
of their employment so long as they did not take advantage of the confidential relationship which was created during their employment.4 " The court
focused on the special relationship of trust that the associates had been able
to develop with firm clients because of their employment with the firm.
Two arguments support the contrary position that departing lawyers
should be allowed to solicit firm clients before departing:47' (1) clients have
a right to choose their lawyers; and (2) lawyers should have professional
autonomy to work where they wish, and with clients who wish to have
them. Some courts have relied on one or both of those reasons to permit
solicitation by departing lawyers.

475. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY § 396 (1958).

476. Id. cmt. b.
477. Adler, Barish, Daniels, Levin & Creskoffv. Epstein, 393 A.2d 1175, 1185 (Pa. 1978).
478. Mark W. Bennett, You Can Take itWith You: The Ethics of Lawyer Departure and Solicitation
of Firm Clients, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICs 395, 398 (1998).
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In Koeppel v. Schroeder,"' three partners in a New York law firm left
to form their own firm. Earlier, the firm's partners had entered into an
agreement governing the termination of a lawyer's association with the
firm; it provided that a departing partner could remove client files if the
clients had consented to the substitution of counsel. 80 After the three partners left, they sent letters to five hundred of the former firm's clients, advising them of the lawyers' departure and the formation of the new firm,
and enclosing a "consent to change attorney" form with a business reply
envelope." The lawyers' former firm sued, seeking, and receiving, inter
alia, a preliminary injunction prohibiting the departed lawyers from further
solicitation of firm clients. The Appellate Division reversed, finding that
the trial court had erred in issuing the injunction.!82 The court distinguished
the Adler, Barish decision, saying that it had involved "salaried associates
of the firm [who] had no agreement with the partners entitling them to seek
the clients' consent to substitute them for the firm.""' Since there was an
agreement in the case before the court, once the lawyers left, they become
competitors, and "[a] competitor who lawfully induces termination of a
contract terminable at will commits no ethical violation . . . . "' It seems
clear, however, that in the absence of an agreement which permitted a departing partner to remove client files with client consent, the lawyers' actions would have been legally impermissible.
Although the boundaries of legally permissible conduct are not clear,
avoiding liability, or even litigation, over client solicitation is simple. An
agreed upon notice of a lawyer's departure sent jointly by the departing
lawyer(s) and the remaining firm does not lead to litigation, liability, or
ethical problems. Such a notice also fulfills the lawyers' joint ethical and
legal obligations to their clients.
The Ethical Proprietyand Legality of No-Compete Agreements
No compete agreements are common in many professions. As a condition of employment, a person agrees not to compete with the employer for
a specified term in a specified area should the employee leave. While
common in some professions, such agreements are unethical for lawyers.
Rule 5.6 addresses "restrictions on [a lawyer's] right to practice." It
prohibits no-compete agreements, whether prospective or retrospective.
Paragraph (a) says that a lawyer "shall not participate in offering or making
a partnership or employment agreement that restricts the right of a lawyer to

479.
480.
481.
482.
483.
484.

Koeppel v. Schroder, 505 N.Y.S.2d 666 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986).
Id. at 667.
Id. at 667-68.
Id. at 668.
Id. at 669.
Id.
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practice after termination of the relationship, except an agreement concerning benefits upon retirement." The broad applicability of the rule is clear
from the language "shall not participatein offering or making." Whether
partner or associate, employer or employee, lawyers may not ethically have
any part in a no-compete agreement.
The commentary to Rule 5.6 addresses the reasons for the ban. A nocompete agreement limits lawyers' "professional autonomy [and] limits the
freedom of clients to choose a lawyer.""' While the former justification is
self-serving, at best, the latter may justify the prohibition.
While clearly unethical in nearly all states,' "[m]any firms have incorporated provisions in their partnership or employment agreements that are
designed to limit departing lawyers' ability or willingness to lure clients
from the firm." ' And while most courts find such agreements unenforceable as against public policy, courts in some jurisdictions have enforced
them, "leaving the question of the attorneys' ethics violations to disciplinary
authorities."'' ,
The Wyoming Supreme Court has not addressed the enforceability of
no-compete agreements among lawyers. It has, however, with respect to
other professionals. While such agreements are traditionally disfavored in
Wyoming as restraints on trade, they are enforceable under some conditions."' The Court has adopted the "rule of reason inquiry from the Restatement of Contracts.'
Accordingly, the party seeking to enforce an
agreement or covenant not to compete must show that the restriction "is
reasonable and has a fair relation to, and is necessary for, the business interests for which protection is sought.""
In Hopper v. All Pet Animal Clinic, Inc., the Wyoming Supreme Court
enforced a covenant not to compete in which a veterinarian had agreed not
to engage in small animal practice for three years within a five mile radius
of the Laramie City limits.496 The court concluded that "[a] well-crafted
covenant not to compete preserves a careful and necessary economic balance in our society... [and] preventing unfair competition from employees
who misuse trade secrets or special influence over customers serves public

485. WYOMING RULESOF PROFESSIONALCONDUCT Rule 5.6 cmt. [1] (LEXIS 1999).

486. No-compete agreements are ethical in Maine and California. ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on
Professional Conduct, LMPC 51:1207-08.
487. Id, at 51:1201; see also Christopher D. Goble, You Can't Take it With You: Enforcing Noncompetition Agreements Between Law Firms and Withdrawing Attorneys, 30 LAND & WATER L. REV. 179,
180 (1995).
488. ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct, LMPC 51:1201.
489. Hopper v. All Pet Animal Clinic, Inc., 861 P.2d 531, 539 (Wyo. 1993).

490. Id.
491. Id.
492. Id. at 536.
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policy."'1 In the final analysis, therefore, serving public policy is the key to
enforceability. One of those policy factors, present in Hopper, may be
missing in a typical no-compete agreement among lawyers. Its absence,
arguably, distinguishes lawyers.
The veterinarian in Hopper had agreed not to engage in the "practice of
small animal medicine" for three years within a five mile radius of the
Laramie corporate limits." This restriction did not prevent the veterinarian
from engaging in large animal medicine, and did not, therefore, prevent Dr.
Hopper from earning a living as a veterinarian without relocating."' While
it would be possible for an agreement among lawyers to specify practice
areas, the more common agreement will be not to engage in the practice of
law. The breadth of such an agreement may make it unenforceable.
Another factor in the Hopper case seems to favor enforcing nocompete agreements among lawyers. The court noted that the covenant at
issue did not harm the public. Dr. Hopper's services, said the court, were
"neither unique nor uncommon," and were available elsewhere in
Laramie."' Lawyers are much more common than veterinarians. Accordingly, it is hard to make a compelling case that a lawyer's services are
unique, and lawyers are certainly not uncommon.
It is difficult to distinguish lawyers from other professions, and the
ethical prohibition on lawyers' no-compete agreements has often been criticized.1'9 Nevertheless, two considerations suggest that such agreements will
not be enforced. First, the Wyoming Supreme Court has relied on lawyers'
ethical standards in determining how lawyers should behave.4"1 The clear
prohibition in Rule 5.6(a) will likely carry signific'ant weight with the court.
Second, the great weight of authority around the country is that such agreements are both unethical and legally unenforceable. 4" Entering into an
agreement which is clearly unethical and probably unenforceable is foolish
at best.

493. Id. at 548.
494. Id. at 536.
495. Id. at 543.
496. Id. at 544.
497. See, e.g., C.D. Goble, supra note 487, at 181.
498. See. e.g., Carlson v. Langdon, 751 P.2d 344 (Wyo. 1988) (relying on Wyoming Rule of Professional Conduct 1.9 to determine whether to disqualify a lawyer).
499. ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct, LMPC 51:1201.
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Paragraph (b) of Rule 5.6 contains another restriction on lawyers'
practice. A lawyer may not ethically agree to restrict his or her practice as
'
part of a settlement agreement "between private parties. ""
A lawyer may
not, therefore, settle a client's case if part of the agreement is an agreement
that the lawyer will not engage in certain practices, such as an agreement by
a lawyer not to represent other plaintiffs against the same defendant10'
Summary
Switching firms creates a host of ethical and legal conflict of interest
issues. Many of them can be avoided if the departing lawyer and the remaining lawyers in the firm work cooperatively to notify clients and fulfill
their joint obligations to their joint clients. Unfortunately, the dissolution of
a firm almost inevitably engenders sufficient acrimony that it is difficult, at
best, for the lawyers involved to work together to properly discharge their
duties to their clients and each other.
While acrimony is common when a lawyer leaves a firm, the ethical
and legal stakes are so high that the lawyers need to put aside their differences and cooperate. If they cannot, lawyers should be the first, not the last,
to recognize the need to involve counsel to assist in the ethically and legally
proper dissolution of the firm.
VIII.

SUPPORT STAFF CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

Lawyers commonly employ, either permanently or temporarily, a support staff of secretaries, investigators, law student interns, and/or paraprofessionals. The employing lawyer is responsible, both legally and ethically,
for the conduct of those employees, including their conflicts of interest.
Lawyers' ethical codes have long contained express provisions regulating lawyers' conflicts of interest.-° While they do not directly address
support staff conflicts of interest, lawyers need to be as concerned about
such conflicts as they are about their own. The reason is that support staff
conflicts threaten clients' expectations of loyalty and confidentiality as
much as do lawyers' conflicts. Accordingly, support staff conflicts of interest may lead to the same consequences: grievances (against the lawyer),
disqualification (of the lawyer), and/or a malpractice action (against the
lawyer).

500. Id. cmt. [2]. The ABA's Model Rules now provide an exception. ABA Model Rule 1.17,
adopted in 1990, allows a no-compete agreement as part of the sale of a law practice. ABA
COMPENDIUM OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY RULES AND STANDARDS 58 n. 8 (1997). See also
ABA MODEL RULES Rule 5.6 cmt. [3]. The Wyoming Rules, which were adopted in 1986, have not
been amended to include Rule 1.17, or any similar provision.
501. ABAIBNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct, LMPC 51:1201.

502. See, e.g., WYOMING RULESOF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rules 1.7 - 1.10 (LEXIS 1999).
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Not surprisingly, support staff conflicts of interest, whether professional or personal, represent a growing area of concern for lawyers and clients. While some of the standards which apply to support staff conflicts are
the same as the standards which apply to lawyers, there are, at least arguably, important differences.
Attorneys' Ethical Responsibilitiesfor Non-lawyer Employees
An attorney's ethical responsibility regarding non-lawyer employees
varies with the attorney's status in a firm. A partner or supervisory lawyer
(or sole practitioner) has a general responsibility to ensure that the firm
makes "reasonable efforts to ensure" that the conduct of any nonlawyer
employee "is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer.""'
An associate does not have that general obligation, but an associate who has
"direct supervisory authority" over a nonlawyer employee must make "reasonable efforts" to ensure that the employee's conduct is "compatible with
the lawyer's professional obligations."' The failure to satisfy these standards is, of course, a violation of the Rules which may lead to a sanction.
In addition to sanctions for improper supervision, lawyers may, under
certain circumstances, be held responsible for employees' misconduct. A
lawyer "shall be responsible" for any conduct of [an] employee which
would be a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct if engaged in by a
lawyer if the lawyer "orders or ...

ratifies" the employee's improper con-

duct, or if the lawyer is a partner in the firm or has direct supervisory
authority over the employee and "knows of the conduct at a time when its
consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial action." 0'
One of the ways a lawyer may discharge the supervisory obligation is
through proper employee training. A lawyer who is responsible for the actions of employees "should give such assistants appropriate instructions and
supervision concerning the ethical aspects of their employment . .

.

"

That training should, at a minimum, include a discussion of the obligations
of confidentiality and loyalty to clients.3 ° Both of those concepts, of course,
include avoiding personal or professional conflicts of interest.
Support Staff Conflicts ofInterest
Support staff conflicts of interest arise under the same circumstances as

503. Id. Rule 5.3(a).
504. Id. Rule 5.3(b).

505. Id.
506. Id. Rule 5.3 cmt.
507. The lawyer should document the training to show that the supervisory obligation has been properly discharged.
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lawyer conflicts of interest. Some arise concurrently; others arise successively.
1. Concurrent Conflicts.
A concurrent conflict arises when two or more clients have differing
interests, or when the interests of a client and an employee are divergent.
The interest may be professional or personal.
The Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory Committee recently addressed the
conflict which arose when a law firm represented a criminal defendant and
an investigator employed by the firm was a potential witness for the prosecution in the same matter."' The committee said that the firm's representation of the client would be materially limited by the employing lawyer's
having to impeach the firm's employee. Accordingly, Utah Rule 1.7 (which
is identical to Wyoming's Rule 1.7) precluded the firm from the representation because of the material limitation created by the investigator's conflict
of interest.-s Similarly, the Illinois State Bar Association has issued an advisory opinion saying that it is improper for assistant public defenders who
share an office to represent joint defendants when they also share secretarial
and investigatory staff."'
Impermissible conflicts may also arise in civil cases. For example, it is
improper for a lawyer to sue a government agency when one of the lawyer's
part-time employees is a member of the board that governs the agency."'
The rule which emerges is simple. Support staff concurrent conflicts
are essentially the same as lawyer conflicts. A firm's conflict checking
should, therefore, include every employee of the firm, not just the lawyers.
2.

Successive Conflicts

Perhaps the most easily overlooked support staff conflicts result from
previous employment. Just as a lawyer who switches firms may disqualify
the new firm from representation because of the lawyer's previous association, an employee who switches firms may cause the same result.
When a lawyer switches firms, the new firm may not continue to represent a client if: (1)the lawyer's previous firm represented a client in a mat508. Utah State Bar, Ethics Advisory Opinion No. 145 (1994).
509. Id.

510. Illinois State Bar Advisory Opinion on Professional Conduct, Opinion No. 91-17. There may
also be an impermissible conflict whenever two members of a public defender's office represent codefendants in a criminal case. Compare Okeani v. Arizona, 871 P.2d 727, 729 (Ariz. App. 1994) (hold-

ing that Maricopa County Public Defender's office is a firm for purposes of conflicts of interest); and
1987) (holding that public defender's offices are unlike
People v. Banks, 520 N.E.2d 617, 620-21 (111.
private law firms for purposes of conflicts of interest).
511.

Illinois State Bar Association, Advisory Opinion No. 95-09
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ter which is substantially related; (2) the interests of the former firm's client
and the new firm's client are materially adverse; and (3) the lawyer switching firms obtained confidential information material to the representation." 2
The conflict may be waived by the former client unless the former client is a
governmental entity."' When it comes to support staff employees, however,
some authorities impose a less rigid rule.
The American Bar Association's Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility has addressed the disqualification of a firm because of
According to the ABA, a law firm
a nonlawyer who switches firms.'
formerly
worked for another firm, and
who
employs
a
nonlawyer
which
who has confidential information about a former client whose interests are
adverse to a client of the new firm's, may continue representing a client
whose interests conflict with the interests of a client of the former firm, as
long as: (1) the new firm screens the nonlawyer from participating in matters involving those clients; and (2) the nonlawyer does not disclose any
information about those clients to the new firm. A number of courts have
applied a similar standard.
In Kapco v. C & 0 Enterprises, Inc.,' a two-attorney firm (the old
firm) moved to disqualify a law firm (the new firm) which represented a
party with opposing interests and which had hired the old firm's secretary.
The court denied the motion because the new firm had been able to show
"clearly and effectively" that the secretary had not shared confidential information."6 The Kapco court's analysis illustrates both the similarities and
differences between how lawyers and non-lawyers are treated.
The first step is identical. Is there a "substantial relationship" between
matters at the old firm and matters at the new firm? If so, there is a presumption that the nonlawyer employee (or lawyer) had access to confidential information. The second step is also the same. Has that presumption of
access to information been rebutted? The standard now changes. For lawyers, the failure to rebut that presumption results in disqualification of the
new firm, unless the client consents.5 17 For nonlawyer employees, however,
the failure to rebut the presumption simply results in a second presumption,
512. WYOMING RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9(b) (LEXIS 1999); see also discussion at
supra notes 434 - 439 and accompanying text.
513. Id. Rule 1.9(a). A former client's waiver of a conflict is not effective unless made "after consultation." Id.; see also Id. cmt. [101.
514. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1526 (1988) (discussing
imputed disqualification arising from a nonlawyer's employment change).
1985).
515. 637 F. Supp. 1231 (N.D. Ill.
516. Id. at 1238-39; see also Makita Corp. v. United States, 819 F. Supp. 1099, 1104 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1993); Grant v. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals, 888 S.W.2d 466 (Tex. 1994), and Phoenix Founders,
Inc., v. Marshall, 887 S.W.2d 831 (Tex. 1994).
517. WYOMING RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9(b) cmt. [9] (LEXIS 1999). The new
firm is disqualified "when the lawyer involved has actual knowledge" of confidential information. Id.;
see also supra notes 434 - 439 and accompanying discussion.
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the employee has shared or will share confidential information with the new
firm. Even that presumption may be rebutted. The rebuttal must, however,
be made "clearly and effectively." If that can be done, the new firm may
continue the representation, even though the new employee has confidential
information about clients of the old firm.
The difference in the standards is based on two intriguing, often unspoken, assumptions. First, that a lawyer who has confidential information
acquired during former employment will not maintain that confidentiality;
the risk that he or she will pass on the information to the new firm is so
great that the only solution is disqualification. Second, a nonlawyer employee who has confidential information from former employment will preserve client confidences. The assumption that non-professionals, who are
usually not subject to codes of ethics (paralegals generally are"'), are more
trustworthy and that client confidences are secure despite a change of employment, seems unwarranted. For as one court has noted, "a nonlawyer
would be more likely to reveal confidential information because he or she
might not be as sensitive to the need to safeguard the information as would
be an attorney."5 9'
In an unsatisfactory attempt to explain the disparate treatment of lawyers and nonlawyers, the ABA says there are "additional considerations"
which suggest that nonlawyers should be treated differently than lawyers.
Those considerations are: (1) nonlawyer employees should have "as much
mobility in employment opportunity as possible consistent with the protection of clients' interests; 5'' ° and (2) Rule 5.3 imposes supervisory obligations on the lawyers; these obligations include appropriate admonitions to
nonlawyer employees which will help protect clients' expectations. It is
unclear, however, why such considerations do not apply with equal force to
lawyers. Neither of the ABA's proffered reasons satisfactorily explains
why clients' confidences are safe when a nonlawyer employee switches
firms.

The ABA's opinion has important limits. There are two circumstances
where a nonlawyer's former employment should result in disqualification of
the new firm: (1) information from the employee has been disclosed to the
lawyers in the new firm; and/or (2) screening of the new employee would be
ineffective. The ABA does not elaborate on the latter point, but it seems
that screening will, necessarily, be less effective in a small firm where the

518. See NATIONAL FEDERATION OF PARALEGAL ASSOCIATIONS MODEL CODE OF ETHICS AND

PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 8 (stating that a paralegal shall avoid conflicts of interest... );
and NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF LEGAL ASSISTANTS Canon 9 (stating that a legal assistant's conduct is
guided by bar associations' codes of professional responsibility... ).
519. Cordy v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 156 F.R.D. 575, 584 (D.N.J. 1994).
520. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1526 (1988).
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employee will have access and be expected to work on all the firm's files.'
Not all courts agree with the ABA's relaxed rule for support staff. In
Williams v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,- for example, the court refused to
apply a different standard to nonlawyers. The only way to protect clients'
expectations of privacy and to preserve public trust in the administration of
justice, said the court, is to "subject.. . 'agents' of lawyers to the same disability lawyers have when they leave legal employment with confidential
information."Similarly, the Nevada Supreme Court has expressly rejected the ABA's opinion. 2'
Ingrid Decker was a legal secretary.' Early in 1995, she went to work
for Thorndal, Backus, Armstron & Balkenbush, a law firm which represented the Ciaffones in a wrongful death case against Skyline Restaurant.
Although she worked for the firm for several months, she was only tangentially involved in the Ciaffone matter. In September of the same year, Ms.
Decker became a legal secretary for Gullock, Koning, Markley & Killebrew, the firm which represented Skyline in the case involving Ciaffone.
Although the new firm "screened" Decker from the Ciaffone matter, the
Thomdal firm, her former employer, moved to disqualify Decker's new
employer because Decker had switched employment. The motion was
granted and the firm appealed.
The Nevada Supreme Court concluded that nonlawyer employees who
switch firms "are subject to the same rules governing imputed disqualification" as are lawyers. 2' Accordingly, screening of nonlawyer personnel is
not ethically sufficient. The reason is simple, "[t]o hold otherwise would
grant less protection to the confidential and privileged information obtained
by a nonlawyer than that obtained by a lawyer."1 7 Such a result would be
contrary to a client's reasonable expectations of confidentiality and the Nevada rules.
The Nevada rule regarding a lawyer's responsibilities for nonlawyer
employees is the same as Wyoming's. A supervisory lawyer or a sole practitioner "shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect
measures giving reasonable assurance that the person's conduct is compati-

52 1. When it comes to lawyers' access to client information, the Wyoming Rules suggest a functional
test because access to information is "essentially a question of fact."
WYOMING RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9 cmt. [7] (LEXIS 1999). Lawyers in small firms may have "general

access to files of all clients," whereas lawyers in a large firm may have access only to a "limited number
of clients-" Id. Such a test, it seems, should apply with equal force to nonlawyer employees.
522. 588 F. Supp. 1037 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
523. Id. at 1044.
524. Ciaffone v. Eighth Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada, 945 P.2d 950 (Nev. 1997).
525 Id. at951.

526. Id. at 952.
527 Id.
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ble with the professional obligations of the lawyer. ' ' 2' That rule, said the
court, means that lawyers and nonlawyers should be subject to the same
standards for disqualification. "'
The approach of the Nevada Supreme Court is far better than the
ABA's because it promotes the confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship, a relationship which the Nevada Supreme Court accurately described as "sacrosanct." '" It cannot be protected unless the same standards
apply to lawyers and nonlawyers. Accordingly, when faced with a motion
to disqualify a law firm because a lawyer or nonlawyer has switched sides, a
trial court has a "duty" to disqualify if necessary to protect the confidentiality of that relationship.53'
Lawyers' Responsibilities When HiringNon-lawyer Employee
As usual, there is no Wyoming authority on point. The safer approach
is, naturally, to apply the standard articulated in the Williams case; nonlawyer employee conflicts of interest should be treatedjust as lawyer conflicts
are. Since there is substantial authority for a different standard, Wyoming
lawyers should, at a minimum, follow the employer guidelines established
by the ABA.
Rule 5.3, discussed above, makes lawyers responsible for certain conduct of nonlawyer employees. That supervisory responsibility imposes duties on both the lawyer who hires a nonlawyer employee from another law
firm and the former employer.Upon learning that a former employee has become employed by another law firm, the former employer should "consider advising the employing firm that the [employee] must be isolated from participating in [any]
matter" in which clients of the former firm are involved as adverse parties. " '
If the former employer is not satisfied that the new firm has taken adequate
measures to prevent the employee from participating in or disclosing information about the former firm's clients, the lawyer should consider filing a
motion to disqualify the new firm from representation in any adverse matters. Lawyers should note that their obligation to protect their clients' reasonable expectations of confidentiality seems to require that they take appropriate steps when an employee leaves the firm, not simply that they
''consider" doing so.

528. Id. (quoting Nevada SCR 187, which is identical to Wyoming Rule of Professional Conduct
5.3(b)).

529. Id.
530. Id. at 952.
531. Id.
532. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 88-1526 (1988)("Imputed
Disqualification Arising from Change in Employment by Nonlawyer").
533. Id.at 3.
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The new employer also has obligations.'- He or she should: (1) admonish a new employee to be alert for any legal matters in which the new
employee may have been involved in former employment; and (2) if such a
matter arises, the new employee "should be cautioned" not to disclose any
information gained while with the former employer, and not to work on any
matter in which he or she was previously involved.
If a motion to disqualify the new firm comes before the court, the new
firm will have to be able to prove what steps it took to fulfill its obligations.
The ultimate question will be how it "clearly and effectively" prevented the
dissemination of information from the new employee. In a typical Wyoming firm, that may be impossible. If the firm secretary has access to all
files, and works on all cases in the firm, it will be difficult to show that he or
she has been effectively screened from the case at issue. Even if the new
firm is able to show that it discharged its obligations in accord with the
ABA's guidelines (and cases such as Katco), a Wyoming court may choose
to adopt the view expressed in the Williams case. That is, the only way to
protect former clients' reasonable expectation of confidentiality is to hold
nonlawyers to the same standards that apply to lawyers who leave employment with confidential information.'
Imputed Disqualification
A theme which emerges from support staff conflict of interest opinions
is that the imputed disqualification rules- apply to support staff, not just to
attorneys. The safer approach, therefore, is for lawyers to assume that the
same personal or professional circumstances which would give rise to a
conflict of interest for an attorney will create a conflict of interest (for the
lawyer or law firm) when a nonlawyer employee is involved.
Every law firm should take the following three steps to avoid support
staff conflicts of interest which may be imputed to the firm. First, the firm's
conflict system should be broadened to include all the firm's employees, not
just the lawyers. Second, when the firm hires a nonlawyer employee or a
lawyer, even temporarily, it should perform a conflicts check, regardless of
whether the new employee has worked for another firm (there may be some
other personal or professional conflicts). Third, the firm should develop a
training program to inform support staff personnel about conflicts of interest.537

534. Id.
535. 588 F. Supp. at 1044.
536. See WYOMING RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10 (LEXIS 1999).

537. A partner in a law firm, a solo practitioner, or a supervisor in an organizational setting, such as a
government law office, must "make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures
giving reasonable assurance that the [nonlawyer's] conduct is compatible with the professional obliga-
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IX. CONCLUSION

Potential conflicts of interest and actual conflicts are inevitable. The
only way to avoid them altogether is to stop practicing. Fortunately,
avoiding conflicts is neither ethically nor legally required. Instead, lawyers
must detect potential and actual conflicts, and then respond properly. Detecting conflicts depends on creating and maintaining a conflicts database.
After a conflict is detected, the proper response contains several possible
steps. First, the conflict must be evaluated and classified. Second, if the
conflict is de minimus, it need not be disclosed (though the lawyer may wish
to) and representation may continue. Third, if the conflict cannot be
waived, i.e., a disinterested lawyer would find waiver to be inappropriate,
the lawyer must not accept the client or must withdraw from representation.
Fourth, if the conflict may be waived, it must be disclosed to the affected

party or parties, and their consent may be sought after consultation about the
consequences and potential consequences of the conflict and waiving the
conflict. Finally, while disclosure and waiver are not required to be in
writing unless the conflict involves a business transaction, they should be.

Anything which threatens a client's reasonable expectations of loyalty
and confidentiality is a potential conflict, if not an actual one. The circumstances which may give rise to a conflict are, therefore, limitless. And
while this article cannot begin to describe all of the myriad of conflicts

which lawyers may confront, the general principles for detecting, evaluating, and responding to conflicts apply, regardless of the circumstances.

tions
of the lawyer." WYOMING RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 5.2(a) (LEXIS 1999). Those

measures should include "appropriate instruction and supervision concerning the ethical aspects" of the
nonlawyers' employment. Id. cmt. [1].
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